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CHAPTER I

POWER AND AUTHORITY IN COLLEGE ATHLETICS

Introduction.
Who controls "big time" college athletics?

How is that

control executed? Has control changed over time? Why do various
interest groups participate in intercollegiate athletics? These
questions are not simple, but they can be approached through an
analysis of the exercise of power and authority in the governance
of intercollegiate athletics.
Media reports, from newspaper sports pages to extensive
television coverage, respond to an intense public interest in
intercollegiate athletics and often reveal substantial problems
in the conduct of college athletics. The problems include
unethical practices by some parties involved in the athletic
governance process who compromise academic integrity for
commercial interests. "The observer is confronted, on the one
hand, with lofty ideals and, on the other, by rumors and even
well-authenticated statements of questionable practices,
deception, and hypocrisy which ... multiply."

(Savage et al.,

1929, p. 32) Savage's early observation is echoed today by the
Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics (1993, p. I) in
its concern "that athletics abuses threaten the very integrity of
higher education." Lucas and Smith (1978) noted turn-of-the•century unethical practices that included recruiting,
compensating, and playing ineligible athletes, such as post
graduates, in collegiate athletic contests. Recent documented

unethical practices demonstrate that athletic constituents have
continued these practices by supplying illegal inducements to
prospective athletes, providing improper benefits to athletes,
and using ineligible athletes.

(33 Institutions. 1994, p. A43)

From recruiting scandals, to eligibility questions, to overcommercialization, the accounts of the persistent abuses that
accompany the reports on intercollegiate athletics demonstrate
that these "myriad problems" have been going on for a long time.
(ACE, 1979) By the mid-1980s, 92% of college presidents felt
there were major problems in the governance of college athletics.
(Gilley et al., 1986) A 1989 Harris Poll indicated that 80% of
the general public surveyed thought college athletics were out of
control and corrupted by big money; yet contest attendance, media
attention, and advertising dollars have all steadily increased
since public interest has continued to grow.

(Knight Commission,

1993, p. II) A significant component of American society,
athletics has become a $100 billion industry annually.

(Andre &

James, 1991) Due to their importance in our society, the
perpetual problems in the operation of intercollegiate athletics
merit attention. In investigating intercollegiate athletics, an
examination of the roles and actions of the constituents
participating in this enterprise is an initial step to
understanding the use of power and authority in athletic
governance.
Who are the constituents involved in the governance of
intercollegiate athletics? Constituents, both on campus and off,
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include governing boards, presidents, athletic directors,
coaches, faculty, students, conferences, alumni, boosters,
business leaders, the National Collegiate Athletic Association,
the media, and the general public. How do each of these
constituents participate in, influence, or even control the
governance of athletics to varying degrees at different
institutions?
The control of intercollegiate athletics can be executed
through regular channels of authority in the governance
structure. However, the presence of continual problems in
intercollegiate athletics suggests that constituents outside the
hierarchy of authority utilize power in the governance process.
The execution of specific constituent control is revealed through
examining their use of power and authority in the athletic
governance process.
Examining the methods of the constituents' use of power and
authority can suggest possible motives for their participation in
the governance of intercollegiate athletics. What motivates
constituent participation? An examination of the needs leading to
the decision-making process employed by constituents in the
governance of intercollegiate athletics will provide insights
into the continued systemic dysfunctioning of athletic
governance.
What has led to the consistent problems over time? An
explanation of the systemic dysfunction begins with an
examination of the constituents participating in the governance

of athletics. An analysis of constituents' methods of
participation, their execution of control through their role in
the authority hierarchy and in the use of power that leads to the
persistent problems, provides further insights into the breakdown
in governance. Finally, an explanation of the apparent needs of
the various constituent groups that motivate their decision
making and lead them to participation, or even positions of
control within intercollegiate athletics governance will reveal
the basis for the systemic dysfunctions in the governance of
intercollegiate athletics.
Problem Statement
The intent of this study is to explore constituent
utilization of power and authority over time that led to systemic
dysfunctions in the governance of big time intercollegiate
athletics, and to develop a model to examine the needs motivating
the interested constituents, thus suggesting alternatives for
reform.
Persistent problems in the operation of intercollegiate
athletics support the need for continued examination of this
controversial area of American higher education. In this study, I
will analyze constituents' use of legitimate authority in the
structure of intercollegiate athletic governance, and their use
of power, both legitimate and illegitimate, in the process of
governance in intercollegiate athletics. I will explain the needs
motivating, and decision-making process employed by, constituents
in intercollegiate athletic governance. I will describe the

systemic dysfunctions over time and recommend specific avenues
for reform in the governance of intercollegiate athletics.
Research Questions
1. Who are the constituents using authority and power in the
governance of intercollegiate athletics:
a. in 1929?
b. currently?
2. How do the constituents employ power and authority in the
governance of intercollegiate athletics:
a. in 1929?
b. currently?
3. What are the needs that appear to motivate the
constituent's involvement in the governance of
intercollegiate athletics:
a. in 1929?
b. currently?
4. How is the current governance of intercollegiate
athletics similar to, or different from, that of 1929?
5. What recommendations emerge from this analysis that would
reform the intensifying breakdown in the governance of
intercollegiate athletics?
Purpose of Study
Why is this study necessary? Through an examination of the
use of power and authority by various constituents in the
governance of athletics, athletic reformers can recognize the
vulnerable elements that exist in the current system and can

identify the areas in the structure and process of
intercollegiate athletic governance that need reform. By viewing
the systemic breakdown in governance, administrators seeking
substantive reforms can identify significant areas in which to
formulate policies and implement practices that will intensify
effectual reform efforts. Constituents can examine their needs
and clarify their roles in the governance of intercollegiate
athletics. The participation of a variety of athletic governance
constituents in reform efforts is critical to success, yet can
only be clearly defined if their needs and roles are mutually
understood.
Reformers must ultimately understand the needs and roles of
the constituents and their use of power and authority in the
governance of intercollegiate athletics in order to devise
feasible governance alternatives. Only through understanding the
players, problems, and process of athletic governance, can
reformers have a genuine and lasting impact upon changes in the
operation of intercollegiate athletics.
Definitions of Terms
In this study, specific definitions for certain terms must
be delineated in order to maintain accuracy. Intercollegiate
athletics involve not only the competition between athletes
representing individual university athletic programs, but also
the complex governance relationships of those individual athletic
programs. Athletics are an on-campus activity as well as an
inter-institutional system of competitive sports, and a social

institution including people, practices, policies, and events in
complex relationships.

(Sage, 1990) Big time athletic programs

are generally housed within elite major research "multiversities"
where, according to Kerr (1982), a series of related communities
are held together. These elite big time institutions boast
celebrated athletic programs competing in many sports, but
emphasizing revenue-producing sports like football and
basketball, which are operated in a conspicuous business-like
manner and display prominent commercial values.

(Savage, 1929;

Gilley et al., 1986)
All big time athletic programs are members of the National
Collegiate Athletic Association Division I-A. The National
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) is the major national
inter-institutional regulatory body that governs intercollegiate
athletics. It is comprised of presidential delegates representing
member schools, and administered by its own extensive executive
and administrative staff. In general, the institutional members
of the NCAA often recommend rules and regulations through a small
group of presidents elected to the Presidents' Commission and
then enact the proposed rules legislation through the votes of
institutional delegates, the faculty athletic representatives.
(Yaeger, 1991)
Rule compliance is the responsibility of the individual
institutions, although an enforcement system has been implemented
by the NCAA executive staff. The NCAA promotes the collective
political and economic interests of intercollegiate athletics,
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above the interests of individual member institutions. While all
big time athletic programs are members of Division I-A--the
highest level of intercollegiate athletic competition as
designated by the NCAA--not all Division I-A universities have
elite big time athletic programs. The focus of this study is the
operation of these elite athletic programs. Over 100 Division I-A
programs are included in the category of big time. The NCAA also
includes other levels of competition. The majority of its 850plus member institutions are less commercially-driven and more
educationally-oriented.

(Knight Commission, 1993)

At the core of this study of elite athletic institutions is
the governance of intercollegiate athletics. Governance occurs
when operating policies are established or changed, whereas
administration involves making decisions on the basis of
policies.

(Westmeyer, 1990) In this study, governance in

intercollegiate athletics includes the formation of policy and
its administration both on-campus and inter-institutionally.
Governance is executed through a variety of structures and
processes. The governance structures of intercollegiate athletics
include the hierarchy of constituent authority and prescribed
procedures for policy formation and execution.
The governance of athletics involves the complex
relationship of a variety of constituencies both within and
outside of the university structure. Therefore, intercollegiate
athletic governance structure is not wholly housed within the
campus boundaries. For example, the NCAA and conferences are
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component constituents of the inter-institutional governance
structure. In addition, the process of intercollegiate athletic
governance involves a complex network of constituents and special
interest groups outside the university. Conflicting interests
between these groups--both within and outside of the formal
governance hierarchy--results in the struggle for control of big
time intercollegiate athletics. For purposes of this study,
control is the direct involvement of constituents in the
operation of intercollegiate athletics, wherein they direct
actions in both governance and administration.

(Chu et a l ., 1985)

Certain constituents control athletics through the use of
legitimate power and accepted lines of authority within the
university governance structure. Other constituents use
illegitimate power, outside the lines of institutional authority,
in the process of governance, in order to gain control. The
constituents involved in athletic governance on-campus include
the governing board, the president, the athletic director, the
coach, and, to a lesser degree, the faculty and students. The
constituents involved in inter-institutional athletic governance
include the NCAA, conferences, and the government. Additional
external constituents involved in the governance process include
the alumni, boosters, business leaders, and the media.
A hierarchy of authority is inherent in the governance
structure and should be clearly delineated. Constituent authority
is supported by the use of legitimate power within the hierarchy.
If the authority hierarchy is not adhered to, gaps are created,
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and illegitimate power is used by constituents to fill in the
gaps in the hierarchy. The use of power and authority, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, is reciprocal in relationships
between constituents.

(Burbules, 1986) According to Wolf (1990),

constituents can use three types of power: interpersonal,
tactical, and structural, which will be explained in detail
later.
What needs motivate constituents to use power and authority
in the governance of intercollegiate athletics? Needs are drives
that motivate behavior. They can be tangible or intangible
factors. According to Maslow (1970), needs are hierarchical,
where basic needs such as security and safety serve as the
foundation upon which higher level needs such as autonomy are
built. Self-preservation will be presented in this study as an
underlying deficiency need of individual constituents, that is,
it takes precedence over other needs.

(Maslow, 1970) For purposes

of this study, self-preservation is the drive by individuals or
groups in athletic governance to preserve their current status.
The needs of various constituents, which result in their use of
power and authority, will be determined by an analysis of the
policies, practices, and circumstances of those constituents in
the governance of intercollegiate athletics.
Constituent needs that spur the exercise of power and
authority ultimately initiate dysfunction in the governance of
intercollegiate athletics. In this study, a systemic dysfunction
exists when the process of athletic governance is incongruent
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with the prescribed structure of governance in intercollegiate
athletics. These systemic dysfunctions are created when, within
the governance structure, breaches in authority are generated by
constituents who either exceed or neglect their prescribed role,
which results in constituent use of power to fill these authority
gaps in the process of athletic governance.
Limitations
This study examines, over time, the needs of constituents
and their use of power and authority in order to analyze a
systemic dysfunction in the governance of intercollegiate
athletics, thus suggesting alternatives for reform. Limitations
of this study include the individual and collective limitations
of previous research that are employed in this analysis. Details
of the methods used in the previous works used for the data in
this study are available only to the degree that they are
revealed within the original sources. Therefore, the data are
limited in this study. For example, the case studies and survey
research conducted as an integral part of some of the reports are
limited in scope and by the reliability and validity of their
methods.
Defining and using social concepts have inherent biases in
perspectives. This study is reliant upon the work of a variety of
other researchers, each having provided an essential component,
concept, or theory that may in itself be biased, thus limiting
this current application. However, many of the most accepted and
respected authorities in their fields have provided the

foundation for this study. The impact of the work of the vast
array of prominent researchers--from Maslow to Wolf, Baldridge,
Savage, Kerr, Frey, Sage, and many others--upon this study are
discussed in Chapter II.
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Introduction.
"We have managed, in the United States, to hide the
structures of power relations beneath more layers of subtlety and
complexity, in schools and throughout society."

(Burbules, 1986,

p. ill) In this study, I intend to remove the shroud confounding
the governance of intercollegiate athletics. Constituents use
power and authority to pursue their aims in the governance of
intercollegiate athletics. These power and authority
relationships are shaped by the needs of various constituents.
Within the system of governance in higher education, athletics is
the arena in which power and authority relationships are studied.
Therefore, an examination of each of these components is
essential. The works of researchers from a variety of disciplines
are indispensable ingredients in the current study. As Wolf
(1990, p. 588) stated, "We can use the work of our predecessors
to raise new questions." This review of related literature is
organized as follows to present the essential components upon
which this study was constructed: power and authority, needs,
governance, and athletics.
Power and Authority
Power is a social concept presented through a variety of
biases by those attempting to explain it. (Burbules, 1986)
Theorists in social psychology, sociology, political science, and

philosophy each bring unique perspective to the study of power
and authority, a subject of concern to "... social study in all
its fields and forms." (Crespi, 1992, p. vii) Traditional views
of power concerned themselves with the forms it takes and the
definitions of the associated terms rather than with defining
power itself.

(Burbules, 1986) Some of these terms surrounding

power include rights, force, violence, coercive circumstance,
obligations, constraints, commands, exploitation, liberty,
manipulation, autonomy, sanction, incentive, enticement, freedom,
control, influence, reward, expertise, and authority.
(Airaksinen, 1988; Henderson, 1981; Shaver, 1981; Pennock &
Chapman, 1972; Oppenheim, 1961) While each of these terms is an
important concept, Henderson (1981, p. 11, 12) noted that the
"diverse terminology used in attempts to explicate ... power" can
create problems in the organization and structure of
conceptualizations regarding power. Many theorists have also
presented typologies of concepts related to power. Examples noted
by Burbules (1986) were: Nyberg's Force, Finance, Fiction, and
Fealty; Galbraith's Condign (punishment), Compensatory (reward),
and Conditioned (persuasive or manipulative); and Wrong's Force,
Manipulation, Persuasion, and Authority. The concentration on
defining the concepts and nature of power through typologies have
been restrictive.

(Burbules, 1986)

Burbules (1986, p. 96) stated that "...traditional theories
of power have assumed that power is a property of individual
persons, wielded instrumentally as a means to particular intended

outcomes." Rather, he argued that power is reciprocal in social
relations, that the "efficacy of power as a conservative system"
can either direct outcomes or preserve the status quo, and that
power is inherent in some relationships.

(Burbules, 1986, p. 96)

Power occurs in social relations and as such is a reciprocal,
"dynamic and interactive" relationship.

(Oppenhiem, 1961;

Henderson, 1981, p. 33) Burbules (1986, p. 96, 97) illustrated
the concept of reciprocity: "X has power over Y and ... Y
empowers X." Giddens (1979, p. 93) stated that power is "always
two-way, even if the power of one actor or party in a social
relationship is minimal compared to another." He described power
interactions as relations of autonomy and dependence.

(Giddens,

1979) Power is also "conflict oriented", that is it begins with
and is the consequence of underlying conflicts of interest.
(Airaksinen, 1988, p. 8; Burbules, 1986; Henderson, 1981) Actors
in power relationships "suppress, disguise, preserve, or deny"
these conflicts of interest in order to obtain a desired outcome
or preserve the current state.

(Burbules, 1986, p. 98) Burbules

(1986, p. Ill) stated that "power endures because underlying
conflicts of interest endure." Hence, an examination of power
requires a knowledge of where each actor's interests reside.
Burbules (1986) concluded that if no conflict of interest exists,
no exercise of power exists. Therefore, a power vacuum occurs
where congruent objectives reign.
While conflicts of interest generate reciprocal power
relations, different degrees of compliance and domination exist

in those relationships.

(Nyberg, 1981; Burbules, 1986)

Interactive power relations usually exhibit tension between
compliance and defiance, or consent and resistance. Burbules
(1986) presented a continuum that placed power relations between
domination and consent. Power relies on compliance, not consent,
and uses domination in the extreme.

(Burbules, 1986) Domination

occurs when one actor uses superior power over a resistant
inferior-powered actor. At the opposite end of the spectrum,
consent occurs when the inferior-powered actor approves the use
of power by the superior-powered actor. Compliance implies that
the inferior-powered actor yields to the superior-powered actor.
(Burbules, 1986) Similarly, Bailey (1969) categorized power
relationships by degree from consensual to command. In command
relationships, domination by the actor with superior power
limits, or eliminates, the autonomy of the actor with inferior
power.

(Bailey, 1969; Burbules, 1986)

While the inferior-powered

actor's autonomy is a "threat" to the superior-powered actor's
authority and control, consensual power relationships at the
other end of the spectrum are "an expression of informed and
autonomous judgement" in a reciprocal power relationship.

(Szasz,

in Rosenbaum, 1983, p. 199; Burbules, 1986, p. 100) The continuum
of power is perceived differently by actors with superior power
and those with inferior power. However, power is "like a machine
in which everyone is caught, those who exercise power just as
much as those over whom it is exercised."
1986)

(Foucault, in Burbules,
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Power relations are "not merely synchronic, but diachronic",
not momentary but relative to previous relations and affective in
future relations.

(Burbules, 1986, p. 98) Power relations are

perpetual; their past history influences predispositions that
establish propensities that "shape and constrain the relation and
which are in turn reinforced by it." (Burbules, 1986, p. 98)
Power is a means of prevention as well as direction and
control.

(Burbules, 1986) Therefore, the intent of outcomes is

central to the concept of control.

(Bailey, 1969; Henderson,

1981) To obtain desired ends in power relations, or control those
situations, a power actor employs a variety of methods; from
obligation and permission, to incentives and inducements, to
persuasion and manipulation, to constraints and sanctions, to
coercion and commands, to force and violence. The continuum of
methods employed by the superior-powered actor in power relations
reveals the degree of acceptance of the superior's outcomes by
the inferior-powered actor. Crespi (1992) described alternative
methods employed by power actors to achieve their objectives:
negotiation, consensus, and coercion. According to Airaksinen
(1988), actors with superior power also use coercion, force,
violence, exploitation, obligation, commands, permission, and
constraints in order to attain control. Bailey (1969) added the
use of collusion. Henderson (1981) noted the role of dependence
by the inferior-powered actor upon the superior-powered actor,
and the use of constraints, inducements, and persuasion.
Manipulation, sanction, coercion, incentive, and enticements are
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methods employed by power actors in pursuit of control.

(Pennock

& Chapman, 1972)
Burbules (1986, p. 105) stated that we "use" power in a
variety of ways in attempts to gain control, without recognizing
that the power relation also "uses" us. Foucault (1977) argued
that power struggles are the core of many power theories and that
they involve not only an attempt by the inferior-powered actor to
escape the power relation but also to wrestle power away from the
superior-powered actor. Burbules (1986, p. 109) noted that power
struggles are

"... attempts to supplant one group in power with

another without rejecting the basic power relation or conflicts
of interest that have given rise to it." In this examination of
interactive, reciprocal power struggles between actors in
intercollegiate athletic governance, I will employ Wolf's (1990)
delineation of modes of power.
Wolf (1990) argued that the study of modes of power would
produce greater clarity in describing power relationships and,
therefore, in applying the concept of power in future research.
He identified four distinct modes of power. The first is a
personal attribute of "potency or capability, the basic
Nietzschean idea of power." (Wolf, 1990, p. 586) This mode does
not describe the "form and direction" of interactive power play;
therefore, for purposes of this study, it will not be employed in
examining the relationships and actions of power actors in
intercollegiate athletics.

(Wolf, 1990, p. 586) The second mode

of power is used in interpersonal relations. This way of using

power concentrates on the "sequences of interactions and
transactions" among the actors involved in the power
relationship, such as one actor's ability to impose will on
another actor.

(Wolf, 1990, p. 586) However, interpersonal power

does not involve the "arena" in which the interactions occur. The
third mode of power does examine the "arena" of play as a
component in power relations in which actors operate within
determinate settings. Wolf (1990, p. 586) identified this mode as
tactical or organizational power, wherein power is used to
control the settings in which interactive power play occurs. For
example, one actor can use power over the environment of another
actor. The fourth mode of power identified by Wolf (1990, p. 586)
is structural power "... that not only operates within settings
or domains but that also organizes and orchestrates the settings
themselves." Structural power shapes the field of play,
establishing the social structure surrounding the arenas in which
power relations occur. Structural power determines the possible
actions of actors engaged in interactive power play, making some
power relations possible and others impossible. However,
structure is itself a social concept that has eluded an agreedupon definition.

(Giddens, 1979; Sewell, 1992)

Other theorists have identified concepts that support Wolf's
(1990) description of structural power as a social force that
determines possibilities for power play. Airaksinen (1988, p. 93170) described the "coercive institution" that parallels
Burbules'

(1986, p. 96) description of the "inherence of power in
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certain institutions, regardless of anyone's actively choosing or
directing them." Such power in "coercive circumstance" is made
necessary by surrounding situations and institutions, and is
neither chosen nor avoided.

(Airaksinen, 1988, p. 97) This

reflects Wolf's (1990) delineation of "how the forces of the
world impinge upon the people" through structural power.
Power is latent in structures of ideology, authority, and
organization; however, "... ideology, authority, and organization
each can take forms, and arise in contexts, in which they are
relatively free from power."

(Burbules, 1986, p. 95, 108)

Ideology is used as a framework of legitimation and rationale for
power relations that can facilitate or restrict action in
relations of power.

(Pennock & Chapman, 1972; Burbules, 1986)

Burbules (1986, p. 107) suggested that many view authority
as the "... legitimate cousin of power: where power coerces,
authority persuades." Oppenheim (1961) described legitimacy as
the right to exercise power thus resulting in authority.
Airaksinen (1988, p.126) presumed that "... some aspects of
authority have a rational core that makes them socially
unavoidable and even morally viable forms of human cooperation."
According to Burbules (1986), authority, whether claimed or
granted, is underwritten by institutional arrangements such as
symbols, rituals, and physical configurations; expertise can
enter in as well. Social factors allow these arrangements to be
taken as authority when often they are intended to maintain
advantage or privilege.

(Burbules, 1986) Privilege is an
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expression of power and is associated with authority.

(Burbules,

1986)
Burbules (1986, p. 107) stated, "Organization as a framework
of power relates closely to ideology and authority." Within that
framework, Airaksinen (1988, p. 121) stated that we "... need a
hierarchical institution supported by authority." Burbules (1986,
p. 107) describe the hierarchical institution, noting that "...
bureaucratic organization is characterized by hierarchy,
specialization, and relegated responsibility." Hierarchy often
preserves the status quo. Within the hierarchy, privileges go
with positions and specialization allows autonomy by position.
Bureaucracy also creates conflict of interest through relegated
responsibilities.

(Burbules, 1986)

Authority in bureaucratic organizations can be "bounded by
relevant and sensible limits" and grounded in consensual
qualifications, it can promote common interests, and it can be
maintained through "respect and trust".

(Burbules, 1986, p. 108)

Conversely, authority can be unquestioned; it can presume
privilege and exercise prerogative beyond justified limits.
(Burbules, 1986) Authority can be used to undermine the exercise
of autonomy.

(Szasz, in Rosenbaum, 1983, p. 200) An organization

can be participatory rather than hierarchical in its decision
making processes by developing collective rather than specialized
tasks, and decentralizing rather than focussing responsibilities.
(Burbules, 1986) Whether in a participatory or hierarchical field
of interactive power play, power is contextual. The field of
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play, the direction of play, the individual actors involved, and
the interests of those actors, determine the use of power and
authority.
Needs
Since power and authority are contextual, any study of power
must identify where the actors' interests reside.

(Burbules,

1986, p. 96) Interests and needs, whether individual or
institutional, serve as motivation. Motivation is a complex
series of desires and drives.

(Owens, 1981) Motivation serves as

an intervening variable between needs and outcomes (see figure
1) . Without motivation, based upon needs, there would be no
organized action directed toward outcomes. Thus, purposive
behavior is motivated by needs and oriented toward a goal.
(Schelling, 1978, p. 17)

NEEDS

MOTIVATION

OUTCOME

Figure l:Motivation as an Intervening Variable
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Needs are drives that motivate behavior. They can be
tangible or intangible factors. A pre-eminent need generating
action, "self-preservation," as first described by James
(1892/1977) was a category of action directed toward maintenance
of the present state of self. For purposes of this study, selfpreservation is the drive by individuals or groups in athletic
governance to preserve their current status. Within this study,
self-preservation is the objective of organisms and organizations
alike, the need of individuals and institutions.
According to Maslow (1970), needs are hierarchical. Maslow
(1970), in his Hierarchy of Needs, placed the basic needs of
survival, security, and safety at the foundation. Maslow (1970)
theorized that human needs build to a peek of autonomous selfactualization. In this regard, the basic need of selfpreservation serves as the foundation upon which higher level
needs such as autonomy are built. However, the basic needs are
deficiency needs, meaning that, if they are not met, the person
will seek to make up for the deficiency, and this takes
precedence over all other needs.

(Maslow, 1970) If lower-order

deficiency needs are not satisfied, they maintain greater potency
and higher-order needs cannot arise.

(Maslow, 1970) In this

study, self-preservation is an underlying deficiency need of
individuals and constituent groups in the governance of
intercollegiate athletics.
Maslow (1970), in his Hierarchy of Needs, suggested that the
basic needs of survival, safety, and security as deficiency needs

serve as the pre-eminent motivation for behavior. While Maslow
directed his work toward general human behavior and motivation,
these theories can be applied to individuals in work settings and
to institutions as well.

(Owens, 1981) Owens (1981) applied

Maslow's theories to educational organizations as well as
individuals in those organizations. He drew four conclusions
about the application of Maslow's Hierarchy in organizations: 1)
unmet needs have prepotency, needs that have been met are not
motivators; 2) the "web of needs" is complex; 3) there is general
intention to satisfy motivating needs, beginning with lower-order
needs; and 4) there are many ways to meet higher-order needs, but
relatively few ways to meet lower-order needs, which are pre
eminent.

(Owens, 1981)

Herzberg (1966) described factors similar to general
deficiency needs in organizational settings as hygiene or
maintenance factors, upon which motivation factors could be
built. His Two-Factor Theory of Motivation described the
preventive quality of maintenance factors, that is, if they are
not sufficiently present, they can prevent motivation. However,
if maintenance factors are satisfied, motivation can occur. In
this sense, Herzberg (1966) suggested that motivation arises from
certain factors, and dissatisfaction arises from a separate set
of factors and can stifle motivation.
Self-preservation, as an interest of individuals or
organizations, is a deficiency need generating the motivation to
use power and authority in interactive relationships. Authority

can be asserted in order to be maintained or extended; a variety
of modes of power can be employed toward the same ends.
(Burbules, 1986; Wolf, 1990) In the governance of intercollegiate
athletics, power and authority relationships are shaped by the
needs of various constituents and the field of play upon which
power interaction occurs. Therefore, an examination of the
governance of higher education, as the field of play where
constituents use power and authority in intercollegiate
athletics, is a foundation upon which to build this study.
Governance of Hicrher Education
Universities are complex organizations that vary from other
organizations in a number of ways: they serve a variety clients;
their employees have varying skills; they possess various
technologies; they use diverse structures and methods of
governance; and they have different relationships to external
environments.

(Baldridge, 1991) The organizational

characteristics of universities include: institutional goals,
hierarchical systems and structures, officials with specific
responsibilities, policy-making processes, and "day-to-day"
bureaucratic administration.

(Baldridge, 1991, p. 39) In this

section, I examine universities by looking at previous works on:
1) the pluralistic nature of the university and its mission and
how that leads to a shared governance ideal; 2) the influence of
external interests as universities pursue resources and the loose
governance structures that ensue; 3) decision-making processes
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and models; and 4) leadership and authority in higher education
governance.
"Goal ambiguity" is common in higher education organizations
and universities that often "try to be all things to all people"
and thus "rarely have a single mission."

(Baldridge, 1991, p. 39)

Cohen and March (1991) suggested that rhetoric and ineffective
efforts by university administrators to produce cohesive goals
have usually resulted in "meaningless" mission statements. Kerr
(1982, p. 41, 136) noted that there is no more bold vision of a
singular mission and described the modern "multiversity" as a
"city of infinite variety", a "pluralistic institution", wherein
several purposes, several power centers, and various clientele
were the norm. Kerr (1982) also noted the existence of "student
power", "faculty power", and "public power," which are evidence
that higher education serves many "clients with disparate,
complicated needs." (Baldridge, 1991, p. 31) In attempting to
serve many masters, universities "do not know clearly what they
are trying to do, they often do not know how to do it either."
(Baldridge, 1991, p. 31)
Universities are "people-processing" institutions where
various clients demand, and often obtain, influence in
governance.

(Baldridge, 1991, p. 40) These clients can be

mutually-dependent internal constituents, such as students,
faculty, administrators, or trustees, who seek to share
governance authority.

(Berdahl, 1991; Mortimer & McConnell, 1991)

Shared governance, while infrequent in practice, is therefore an
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ideal wherein "... joint involvement is preferable to segmental
decision making."

(Mortimer & McConnell, 1991, p. 164) The

concept of shared decision making "ignores conflict of interest",
assuming that shared values give rise to consensus and
"consultation and joint effort should be built on a high degree
of trust."

(Mortimer & McConnell, 1991, p. 166, 169) The shared

governance model also "...takes little account of external
forces." (Mortimer & McConnell, 1991, p. 166)
Institutional clientele include constituents in the external
environment. Most "... of the threats to departmental, college,
and campus autonomy and patterns of governance are generated by
external forces and developments."

(Mortimer & McConnell, 1991,

p. 167) Universities, like any complex organizations, are
"environmentally vulnerable" to outside influences.

(Baldridge,

1991 , p. 42) On a "continuum from 'independent' to 'captured',"
Baldridge (1991, p. 42) placed universities in the middle. While
they had enjoyed "substantial insulation" as a whole, they are
now facing "powerful external forces." (Baldridge, 1991, p. 42)
When applied, this strong external pressure seriously reduces the
"operating" or "procedural autonomy."

(Baldridge, 1991, p. 33;

Berdahl, 1991, p. 218) Kerr (in Keller, 1983, p. 24, 25) stated
that "autonomy--to the extent it ever existed--is dead".
Berdahl (1991, p. 218) noted the impact of external
constituents, such as donors, courts, state governments, and
federal bureaucratic offices, that "often have the power of
control, not even to mention the murky terrain of influence" in
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higher education. He described the specific situation that may
arise with:
... our good friends, the alumni, who, on the one hand,
support alma mater with their money, their enthusiasm, and
their volunteer efforts.

But on occasion, their enthusiasm

can go too far, particularly in such areas as
intercollegiate athletics, where there have been instances
of gross interference with campus decisions and priorities.
... Not only do they give money and support, but sometimes
they want to help control the academy's decisions.

(Bardahl,

1991, p. 219)
Furthermore, state governments are externally seeking control
over institutional role, budget, and performance while the
influence of "the flow of federal money" over the direction of
the university is tied to policies designed to "broaden access"
and assure "social justice and affirmative action."

(Berdahl,

1991, pp. 221-222) Even the external forces involved in
university governance have diverse interests and are not always
cooperative, competing among themselves for influence.

(Berdahl,

1991)
In relation to external constituents, Hackman (1991) defined
environmental power as the ability to acquire needed outside
resources, while institutional power was influence within the
institution. External resources are sought out because
"peripheral units," such as athletics, must "bring in financial
resources" and "'pay their own way ... or they will shrink.'"
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(Hackman, 1991, p. 275) This

predicament creates institutional

conflict and ambiguity. Kerr (in Keller, 1983) noted:
There is a 'kind of lawlessness' in any large university
with separate sources of initiative and power; and the task
is to keep this lawlessness within bounds ...
There are several 'nations', of students, of faculty,
of alumni, of trustees, of public groups. Each has its
territory, its jurisdiction, its form of government. Each
can declare war on the others; some have the power of
veto... It is a pluralistic society with multiple cultures,
(p. 28)
The lawlessness of an "organized anarchy" implies
"confusion, disarray, and conflict" in higher education
organizations.

(Cohen & March, 1991, p. 399; Baldridge, 1991, p.

44) Four systemic ambiguities were identified as fundamental in
"organized anarchies": ambiguity of purpose, ambiguity of power,
ambiguity of experience, and ambiguity of success.

(Cohen &

March, 1991, p. 399) Cohen & March (1991, p. 399 - 404)
concluded: universities have no clear goals; formal authority is
limited and often not accepted, while "the real power" is hard to
find; outcomes are dependent upon factors outside presidential
experience; and goals and outcomes are independent of each other,
creating diverse criteria for success.
The concept of "organized anarchy" supports the
organizational characteristics of higher education institutions
identified by Baldridge's (1991 , p. 34): unclear goals, client
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service, unclear technologies, problematic professionalism, and
vulnerable environment. "Organized anarchy" also suggested a
"looser, more fluid kind of organization," described by Weick
(1991, p. 103) as "loosely coupled systems."

(Baldridge, 1991, p.

34) Loose coupling refers to an independent, yet responsive
connection between university elements with diverse interests,
using task-induced technical or office-oriented authority
coupling mechanisms.

(Weick, 1991) Kerr (1982) described the

looseness of university governance as:
... the multiversity with its strung-along type of unity,
with its lack of devotion to any single faith and its lack
of concentration on any single function, with a condition of
cohesion at best or coexistence at next best or contiguity
at least,

(pp. 138-139)

Decision-making is problematic in a "loosely coupled,
ambiguous organization."

(Cohen & March, 1991, p. 404) In such

organizations, decision making often results from* unplanned
activities.

(Baldridge, 1991) Keller (1983, p. 26) called for an

end to the "era of laissez-faire" governance and suggested the
need for planning an "academic strategy" in university decision
making.
Organizational decision-making in higher education
governance can be categorized in "bureaucratic", "collegial", or
"political" models.

(Baldridge, 1991, p. 38)

However, Baldridge

(1991, p. 45) stated that "... the search for an all-encompassing
model is simplistic, for no one model can delineate the
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intricacies of decision processes in complex organizations."
While no model stands on its own, each has valid aspects to help
examine higher education governance structures. Baldridge (1991,
p. 35) suggested that these models be used "jointly to examine
different aspects of the governance process."
Bureaucratic structures were described by Weber, in
Baldridge,

(1991, p. 46) as "networks of social groups dedicated

to limited goals and organized for maximum efficiency." The
elements of bureaucracy associated with university governance
were summarized by Baldridge (1991): the state charter allows
external state influence; the formal hierarchy specifies formal
relationships; the communication channels are formalized;
authority relations are definitive; rules and regulations
formally govern the university; people processing and record
keeping abound; and decision processes for routine decisions are
delegated. The bureaucratic model has weaknesses when applied to
higher education because it explains the "formal structure" of
governance and "authority--legitimate, formalized power," but it
fails to provide illumination about the "dynamic processes" or
the use of informal power and influence in institutions of higher
education.

(Baldridge, 1991, p. 47) While bureaucracies explain

the most efficient manner of executing policies, they do not
examine changes over time, nor do they address how policies are
developed.

(Baldridge, 1991)

The collegial governance model examines the process of
policy-making in higher education. The university has been viewed

by some as a "collegium," a "community of scholars," wherein
there is full participation by all members in decision-making.
(Baldridge, 1991, p. 48) Such a "roundtable" democracy suggests
that academic institutions should process differently from
bureaucratic hierarchies.

(Baldridge,1991, p. 48) The academic

community achieves "coordination" in decision-making through
"dynamic consensus."

(Millet, in Baldridge, 1991, p. 48) Ideally,

within the collegial model, the faculty's professional authority
is based upon expertise rather bureaucratic position.

(Baldridge,

1991) However, noting the "discontent and anxiety" of
academicians with the governance structure of higher education,
Baldridge (1991) suggests that the model of university governance
ought to be a "utopian" collegium, not that it is one. The most
obvious shortcoming of the collegial model in the governance of
higher education is its incapacity to deal with conflicts of
interest.

(Baldridge, 1991)

Neither bureaucratic rule-making nor collegial consensus
explains the "power plays, conflict, and the rough-and-tumble
politics" of institutional governance.

(Baldridge, 1991, p. 50)

Within the "loosely coordinated, fragmented political system" of
governance in higher education, the political model offers an
explanation of the decision-making process that is less
"systematic or formalistic" than the other models.

(Baldridge,

1991, p. 54) In the political model where complex organizations
are viewed as "miniature political systems, with interest-group
dynamics and conflicts," policy-making is the focus.

(Baldridge,

1991, p. 50) The model is based upon the following assumptions
about the political process: inactivity prevails and decisions
are made by small groups; participation in the process is fluid
by those interested; universities are divided into "interest
groups with different goals and vales"; conflict is normal and
healthy in complex organizations; formal authority is limited by
competing interest groups; and external interest groups are
influential in internal governance processes.

(Baldridge, 1991,

p. 51, 52) In this light, the political model is particularly
applicable in examining aspects of constituents' use of power and
authority in governing athletics in higher education.
The governance of higher education involves a complex
political community that creates a variety of pressures and many
sources of power and influence that impact decision-making in the
university setting. In addition, within the political model,
university decision-making includes a "legislative stage" that
generates policy based upon these various influences, and a
"policy execution phase" that provides feedback and possibly
creates new conflict.

(Baldridge, 1991, p. 55, 56) In the

political decision-making process, interest groups or
bureaucratic processes determine the decision which needs to be
addressed, and then the right of decision-making is "subject to
conflict, power manipulation, and struggles between interest
groups." (Baldridge, 1991, p. 52, 53) Committees, councils, and
advisory groups are part of a diffuse, "complex decision network"
in higher education that "allows a cumulative buildup of
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expertise and advice." (Baldridge, 1991, pp. 53, 54) Baldridge
(1991) described the process of decision-making in the political
model:
First, powerful political forces--interest groups,
bureaucratic officials, influential individuals,
organizational subunits--cause a given issue to emerge from
the limbo of ongoing problems and certain 'attention cues'
force the political community to consider the problem.
Second, there is a struggle over locating the decision with
a particular person or group, for the location of the right
to make the decision often determines the outcome. Third,
decisions are usually 'performed' to a great extent by the
time one person or group is given the legitimacy to make the
decision; not all options are open and the choices have been
severely limited by the previous conflicts,

(p. 54)

Leadership in the governance of higher education is viewed
differently based upon the model of governance applied. In the
bureaucratic model, the leader plays the role of "hero" presiding
over a "complex pyramid of power." (Baldridge, 1991, p. 57) The
collegial leader is a negotiator and facilitator in obtaining
"consensus in a community of scholars."

(Millet, in Baldridge,

1991, p. 57) The political leader who "jockeys between power
blocs", negotiating, facilitating, mediating, and networking to
"fight for desired changes" is "... not at the peak of a pyramid
but rather at the center of intersecting circles."
1991;

Baldridge, 1991, p. 58)

(Berdahl,

Whetten and Cameron (1991) identified the characteristics of
successful leaders: they put equal emphasis on process and
outcome; they are risk takers with a low fear of failure; they
nurture support of strategic constituencies; they do not succumb
to external demands; they leave a distinct imprint; they are
excellent communicators; they respect the power of organizational
cultures; and they highlight sources of opportunity that exist.
For this study, effective leaders use power and authority in
interactive relations either to maintain the status quo or to
achieve intended outcomes. In order to achieve their ends,
leaders can use two types of authority: administrative authority
that is derived from a legitimate position within the power
hierarchy; and professional authority that is derived from
knowledge.

(Etzioni, 1991) Leaders exercised authority as "line"

authority that follows the chain of command or "staff" authority
that occurs outside the "line" and contends with a degree of
autonomy..(Etzioni, 1991)
Within the university hierarchy, the governing board and the
president are responsible for providing leadership and direction.
The president serves "at the pleasure of the board." (Kauffman,
1980) Effective boards are responsible for policy formation.
(Chait et al., 1991) The formation of policy is an action of
governance, while the application or execution of policy is an
action of administration.

(Westmeyer, 1990) Both are necessary

for effective governance. The structure of governance remains
similar to that described by Elliott (1935) wherein the board
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could act unilaterally or through delegation of authority in the
university hierarchy, which included the president, faculty, and
other administrators serving as leaders. However, the processes
in governance involve power relationships outside the formal
university hierarchy.
Pfeffer (1991) concluded that leaders are constrained in
their actions by external factors and circumstances beyond their
control. These constraints can be an application of Wolf's (1990)
notion of structural power. For example, Barrow (1990) noted the
impact of capitalism on the "reconstruction of American higher
education" prior to 1928. While "environmental forces" go "beyond
administrative control," effective administrators can have an
impact upon organizational effectiveness and performance.
(Whetten & Cameron, 1991, p. 459) The impact of effective leaders
in one arena of governance is described by Hackman (1991, p.
276): "Sports have increased because ... the president decided to
emphasize it." While this is an over-simplified analysis, the
arena of intercollegiate athletics merits the attention of
research in the governance of higher education.
Intercollegiate Athletics
While reform efforts are abundant in college athletics
today, current reform agendas take into account neither the
possibility of long-term systemic breakdown of the higher
education governance structure and processes relative to
intercollegiate athletics, nor the power relationships of the
constituencies involved. Lessons from history can be applied by

modern decision-makers addressing current problems. Thelin (1982,
p. 1) noted the need to examine history because the complexities
in structure and processes of universities are derived from "the
fact that universities are historic institutions." Eitzen and
Sage (1978, p. 25) stated: "Current social circumstances are
related to events of the past, consequently sociologists use
history to develop an understanding ..., making the current ...
more meaningful."
Lucas and Smith (1978, p. vi) suggested that, in looking at
history, finding "a continuous stream of ideas" is adequate,
rather than attempting to observe a "single central theme";
however others have examined specified themes in relation to
college athletics. Davenport (in Chu et al., 1985, p. 6)
described a "paradox" in college athletics where the athletic
pursuits of winning, commercialization, and money contradict the
epitome of scholarship, academic integrity, and the positive
qualities perceived in higher education. Lawrence (1987)
concentrated on the development and pervasive role of the NCAA in
college athletics.

Hart-Nibbrig and Cottingham (1986, p. 1)

traced the evolution of sport relative to the economic and
political factors that created "corporate athleticism", and the
problems associated with that evolution.

Smith (1988)

concentrated upon the conflict between collegial "paternalism"
and student "freedom" in college athletics. Hardy and Berryman
(in Frey, 1982) surveyed the development of intercollegiate
athletics relative to institutional control and educational
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value. Chu (in Chu et al., 1985) examined the formal
incorporation of athletics into the ambiguous concept of American
higher education. Andre and James (1991, p. xix) presented the
"conflict and controversy" that surrounded the development of the
institution of college athletics.
Lucas and Smith (1978, p. v - vii) stated that the history
of American sport reflects the "dominant social themes in
American society", and provides a deeper knowledge of athletics
relative to modern society. Eitzen and Sage (1978, p. 25)
concluded that athletics are "a microcosm of American society"
that reinforce and reflect societal values as a "mirror of
American life." The relationship between athletics and American
societal values was described as "reciprocal" in nature by Eitzen
and Sage (1978, p. 59) and Nyquist (in Chu et al., 1985). Sports
"properly conducted provide values of enduring human
significance."

(Simon, 1991, p. 200) The dominant American values

associated with athletics were presented by Eitzen and Sage
(1978): Success (Individual Achievement); Competition; Means to
Achieve (Hard Work); Progress; Materialism; and External
Conformity. Violence has emerged as the ultimate method of
"survival of the fittest" in the theory of Social Darwinism as it
exists in society and as it is expressed in sports.

(Eitzen &

Sage, 1978, p. 68) Marmion (1979) stated that American college
athletics have "truly become a part of the social fabric of our
society." McPherson (1989) and Sage (1980) noted that athletics
are pervasive in our society. It is because of sports'
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pervasiveness that an examination of the "rise of sport in
America" is important in providing "clues to understanding sport
in its present form."

{McPherson, 1989; Sage, 1980; Eitzen &

Sage, 1978, p. 54)
Smith (1988) viewed extracurricular activities, including
sports, as an expression of student rebellion, or freedom,
against the paternalism of early universities. Intramural class
competitions were documented early on the American college
campus, with students "playing at ball" as far back as 1761.
(Lawrence, 1987, p. 1, 2; Smith, 1988) However, things changed
when Harvard met Yale in a crew race on August 3, 1852: the
Boston, Concord, and Montreal Railroad company, in a commercial
venture to promote its line to Lake Winnipesaukee, New Hampshire
as a vacation destination, sponsored the first inter-college
athletic competition.

(Lucas & Smith, 1978, p. 196, 197) This

marked the "watershed of intercollegiate sports", followed, on
July 1, 1859, by baseball between Amherst College and Williams
College, and English soccer-style football between Rutgers and
Princeton on November 6, 1869.

(Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986,

p. 18; Smith, 1988, p. 219; Davenport, in Chu et al., 1985, p.7)
However, it was the debut of American rugby-style football on May
15, 1874 with a tie between Harvard University and McGill
University of Canada, followed a year later on June 4, 1875 with
Tuft University defeating Harvard, that prompted more widespread
institutional and public interest in intercollegiate athletics.
(Smith, 1988)

Football was received enthusiastically by students and
spectators alike; however, it created controversy with respect to
the "place of athletics in higher education."

(Davenport, in Chu

et a l ., 1985, p. 7) "King football" caught the attention not only
of the public, but also of the college administrators of the day
who recognized the publicity and revenue potential associated
with a winning team.

(Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986, p. 18, 19)

As communication and transportation technologies advanced,
college athletics became more pervasive in American society.
(Eitzen & Sage, 1978? Sage, 1980; McPherson, 1989) As successful
sports teams received newspaper attention, business-like, "winat-all-cost" athletic programs emerged.

(Lawrence, 1987, p. 6, 7)

Veysey (1965) implied that a bandwagon effect of successful
athletic programs at leading institutions such as Harvard existed
within higher education:
Trustees of existing institutions ... sometimes preferred
to risk experimentation rather than continue in the
unpromising ways of the past ... Once one respectable
institution moved in a new direction, others found
themselves under a powerful compulsion to follow suit.

(p.

10, 11)

Systemic problems have existed in the relationship of
athletics to higher education since the advent of intercollegiate
competition on August 3, 1852. (Smith, 1988; Hardy & Berryman, in
Frey, 1982) From early, unorganized student activities, studentrun college athletic clubs "promoted and encouraged" inter-

college competitions.

{Hardy & Berryman, in Frey, 1982, p. 17;

Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986, p. 18) But "students erected
within the gates a monster" that needed to be controlled.
(Rudolph, 1962, p. 155) Kerr (1982, p. 16) concurred: "Once
started, university spectator sports could not be killed even by
the worst of teams or the best of de-emphasis; and few
universities seriously sought after either." Athletics became a
vehicle for campus unification, as Rudolph (1962, p. 381)
suggested that "if every man did not take the same courses, at
least he had an opportunity to cheer for the same team." College
athletics had a variety of proponents, despite its uncomfortable
fit in the academic environment.
Willing academicians, government leaders, and the American
general public entertained the notion of new programs and
objectives for higher education, and the colleges' businessminded presidents and trustees used athletics as a means of
remedying financial and enrollment difficulties. Without a
well-accepted understanding of the importance and
responsibilities of the American college and university,
leadership in higher education had to search creatively for
funds and students, altering programs and educational
philosophies in the process.

(Chu, 1985, p. 36)

The control of college sports, whether shared or absolute,
evolved among "students, alumni, presidents, faculty, and
professional administrators", gradually shifting from its student
origins to alumni and, later, college faculty and administrators.
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(Hardy & Berryman, in Frey, 1982, p. 17) Smith (1988, p. 212)
concluded that students had lost control of athletics because
they "lacked the responsibility to run them without conflicting
with academic values." The faculty had quickly regulated studentrun athletics; professional coaches then began to run individual
sports; and the alumni and college authorities controlled the
financial aspects.

(Smith, 1988; Hardy & Berryman, in Frey, 1982)

During the 1855 rematch of the Harvard-Yale crew regatta,
the eligibility of an "already-graduated" Harvard competitor
demonstrated the need for some collective regulation and
governance for intercollegiate athletics.

(Lucas & Smith, 1978,

p. 198) Hardy and Berryman (in Frey, 1982) stated that:
By the turn of the century,

... both supporters and

detractors had adopted the posture that proper governance
and regulation were necessary to (depending on one's
position) improve, reform, or salvage the athletic pastimes
which, like a weed, could neither be left alone nor
completely eradicated,

(p. 16)

The formation of the NCAA finally addressed the issue of interinstitutional governance of college athletics.

(Smith, 1988) In

response to public outcries bemoaning the brutality in college
football, which had resulted in 18 deaths and 143 serious
injuries in 1905 alone, President Theodore Roosevelt charged
representatives of Harvard, Yale, and Princeton with the task of
reforming the sport or abandoning it. (Slaughter & Lapchick,
1989; Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986; Lawrence, 1987) The
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purpose of the NCAA, to oversee college sports, was stated in its
initial Constitution:
Its object shall be the regulation and supervision of
college athletics throughout the United States, in order
that the athletic activities in colleges and universities
may be maintained on an ethical plane in keeping with the
dignity and high purpose of education.

(Hardy & Berryman,

in Frey, 1982, p.22; Davenport, in Chu et a l ., 1985, p. 8}
The NCAA adopted rules regarding eligibility and amateurism.
(Slaughter & Lapchick, 1989) Lawrence (1987) presented the
"Principles of Amateur Sports" in the NCAA's Amateur Code that
discouraged:
...the offering of inducements to players to enter colleges
or universities because of their athletic abilities and of
supporting or maintaining players while students on account
of their athletic abilities, either by athletics
organizations, individual alumni, or otherwise, directly or
indirectly,

(p. 21-23)

As amateurism was promoted by the NCAA, commercialized athletic
programs were for the first time being formally recognized as
components of higher education.

(Davenport, in Chu, 1985) In

their efforts to field winning and financially successful teams,
universities ignored NCAA amateur rules. The NCAA continued to
resolve through unenforceable regulations the amateur ideal
despite its members ignoring the rules on amateur eligibility to
a significant degree.

(Lawrence, 1987, p. 24, 25)

Lucas and Smith {1978, p. 145) and McPherson (1989) viewed
amateur rules as elitist, yet the existence of athletics had a
"democratizing" effect as they allowed everyone in the emerging
nation to share in the common American values reflected in
sports. The "social aristocrats" immigrants, and the new middle
class working "rabble" all supported and encouraged the growth of
college athletics.

(Eitzen & Sage, 1978, p. 49) The rise of the

industrialized society and the development of urbanization in
America, combined with technological advances, spurred the growth
of widespread interest in "corporate sport." (Eitzen & Sage,
1978, p. 20, 43) Hart-Nibbrig and Cottingham (1986, p. 17}
suggested the historic links "between a growing, aggressive
business system ... and the organization of intercollegiate
athletics." By the 1920s, college athletics were part of "mass
entertainment in a growing industrial society." (Hart-Nibbrig &
Cottingham, 1986, p. 23) As the nation offered new freedoms and
opportunities, athletics became "the one big national
denominator" in the "Golden Age" of college sports in the
twenties.

(Davenport, in Chu, 1985, p. 8? Hart-Nibbrig &

Cottingham, 1986, p. 22)
In 1929, Howard Savage, for The Carnegie Foundation for the
Advancement of Teaching, conducted what " ... was, and probably
remains, the most thorough look ever taken at U.S. college
sport."

(Lawrence, 1986, p. 8) The Savage Report condemned the

"highly organized commercial activity" of college athletics, and
placed the responsibility for corrective action with the
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"president and faculty."

(Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986, p. 23)

The Savage Report outlined the abuses in college athletics and
prescribed solutions; however it was not well received.

(Hart-

Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986; Davenport, in Chu, 1985) The NCAA
acknowledged the problems presented in the Savage Report, but did
little to correct the situation.

(Slaughter & Lapchick, 1989)

Hanford (1979) noted that the Report had little effect on the
direction that intercollegiate athletics took.
The Great Depression, following close on the heals of the
Savage Report, affected "all facets of our society", including
intercollegiate athletics.

(Davenport, in Chu, 1985, p. 11)

Financial constraints led university athletics to become more
"influential and businesslike" in their pursuit of resources,
thereby intensifying illegal recruiting and other violations.
(Slaughter & Lapchick, 1989, p. 8; Lawrence, 1987; Davenport, in
Chu et a l ., 1985; Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986) World War II
initiated a "hiatus in the growth of intercollegiate sports" and
only one major change in NCAA regulation, freshman eligibility.
(Davenport, in Chu, 1985, p. 11, 12; Lawrence, 1987)
After World War II, football, and "big time" newcomer
basketball, emerged to solidify their importance in society.
(Davenport, in Chu, 1985, p. 12) The 1950s were marred with
point-shaving and recruiting scandals where football and
basketball players had become little more than "commodities in a
growing mass entertainment industry". (Slaughter & Lapchick,
1989, p. 10; Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986, p. 25) Expanding

commercial interests and abundant abuses in college athletics
pushed the NCAA to move from "an advisory body to a governing
body with full power to police and penalize." (Davenport, in Chu,
1985, p. 12, 13; Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986, p. 24, 25) In
1952, the NCAA devised an enforcement policy that was to control
and punish member abuses.

(Lawrence, 1987) Yet the advent of

televised sports, with mass appeal and vast revenue, soon changed
intercollegiate athletics as well as the role of the NCAA.
(Davenport, in Chu, 1985; Lawrence, 1987)
Television enhanced the money-making prospects of
commercialized intercollegiate athletics and led to the rise of
"corporate athleticism".

(Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986, p. 25,

26) College sport had become "a spectacle, big business, and an
extension of power politics" wherein the "goal of pleasure" was
"replaced by extrinsic rewards, especially money."

(Eitzen &

Sage, 1978, p. 20) The "big time" commercial nature of athletics
in the university has prompted great concern.

(Atwell, 1979;

Lopiano, 1979; Nyquist, 1979; Frey, in Chu et al., 1985;
McPherson, 1989; Bailey & Littleton, 1991) The finances
associated with the control of televised sports reinforced the
emergence of the NCAA as an economic cartel offering college
athletics as its product.

(Koch, in Frey, 1982; Sage, in Frey,

1982; Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986; Lawrence, 1987; Wilson,
1994) As television money increased the commercialization of
intercollegiate athletics, the civil rights movement and the
campus unrest of the 1960s and 1970s increased the opportunity
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for participation, reflecting the societal concerns of the day.
(Davenport, in Chu, 1985; Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986; Hardy
& Berryman, in Prey, 1982; Hanford, 1979}
The 1960s reflected the civil rights movement with expanded
athletic opportunity for blacks; however, many academically
unprepared black athletes matriculated solely for athletic
purposes into commercial athletic programs where they served as
cheap labor in the production of massive athletic profits.

(Sage,

1980; Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986; Lawrence, 1987) Athletics
themselves became a "commodity" in a "collusive intercollegiate
athletic market." (Sage, 1990, p. 104; Koch, in Frey, 1982)
Slaughter & Lapchick (1989, p. 11) viewed the 1960s and 1970s as
a period of "ascendancy" for profitable commercialized
intercollegiate athletics. Boyer (in Slaughter

&

Lapchick, 1991,

p. xi) noted the increasing cultural importance of athletics:
"Big-time sport, collegiate and professional, is becoming the new
civil authority in our culture. It draws the pride and unifies
the community the same way great cathedrals did in earlier
times."
In the 1970s, the expanded women's movement prompted Title
IX of the Higher Education Act, legislation that continues to
have a significant impact upon intercollegiate athletics.

(Hart-

Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986; Davenport, in Chu et a l ., 1985;
McPherson, 1989) Women's sports have continued to receive less
attention and less money than those of men; however, the NCAA,
which took over women's championships from the Association for

48

Intercollegiate Athletics for Women only after its efforts to
thwart Title IX regulations failed, has witnessed, if not
stimulated, increased opportunities for women in athletics.
(Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986; Acosta & Carpenter, in Chu et
al., 1985)
In the 1980s, reformers addressed their main concerns in
athletics, institutional control, commercialization, and the
academic integrity of the institutions involved, and often
questioned the paradox of athletics in higher education.
(Davenport, in Chu et al., 1985) While Hanford (1979) questioned
whether institutions could maintain their autonomy while
governing athletics, Sage (1990, p. 188) suggested that
intercollegiate athletics have the typical problems of
"conventional capitalistic entertainment enterprises." Serving in
an entertainment role, athletics engage in intense competition
for resources. Universities deviate from this role by avoiding
payment to athletes for the product through invoking "the
educational mission of the university" and using the "ideology of
amateurism" in college athletics.

(Sage, 1990, p. 188)

Many researchers (Chu, in Chu, et al., 1985; Frey, in Chu et
al., 1985; Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986; McPherson, 1989;
Bailey & Littleton, 1991) have noted that commercial practices in
"big-time" athletic programs and poorly defined university
missions have allowed the influence of extramural constituents on
college athletics. The need to match institutional goals with
athletic governance structures is particularly difficult with
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"ambiguous and conflicting goals" in universities, yet it has
been central to the discussion on intercollegiate athletics since
their inception.

(Hardy & Berryman, in Frey, 1982, p. 25; Chu, in

Chu et al., 1985)
As the 1990s proceed, reform advocates continue to discuss
the issues of control, commercialization, and

academic integrity

in college athletics. Hardy and Berryman (in Frey, 1982, p. 17)
stated: "Students, coaches, faculty, presidents, alumni and
boosters all had differing notions as to the athletic interests
of their institutions." Frequently internal constituents such as
coaches, faculty, and administrators have conflicting interests.
(Scott, in Frey, 1982; Bailey & Littleton, 1991) Gilley et al.
(1986, p. 3) noted that "lack of internal control (including
confused and fractured lines of responsibility) is a critical
factor contributing to problems in university athletic programs."
In addition to internal interest-group conflicts, athletics
have formed connections with external constituencies; in part
because regularly administered institutional budgets have been
restricted in relation to athletic costs.

(Chu et al., 1985)

Athletics have been deemed unworthy of full incorporation into
the educational curriculum and as such are not fully funded.
(Scott, in Frey, 1982)

They are left to forge their external

connections in pursuit of resources. In turn, as external
constituencies provide revenue to college athletics, external
influence is attached to the purse strings, and the external
special interest constituencies seek control of commercial
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collegiate athletics.

{Frey, in Chu et al., 1985; Hart-Nibbrig &

Cottingham, 1986; McPherson, 1989; Bailey & Littleton, 1991)
According to Gilley et al.{1986, p.26), "Today, power is so
widely diffused outside colleges and universities that an
institution must strive to become a major shareholder of its own
athletic material."
In a case study involving "...universities having major
athletic problems" as well as "seven exemplary institutions", the
problematic universities featured "an absence of adequate
administrative supervision of the athletic program", while the
comparison schools "were less administratively independent."
(Gerber, in Gilley, 1986, p. 36-37). According to Frey (1982):
"Ever since the first intercollegiate athletic event in
the mid 1850's, the course of action of college athletic
programs has been dictated by groups which, in fact, do
not originate within the boundaries of the campus.

That is,

a great deal of what happens in intercollegiate athletics is
the result of a response to the interests and demands of
externally based constituencies."

(p. 106)

Among the external interest groups are the alumni, the
community, business interests, the general public, booster clubs,
the government, and television.

(Kjeldsen, in Frey, 1982; Frey,

in Chu et a l ., 1985; Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986; McPherson,
1989; Sage, 1990; and Bailey & Littleton, 1991) College athletics
serve the interests of the general public and the surrounding
community by providing entertainment.

(Michener, 1976)
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Commercialized college sport spectacles also provide benefits to
business interests, as Kjeldsen (in Frey, 1982) noted the
"beneficiaries of intercollegiate athletics" include:
... community business people who either directly provide
services and/or supplies to the athletic department or who
benefit from the infusion of money into the local economy,
and ... the seeker of entertainment services who realizes a
period of diversion from the normal routines of life.

(p.

201)

Bailey and Littleton (1991) noted that alumni interests are
also served through personal satisfaction and ego-gratification
derived from a connection to a highly visible, successful
athletic program. Hart-Nibbrig and Cottingham (1986, p. 12, 13)
contend that all successful college athletic teams have "strong
booster groups" that influence college athletics through "a
financial and economic infrastructure" without which a serious
commercial college athletic program would be "unable to compete."
Gilley et a l . (1986, p. 7) concluded that the " ... lack of
control of boosters has caused more problems for ... universities
than ... any other aspect of athletics."

The university's loss

of control over external constituencies was addressed by Bailey
and Littleton (1991): "Fortunately for most university
presidents, the control of fervent external groups is a matter of
keeping the larger university purposes and their need for
financial support in some perspective." (p. 43)
While " ... some would argue that because of their own
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indigenous decentralized form of governance,

... " universities

are not able to " ... refute the claim that they are at the mercy
of a subculture with alien values, one that is closely linked to
ominous forms of wealth, egocentricity, and political power."
(Bailey & Littleton, 1991, p. SI) Boyer (in Slaughter & Lapchick,
1989) argued that American universities must execute the
responsibility of athletic control and that the regular
governance structure of the institution should provide the means
for control:
... of first importance, there must be firm leadership at
the top from the board of trustees and the president of the
college or university.

Ethical direction for the coaches

and athletic directors, for the faculty athletics
committees, for student athletes, for the fans and
especially the alumni, must come from the board and the
president.

The buck stops there,

(p.xiv)

Presidents have the NCAA charge of "ultimate responsibility and
final authority for the conduct of the intercollegiate athletics
program." (Bailey

&

Littleton, 1991, p .67) Presidents are

becoming more collectively active in the governance of
intercollegiate athletics through the NCAA Presidents'
Commission, which was established " ... because there was a
perception that presidents did not have the means to play a
definitive role in intercollegiate athletics."

(Bailey &

Littleton, 1991, p .100)
The NCAA is a regulatory body acting in the interests of its

more than 850 voluntary member institutions {Tow, in Frey, 1982,
p.108). It enacts and enforces rules governing intercollegiate
athletics as approved by its member institutions, and yet it has
significant authority over those same member institutions. Bailey
and Littleton {1991, p. 128, 129) stated: "The structure of the
NCAA membership and the policies for distribution of the
association's revenues can influence significantly the ability of
member institutions to control abuses in college sports." Noll
(in Andre & James, 1991, p. 198) stated: "Judging from the
popular literature, the moral high ground is occupied by the
NCAA.

...depicted as fighting the good battle."
The NCAA's influence over its membership promotes the

perception of the role of the NCAA as that of a cartel, an
association designed to monopolize control over college
athletics.

(Sage, in Frey, 1982,

p. 131-138) Noll (in Andre &

James, 1991, p. 198) observed that "...the economic value of
intercollegiate athletics have continued to grow, and the cartel
practices of the NCAA have become more important. Lawrence (1987,
p. xiii) viewed the NCAA as an "intercollegiate athletic cartel
... colluding to restrict output in an effort to raise prices

and

profits." The role of the NCAA as a cartel issupported also by
the fact that the NCAA has its own legal department, and also the
Governmental Affairs and Joint Legislative Committee to lobby for
its interests and self-protection; at times against its own
members.

(Lawrence, 1987, p. 152) Nevertheless, the NCAA is
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central to athletic reform movements, providing a structure for
change at the national level.
The issue of control of intercollegiate athletics has gone
beyond institutional walls and the NCAA. A variety of external
constituents influence the governance of intercollegiate
athletics. Government involvement, through legislation and the
courts, has attempted to curtail the undesirable influences of
some external constituents, but in the process has become an
additional external influence on college athletics, a
longstanding fear of higher education.

(Bailey & Littleton, 1991)

While externally situated booster organizations and individual
boosters exert significant commercial influence on athletic
departments, and government exerts regulatory influence, the
television medium has been called the "most important external
influence on college sports" (Hart-Nibbrig

&

Cottingham, 1986, p.

11) .

The media, in particular television, has played a key role
in the development of commercialized, ,rwin-at-all-cost",
"corporate athletics."

(Hart-Nibbrig

&. Cottingham,

1986, p. 11)

Bailey and Littleton (1991) noted:
The media, including television, in its encompassing
treatment of sports merely responds to what the public
desires.

And, partly as a result, the university itself

remains in its purposes and modes of conduct the least
understood of democratic institutions, its one visible and
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significant connection to the lives of most Americans being
intercollegiate athletics,

(p. 47)

Television creates, promotes, and organizes "highly
lucrative sports markets", thus raising the "financial stakes
associated with college sports."

(Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham,

1986, p. 11) Hart-Nibbrig and Cottingham (1986, p. 68) concurred:
"Of all the revenue-generating sources for college athletics none
has had the dramatic impact of television." Examples of the
financial gains to be made include a recent billion dollar NCAA
contract with the CBS television network, a forty million dollar
NBC television football contract with the University of Notre
Dame, the College Football Association's 210 million dollar
contract with the ABC television network, and Penn State
University's creation of its own satellite television network.
(Lederman, 1990; Blum, 1995)
The NCAA, itself receiving much of its operating revenues
from television contracts, is currently discussing options for
"revenue sharing" in order to distribute the extensive revenue
more equitably among its membership.

(Lederman, 1990; Blum, 1994)

The revenue generated from the mass media's promotion of college
athletics is tantalizing to university athletic programs, some
with budgets up to 15 million dollars and deficits over one
million dollars (Thelin & Wiseman, 1990). Padwe (in Slaughter &
Lapchick, 1989, p. 123-135) described the role of the media in
creating "the moral and ethical wasteland intercollegiate
athletics have become." The media continues to influence
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intercollegiate athletics as Bailey and Littleton (1991)
explained:
Much has already been said about the importance of
consensus development, and the roles of individual CEOs, the
NCAA Presidents' Commission, athletics conferences, and
educational organizations in achieving that consensus.

At

this point in the reform movement, the media can be the
strongest force in helping these entities in that effort by
creating an awareness on the part of the public of the
pressing need to control abuses in college sports and of the
changes that must be made to accomplish this.

(p. 108)

The commercial entertainment business of college athletics
is at the same time influenced by the media and propelled by
those it entertains, thus demanding media attention as noted by
Andre and James (1991):
Americans spend almost $100 billion a year on sports. Only
defense, education, and health get more of our gross
national product.

Most of that money is spent on spectator

sport, and a sizable fraction of it on college sport.
result, sport is always in the news,

As a

(p.ix)

The commercial practices in the business of college athletics
have enhanced professionalism in college athletics through
employing athletes for compensation, as Sage (in Chu et a l .,
1985) stated:
Big-time intercollegiate sport is a business enterprise...
Not only are big-time intercollegiate athletic programs a
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commercial enterprise functioning as a part of a cartel
and employing athletes, but the programs are operated with
employees (athletes) who are being paid slave wages,

(p.

211 )

Hart-Nibbrig and Cottingham (1986, p. 10) proclaimed "...the
reign of the amateur in intercollegiate athletics has ended. The
present system of intercollegiate sport is highly
professionalized.11 Receipt of any form of compensation
constitutes a degree of professionalism:
... any difference between a student-athlete in a big-time
sports program and a professional athlete lies only in the
amount of the compensation, not in any special quality the
amateur enjoys and the professional lacks.

(Lawrence, 1987,

p. 145)
Noll noted that, due to strict NCAA rules, a "strong college
player ... is paid approximately 3 to 10 percent of his actual
economic value to a university."

(in Andre & James, 1991, p. 206)

Bailey and Littleton (1991, p. 64) argued that the current NCAA
regulations in intercollegiate athletics that foster the image of
amateurism are "... keeping student-athletes in a kind of
economic bondage even though their athletic efforts annually
produce untold millions of dollars in revenue." The major sources
of revenue in today's commercialized athletic system include "...
gate receipts, television, and postseason play."

(Noll, in Andre

& James, 1991, p. 200)
Noll (in Andre & James, 1991, p. 197) concluded that

"American universities have an uneasy relationship with their
commercial activities." Financial necessity can cause conflict
with the intellectual mission of an institution. Financial
pressures have at times led unscrupulous practitioners to obtain
academically "substandard" student-athletes who are expected to
remain eligible for play, if not for graduation.

(Gilley et al.,

1986, p. 25; Nyquist, in Chu et a l ., 1985) As reform movements
attempt to bring athletics and academics "... into a reciprocal
relationship, the issue of use of public funds for athletics will
have to be addressed more precisely."
p. 125-126)

(Bailey & Littleton, 1991,

Currently, public policy against using state funds

for athletics serves as evidence of the fissure between athletics
and academics, and as a stumbling block for incorporating
athletics into the university mainstream; therefore, "...the
overt translation of intercollegiate athletics into a commercial
enterprise" occurs.

(Frey, in Chu et al., 1985; Bailey &

Littleton, 1991, p. 64)
A variety of interests in higher education, as well as
athletics, have identified both abuses and benefits in college
athletics. The search for blame has been directed in numerous
arenas, including: The NCAA, the university, the board, the
president, the faculty, the coaches, the players, the media, and
extramural concerns. For example Boyer (in Slaughter & Lapchick,
1991, p. xiii) noted: "Faculty are especially crucial to the
cause of ethics in athletics.

... Their records ... are

embarrassingly weak." Lawrence (1987) concluded:

The NCAA has turned college sports into big business, with
pressure to cheat on recruiting rules, to keep academically
unfit students eligible, and to retain coaches who win but
who sometimes do not exemplify the values generally believed
to come from athletics,

{p. xv)

The university itself has been charged with "hypocrisy" for
housing athletic programs.

(Bailey & Littleton, 1991, p. 61)

Bailey and Littleton (1991) observed:
...college sports are essentially a culture not
sufficiently responsive to the educational and ethical
rhythms of their environment and, left to their own
dynamic, tend to seek constantly a life of their own outside
that setting. Yet they must live there, within the
university...

(p. 30)

Identifying contributors to the problems facing college athletics
demonstrates the scope of intercollegiate athletics and the need
for a comprehensive, unified strategy in addressing these complex
problems. The concern for the role of athletics in higher
education is not a new one. Lapchick (in Slaughter

&. Lapchick,

1991) stated:
There is a great deal of debate over whether college
athletics has changed significantly since its first
appearance.

... In reviewing the history of sport at those

schools, we would do well to be cautious in assigning
sainthood to ancestors and damnation to contemporaries.
Conflict and controversy have followed the development of
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sport in America just as surely they have followed the
development of any social institution.

Nostalgia often

blurs our vision ... Today's problems in sport are not new,
nor have they just recently bloomed.
precursors to today's

In unearthing the

problems, we must becareful to

realize that, in reconstructing

their contexts and

environments, we tend

to ignore the clouds for

and the hardships for

the joys. (p. xix)

the sunshine

According to Lapchick {in Slaughter & Lapchick, 1991, p. xx) ,
current observers of intercollegiate athletics "...are simply
deluding themselves when they wax nostalgic for a time when
things were better." Boyer (in Slaughter & Lapchick, 1991, p. ix,
x) argued that while "ethical issues in sport predate our own
time," they have changed, becoming "... more serious than before.
Changes in degree have become changes in kind. Now, sport
programs involve staggering amounts of money, television
contracts, and mass audiences." Giamatti (1988, p. 191)
concluded: "To reform intercollegiate athletics is to begin to
approach, again, a true examination of American higher
education's nature and purpose."
Conclusion
A variety of reform recommendations have been made. Some
suggest that athletics be moved off college campuses.

(Simon, in

Andre & James, 1991; Nyquist, in Chu et al., 1985) Lawrence
(1987) demonstrated the inevitability of the connection:
"One obvious solution would be to abolish commercial
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football at all universities.

... The history of

intercollegiate sports shows, however, that this solution
would be short lived.

With the loss of big-time football,

fans would turn to the next level of collegiate competition
to satisfy their appetite for the game.

Fraternities, for

example, might start an interuniversity league.

They would

quickly find enough outside interest to play in stadiums and
charge admission.

Driven by the public recognition and

potential television appearances, these teams would begin
recruiting actively, and suddenly the cycle would start
again.

Thus, while it may be interesting to imagine what

education would be like without big-time athletics,
practically speaking,it would be difficult to abolish
sports."

(p. 144)

Noll (in Andre & James, 1987) and Bailey and Littleton (1991)
noted a need for revenue sharing within the NCAA in conjunction
with an increase in academic standards for participants. Hanford
(in Chu et al., 1985) recommended that freshman should be deemed
ineligible for competition. Atwell (in Chu et al., 1985)
emphasized the need to begin reform at the scholastic level and
to maintain high academic standards. Boyer (in Chu et al., 1985)
deemed it critical to reduce commercialism and maintain academic
integrity. Sperber (1990, p. 345) called on all interests
involved in college athletics to "stop pretending" that they "are
connected to the educational mission of American colleges and
universities."

Uehling (in Chu et a l ., 1985)/ Davis (1979), Hanford (in
Frey, 1982) recognized the need for increased presidential
leadership. According to Gilley (1986, p. 9), "It is clear that
strong presidential leadership, clear lines of authority and
responsibility, and tighter internal university control are
required. 11 Boyer (in Chu et al., 1985) noted the need for Board
support. Scott (in Frey, 1982, p. 35) echoed the presidents' need
for the "steadfast support" of the board of trustees; and
suggested "strengthening the head of the professional personnel
in charge of athletics."

Marmion (1979, p. 344) noted the need

for administrators to get involved and warned of "governmental
involvement." Atwell (1983) and Frey (in Chu et a l ., 1985, p.
187) also described the alternatives for increased government
involvement in college sports. They warned that the government
might install a "tsar" for intercollegiate athletics, as it has
in the war on drugs, or that it might increase legislation
specifically addressing athletic issues, or that it might
increase its involvement as "a result of court actions."
Sage (1990, p. 184) called for the NCAA to stop "blaming the
victim", to take responsibility and to address "the inherent
structural problems." Slaughter and Lapchick (1989) called on the
NCAA to establish a comprehensive policy for reform including
prescribed responsibilities for presidents, coaches, and athletic
administrators in dealing with academic and athletic achievement.
McPherson (1989, p. 81) suggested that neither a "total
professional entertainment model" nor a "total amateur model"

would work for intercollegiate athletics in our society. Athletic
and academic programs need to be "intimately integrated" in
higher education.

(McPherson, 1989, p. 81) Toward this end, Hart-

Nibbrig and Cottingham (1986, p. 107-117) presented three reform
options: a "commercially viable semiprofessional college sports
system" that would function as a feeder system for professional
athletics and be tangential to the university; a residual amateur
system with university control and academic emphasis being the
cornerstones; and a "corporate athleticism" model with commercial
interests competing for influence over university athletics and
the inherent conflicts with academic interests that would occur.
However, each of the three models would extend the struggle
between academic and commercial interests.
Since athletics reside within the university and are
nourished by external sources, there appears to be no single
formula for success in controlling intercollegiate athletics, as
Bailey and Littleton (1991) noted:
There are many reasons for the lack of effective control of
abuses in college sports. Perhaps the two most important
are the failure of the leadership of higher education to
recognize the seriousness of the problem and the fact that
over the past century control has often been directed more
toward the treatment of the symptoms than to the fundamental
causes of the malady....

As a result, the complex matrix of

causes has not been adequately clarified, and, therefore, no
foundation has been developed for a holistic approach to the
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control of abuses in college sports with emphasis on the
fundamental causes,

(p.ix)

Cooperative reform efforts involving 11...leaders from higher
education, business, the Congress, sports, and boards of
trustees", in the form of the Knight Commission, have set out to
jointly recommend reform in intercollegiate athletics."

(Atwell

et a l ., in Lederman, 1990, p.38) Boyer described the stakes at
hand in the reform of college athletics:
I am confident we could meet the challenge of ethics in
college sport.

Indeed, we must, for if the institution of

higher education allows unscrupulous practices and athletic
scandals to undermine the integrity of the enterprise, that
college or university loses its authority in society.

...

It should be remembered that what is at stake is nothing
less than the basic definition of the institution of higher
education,

(in Slaughter & Lapchick, 1991, p. xiv)

Through examining the persistent dysfunctions in the governance
of intercollegiate athletics, practical reforms can be
determined. This study pursues feasible reform alternatives based
upon an examination of the needs motivating constituents to
exercise authority and power in the governance of intercollegiate
athletics.

CHAPTER III

DESIGN OF THE STUDY
Introduction
This study determines avenues for reform in big time
intercollegiate athletics by looking at the systemic dysfunctions
of governance over time as revealed by an analysis of the needs
that have prompted constituents to exercise power and authority
at two points in the development of intercollegiate athletics.
First, an examination of the policies, practices, and
circumstances of intercollegiate athletics in 1929 based upon the
data provided in the Savage Report (1929) reveals the use of
power and authority by various constituents at that time. Next,
the current policies, practices, and circumstances of
intercollegiate athletics are examined to determine constituent
use of power and authority using recent data from a variety of
reports and other sources. These examinations of constituent use
of power and authority illustrate the systemic dysfunction in
governance over time wherein constituents can either fulfill or
relinquish their authority roles, which results in gaps in
authority that are filled in by other constituents' use of power.
Finally, the needs that drive these constituents to either use or
not use authority and power in intercollegiate athletic
governance emerge from the examination of their actions.
In order to effectively accomplish these ends, the design of
this study must be grounded within a sound conceptual framework,
founded upon the application of relevant source materials, and

conducted using viable methodological procedures. That is, in
describing the design of this study, I must first establish the
conceptual framework within which the study has been conducted.
In so doing, I examine university governance and its component
constituencies, the utilization of authority and power by these
constituents, and the needs that prompt their exercise of
authority and power. Based upon this conceptual framework, I then
provide a description of the sources utilized in the study. I
conclude with an explanation of the methodological procedures
employed in this study.
Conceptual Framework
Although Westmeyer {1990} identified athletics as a major
area for policy setting, many organizational theories and
governance models in higher education have overlooked the
complex, if not confused, relationship of intercollegiate
athletics to institutional governance. Westmeyer {1990} defined
governance as policy-making, distinct from administration, which
is the execution of policy through decision-making, and
management, which may not involve decision-making at all.
Governance occurs within a structure. A variety of
institutional governance models are recognized in higher
education research, including the collegial model, the political
model, and the bureaucratic model.

{Baldridge, 1991) No single

theory is sufficient in explaining the governance of
universities. The collegial model presents decision-making as a
consensus-building process relying on professional, or expert,
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authority rather than bureaucratic authority. The political model
emphasizes the application of power, to resolve conflicting
interests, in setting and administering policy. The bureaucratic
model highlights in particular the structural hierarchy within
the institution, the organizational chain of command, and the
lines of authority. Each of these models illustrates certain
aspects of institutional governance within which a variety of
constituents operate.
Who are the constituents within the institutional hierarchy
who are involved in governance and administration? Westmeyer
(1990)

identified participants within the governance structure of

institutions of higher education: the state legislature, the
state coordinating boards, governing boards, the president, other
administrators, and the faculty. The state confers a charter upon
the governing board of an institution, which then becomes the
supreme legal authority responsible for university policy.
(Kauffman, 1980) Presidents provide leadership in the operation
of the university, serving at the will of the board.

(Kauffman,

1980) Both boards and presidents are charged with the protection
and fulfillment of the institutional mission.

(Chait et al.,

1993) Within the bureaucratic hierarchy of intercollegiate
athletics governance, other administrators would include the
athletic director and his/her assistants and the coaches.
Athletic administrators and coaches are chiefly responsible for
the daily operation of athletic departments. Conferences and the
NCAA are also part of the bureaucratic structure of governance in
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that, while they are housed off campus, they are involved in
policy making for intercollegiate athletics.
The institutional governance structure operates through the
processes of governance. The processes of governance occur within
the interactions among the constituents. However, governance,
which involves the processes, procedures, and practices of
setting policy and administering policy through decision-making,
can be influenced subtlety from the outside.

(Westmeyer, 1990)

These "subtle influences" are actors outside the governance
structure who have the potential to influence the processes of
institutional governance.
These external constituents include the alumni, the federal
government, the state governments, funding agencies, accrediting
agencies, and the public. The alumni provide "the greatest source
of support for sports programs."

(Westmeyer, 1990, p. 126) The

federal government utilizes finances, most with restrictions and
regulations attached, and federal court decisions. State
governments use funding, direct legislation, and board influence.
Funding agencies, with regard to intercollegiate athletics,
include individual donors, private companies, the media,
foundations, and governmental agencies. They influence governance
processes through their distribution of resources. The public,
with regard to intercollegiate athletics, includes students,
parents, fans, the college community, and the general public. The
public influence is through their financial support as consumers
of intercollegiate athletics.
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For the purpose of this study, the constituents who are
legitimately involved in the governance process of
intercollegiate athletics consist of the state government, the
board, the president, the faculty, the athletic administration,
the coach, the conferences, and the NCAA.

(Knight Commission,

1993; Bailey & Littleton, 1991; Yaeger, 1991; Gilley et al.,
1986; Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986; Chu et al., 1985; Frey,
1982; Savage et al., 1929) On the other hand, constituents who
influence the governance process from a position external to the
formal governance structure include the alumni, local businesses
and corporate sponsors, boosters, the local community, the
general public, state governments, the federal government, the
media, and in some circumstances the NCAA.

(Knight Commission,

1993; Andre & James, 1991; Lawrence, 1987; Gilley et al., 1986;
Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986; Chu et al., 1985; Frey, 1982;
Savage et al., 1929)
Constituents, both within and external to the formal
governance structure, may or may not influence the governance
process through policy-setting and decision-making, regardless of
their location on or off campus. For example, the NCAA, which is
located off-campus, is part of the formal intercollegiate
governance structure and has influence in athletic policy. While
students reside on-campus, but are not part of the formal
governance structure and have little or no influence in athletic
policy. Yet the alumni, who are neither part of the formal
governance structure nor on-campus, also have influence in
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intercollegiate athletic policy. These apparent contradictions
are clarified by an examination of constituents' use of authority
and power.
Burbules (1986) defined authority as a legitimate right to
govern, which in the case of higher education is granted by the
state to governing boards. Legitimate authority is a function of
position and includes components such as positional privilege and
expertise. Bureaucratic hierarchy supports authority
relationships through designating the roles and responsibilities
of authorized actors. Constituents gain control by exercising
legitimate authority through the formal governance structure. For
purposes of this study, the legitimate authority of constituents
in athletic governance is indicated by their prescribed roles and
responsibilities, by official institutional policy and policysetting structures, by the formal structure of the bureaucratic
hierarchy, by the official channels of communication, and by the
chain of command.
While authority is exercised legitimately through the
governance hierarchy, power is exercised through both the formal
and informal processes of intercollegiate athletic governance.
Constituents can utilize power legitimately to support authority
or illegitimately to circumvent authority. In examining the use
of power by constituents, the distinct modes of power identified
by Wolf (1990) are employed: interpersonal power centers on the
capacity of an individual or group to impose its will upon
another individual or group through interactive relationships;
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tactical power involves the methods and strategies employed to
obtain desired outcomes by controlling a specified environment;
and structural power organizes and shapes the domains of power
play, thereby determining the form and direction of possible
interaction. These modes of power are applied in the examination
of the arenas, circumstances, and constituent practices involved
in policy setting and decision-making that reveal the use of
power in the governance of intercollegiate athletics.
For the purpose of this study, power is evident through
certain assumptions: a conflict of interest must exist in power
relationships; power relationships are reciprocal in nature; and
power relations exist within an environment which can be
influenced by its constituents.

(Burbules, 1986) The exercise of

power by constituents includes obtaining control or influence
through the use of coercion, exploitation, incentive, sanction,
negotiation, or command, among others.

(Crespi, 1992; Airaksinen,

1988; Burbules, 1986; Henderson, 1981; Pennock & Chapman, 1972;
Bailey, 1969; Oppenheim, 1961)
When an actor relinquishes authority by not fulfilling
his/her prescribed role and responsibilities, gaps in authority
develop. Other actors then exercise various modes of power to
fill these gaps in authority. An examination of the needs that
motivate these actors to either exercise authority, relinquish
authority, or utilize power can help clarify the systemic
dysfunctions in the governance of intercollegiate athletics.
(Owens, 1981; Maslow, 1970)
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Sources
Since this study analyzes two time periods to determine the
degree of consistent failure in authority, I must ground the
analysis of governance structure and processes within its own
time frame. Standard university governance procedures are
delineated for both the 1929 period and the present. Elliott and
his colleagues (1935) in The Government of Higher Education
described the structure and procedures of governance in the
American system of higher education. The authors delineated the
roles and responsibilities of university constituents both within
and outside of the campus authority hierarchy.

(Elliott et al.,

1935) The ultimate authority in university governance was
bestowed by the state upon the governing board. The board
typically retained authority in policy matters, particularly as
they pertained to the mission. As capitalistic interest in higher
education increased, universities began redefining and refining
their missions in the 1920s.

(Barrow, 1990) The general principle

stood that "boards should legislate and presidents should
execute."

(Elliott et al., 1935, p. 187) The board delegated to

the president the authority to execute policy, except in areas of
"legal responsibilities, and investments." (Elliott et a l ., 1935,
p. 187) The emerging capitalistic interests of the university
resulted ultimately in "little else than businessmen" serving in
the role of president.

(Kauffman, 1980; Veysey, 1965, p. 346)

Administrative officers carried out responsibilities with various
degrees of authority in the hierarchy. In some institutions,
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"dual organization" resulted in "several administrative officers
who are not subordinate to the president."

(Elliott et al., 1935,

p. 187)
Kerr (1982), Westmeyer (1990), and Baldridge (1991) are
among the many scholars whose combined works reveal the current
structure and procedures in university governance. Today's
"multiversity" continues to lack clarity in its purpose.

(Kerr,

1982) "Goal ambiguity" has led to such complexities in today's
universities that their governance process cannot be explained
using one prototype, but requires at least three models: the
bureaucratic, the collegial, and the political.

(Baldridge, 1991)

The typical current governance structure remains similar to its
1929 counterpart, with the governing board at its pinnacle, and
the president serving at the will of the board.

(Westmeyer, 1990)

Governing boards continue to be granted the ultimate authority in
policy-making on individual campuses.

(Chait et al., 1993) And

presidents continue to have major responsibilities in policy
execution.

(Kauffman, 1980)

In order to analyze the governance issues earlier in the
century, I used data from the 1929 Carnegie Foundation for the
Advancement of Teaching (CFAT) Report entitled American College
Athletics

(commonly referred to as the Savage Report). Lawrence

(1987, p. 8) described the Savage Report as "... the most
thorough look ever taken at U.S. college sport." Introducing the
Report, Savage (1929) stated its purpose:
The present enquiry has for its object to ascertain the
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significant facts concerning college athletics in the United
States ... , to analyze these facts in relation to American
college and university life, ... and to present a summary of
American college athletics, their merits and their defects,
together with such suggestions looking toward their
improvement as may grow out of the materials at hand.

(p. 3)

The Savage Report (1929) documented the policy and practices of
the institution and the constituents involved in the governance
of intercollegiate athletics. Scholars agree that the
recommendations presented in the Savage Report (1929) were
neither well received nor effective in changing the direction of
American college athletics, yet, accurately reflected the
condition of athletics in American colleges as they had developed
in 1929.

(Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986; Davenport, in Chu et

al., 1985; Slaughter & Lapchick, 1989; Hanford, 1979) Savage
(1929) addressed the inefficacy of previous reform:
The present situation in American college athletics could be
described and efficacious remedies proposed merely by
setting forth a series of quotations from materials
published before 1900. The complaints that have been voiced
since 1900 have been in the main echoes or amplifications of
the adverse criticisms of previous years. Some of the
reasons these cries have gone unheeded are to be found in
their general nature and lack of specific modern instances,
but especially in the fact that the interests of individuals
and the special pleadings which have been used to buttress
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and justify their complaints have obscured the truth of
their utterances,

{p. 11, 12)

According to its authors, the Savage Report (1929, p. 12) was
"not the final word" on intercollegiate athletics, nor did it
propose "a formula for remedying" all of the problems in college
athletics because college athletics were "so complex and so
overlaid with the interests of individuals." Smith's (1988)
historical analysis of the athletic governance and constituent
roles is used in the current study to coordinate with the 1929
Savage Report.
With no single current report providing sufficient evidence
for an analysis of contemporary athletic governance, a variety of
national reports are employed to examine constituent use of power
and authority. The Reports of the Knight Foundation's Commission
on Intercollegiate Athletics (Knight Commission, 1993) resulted
from a three year, three million dollar investigation of athletic
abuses in higher education. The Knight Commission (1993)
documented the roles of selected constituents in the governance
of intercollegiate athletics. Its ultimate purpose was the
proposal of a reform agenda, based upon redefining constituent
roles and clarifying intercollegiate athletic goals.
Published in 1983, the NCAA Report of the Select Committee
on Athletic Problems and Concerns in Higher Education (NCAA
Report) was convened by the NCAA Council in order to:
... bring together a group of esteemed individuals,
combining the highest standing in higher education with
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extensive knowledge of intercollegiate athletics, to examine
in detail the serious problems affecting college athletics
today,

(p. 23)

The NCAA Report (1983) first identified problem areas in
intercollegiate athletics. It then generated "conclusions and
recommendations" concerning academic issues, athletic governance
issues, athletic finance issues, recruiting issues, and NCAA
enforcement issues.
The American Council on Education (ACE) and George Mason
University cooperatively issued the Special Report on
Administration of University Athletic Programs: Internal Control
and Excellence.

(Gilley et al., 1986) This study presented data

from a survey of 138 Division I-A university presidents, and
included an historical examination of athletic problems, and
comparisons of case studies from eight institutions. Four of the
institutions exhibited problems in athletics and four were
trouble-free. Gilley and his colleagues (1986) focused on
leadership and control in intercollegiate athletics.
The NCAA Presidents' Commission Third National Forum (1988)
offers perspectives and insights from a federal representative,
the NCAA administration, and the NCAA presidential membership.
Commission Chair John Slaughter noted that the NCAA Forum
provided the "opportunity to discuss and to debate the
substantive policy issues in college athletics." (NCAA Forum,
1988) The ultimate purpose was to enable Forum participants to
recognize and define the problems and abuses in college athletics
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and to treat these problems through recommended reform
legislation to be sponsored by the NCAA Presidents' Commission.
Additional sources used in interpreting modern college
athletics include books and journal articles by contemporary
social scientists who examine intercollegiate athletics. For
example, many prominent researchers contributed to the ACE Report
(1979), who after three years of investigation devoted an entire
issue of its Educational Record to college athletics. A variety
of scholars examining legal, financial, and governance issues in
intercollegiate athletics are presented by Frey (1982) in
Governance of Intercollegiate Athletics and in Government and
Sport. (Johnson & Frey, 1985) In Sport and Higher Education. Chu
and his colleagues (1985) compiled descriptive and analytical
studies by contributing authors that focused on historical,
financial, governance, and academic issues in intercollegiate
athletics.
Comprehensive general studies that describe commercial and
athletic interests, analyze problems in governance, and prescribe
various reform recommendations include Bailey and Littleton
(1991), Andre and James (1991), Slaughter and Lapchick (1989) ,
Lawrence (1987), and Chu (1989). Commercial interests and the
role of the NCAA are examined by Yaeger (1991) and Funk (1991) .
Hart-Nibbrig and Cottingham (1986), Sperber (1990), Thelin
(1994), and Lapchick (1986) examine the commercialization of
intercollegiate athletics and describe interests impacting the
governance of college athletics. Sage (1990; 1980), Eitzen and
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Sage (1978), McPherson (1989), Wilson (1994), and Baker (1981)
offer sociological analyses of the significance and operation of
intercollegiate athletics in American society.
Methodological Procedure
The research questions delineated in Chapter I dictate the
methods and procedures employed in this study. First of all, the
constituents who use authority and power in the governance of
intercollegiate athletics must be identified from within the
source materials from both 1929 and the present. Using the
explanation of legitimate governance structure presented by
Elliott (1935) and Savage (1929), I isolated the actors who were
designed to be in authority positions from those who were located
outside the bona fide structures. I identified constituents using
power by their actions in intercollegiate athletics through
interpreting and generalizing examples presented in the source
materials.
Second, the manner by which constituents utilize power and
authority in the governance of intercollegiate athletics had to
be discovered. I determined the use of power and authority by
interpreting constituent actions, practices, policies,
structures, and circumstances in the governance of
intercollegiate athletics. Sources from both time periods are
presented to demonstrate examples of the use of power and
authority. If those in authority roles demonstrated that they had
relinquished their proper roles, further examination sought to
document the exercise of power to fill in the gaps in authority.
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My interpretation of constituent uses of power through actions,
practices, policies, structures, and circumstances is based upon
the modes of power identified by Wolf (1990).
Third, the analysis proceeded to the needs that motivate the
constituent to exercise power and authority in the governance of
intercollegiate athletics. Maslow's (1970) Hierarchy of Needs and
his concept of deficiency needs are applied to the use of
authority and power by constituents. Common factors that affect
the concept of self-preservation in constituent use of power and
authority were sought.
When, over time, authority roles are not executed properly
and the resulting gaps are filled by the use of power, an
incongruence between the governance structure and the processes
employed by constituents in the governance of intercollegiate
athletics occurs. This incongruence indicates a systemic
dysfunction in the governance of intercollegiate athletics. An
interpretation of source materials that determines who uses power
and authority, how they use power and authority, and why they use
power and authority are instruments of analysis that lead to the
development of recommendations for systemic change in athletic
governance. Reform alternatives are generated from this study
based upon the answers to the research questions.
This study employs a variety of research methods in order to
address the questions posed above. Each method has its strengths
and shortcomings, as does the collective use of a number of
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methodological techniques. All research methods and results,
therefore, are subject to argument:
Methodological diversity is a phenomenon endlessly familiar
to academic researchers, and they know its basis is partly
technical and partly a matter of what researchers feel it is
most important to explain.

(Cohen & Garet, 1983, p. 304)

As Kaestle (1988, p. 67) noted, "not all questions are
linked to quantitative research"; therefore, this study employs
elements of such qualitative research techniques as Content
Analysis, Historical Interpretation, Descriptive Study, and Case
and Field Study. The methodologies employed are qualitative
designs in social research, employed to define and use social
concepts such as power and authority, and as such are subject to
inherent biases.

(Burbules, 1986) While this study does not

employ an empirical, quantitative analysis of data, some of the
source materials utilized quantitative research methods.
Some elements of the Content Analysis methodology are used
to identify and extract information from past and present
sources. The analysis is systematic and sequential in nature, the
material is examined in the context of its time and source, and
inferences are made from the data collected.

(Krippendorff, 198 0)

The content of the source documents identified are examined for
specific examples indicating the use of power and authority by
constituents in the governance of intercollegiate athletics. One
example of a specific breach in authority cited in a national
report indicates a systemic occurrence if the context in which it
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is referenced indicates that it is representative of similar
occurrences. Such indicators are generalized to demonstrate the
authority structure as well as the power relationships among
constituents in the process of governance. For example, the
Savage Report (1929, p. 90) specifically cited the University of
Wisconsin's illegitimate use of a "slush fund" to emphasize the
common existence of such funds at universities of the day.
Historical Interpretation is used to examine the distant and
recent past. It requires "challenging and creative interaction"
with source materials by historical "scavengers."

(Kaestle, 1988,

pp. 61, 71) Historical analysis is based on the sources at hand,
but it is also based upon the historian's temperament,
convictions, hunches, and explicit and implicit theoretical
beliefs:
The rules of investigation and analysis help us less and
less as we attempt to make broader generalizations about the
past, or make judgments about its relation to the present,
and this is part of what we mean when we say that history is
also art.

(Kaestle, 1988, p. 61)

Historical interpretation remains largely subjective, as Kaestle
(1988, p.68) noted that history "... is selective and
interpretive, it is necessarily guided by the individual
historian's sense of what is important, where to find meaning,
and how social change and human motivation work. 11
Kaestle (1988, p. 67) noted the methodological problems
associated with historical interpretation: "There is no single,

definable method of inquiry, and important historical
generalizations are rarely beyond dispute." Kaestle (1988)
presented four key problems to watch for: confusing correlations
with causal relationships; avoiding vagueness and presentism when
defining key terms; differentiating between evidence of ideas
about how people should behave and evidence of ideas about how
people in fact behave; and distinguishing between intent and
consequences. While no researcher can "completely transcend or
resolve the four problems," it is essential that researcher and
reader alike be aware of the problems and of the "associated
methodological challenges" in attempting to make meaningful
generalizations resultant to interpretive analyses.

(Kaestle,

1988, p. 70)
Because this period of exploration and revision has resulted
in diverse eclectic methodologies, because no new
methodological or ideological consensus has emerged--in
short, because there is no successful paradigm in
educational history today--it is all the more important that
each reader of educational history be critically alert and
independent.

(Kaestle, 1988, p. 71)

This study also employs elements of both Descriptive and
Case and Field Study methods. In its broadest sense, the term
Descriptive can include many types of studies designed to
describe situations or events.

(Isaac & Michael, 1981) The

current study is Descriptive only in that it systematically
describes the facts and characteristics of a given population or

area of interest.

(Isaac & Michael, 1981) The data described is

generated from an analysis of other source materials. Many of the
sources examined in this study utilized the Case and Field Study
techniques, in that they intensively analyzed the background,
current status, and environmental interactions of intercollegiate
athletics governance.

(Isaac & Michael, 1981) While the Case and

Field Study method is vulnerable to subjective biases, it can
provide useful anecdotes and examples from which to generalize.
(Isaac fie Michael, 1981) For example, case studies such as the one
of UNLV basketball coach Tarkanian's battle with the NCAA, and
the involvement of the board and president, provide examples of
the use of power and authority by each of these constituents in
intercollegiate athletic governance from which generalizations
can be drawn.

(Yaeger, 1991)

Elements of a variety of methodologies are used in this
study to analyze constituent use of power and authority in the
governance of intercollegiate athletics by applying established
concepts and theories to information obtained from the source
materials. Specifically, Wolf's (1990) modes of power are applied
to the content of relevant source materials from both 1929 and
the present. In Chapters Four and Five, this study interprets
circumstances, structures, actions, practices, policies, and
resources through examples and generalizations in order to
determine constituent use of power and authority in the
governance of intercollegiate athletics. Chapter Four identifies
the constituents who use power and authority, analyzes how they
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use power and authority, and determines dysfunctions in athletic
governance in 1929. Chapter Five examines constituent use of
power and authority and the subsequent systemic dysfunction in
intercollegiate athletic governance. The need for conducting this
study over time is evident in the application of the findings to
the development of reform alternatives. Chapter Six describes the
systemic breakdown of intercollegiate athletic governance over
time and uses the work of Maslow {1970) to analyze the needs
prompting constituent use of power and authority over time, thus,
determining viable alternatives for reform in athletic
governance.
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CHAPTER IV

AUTHORITY AND POWER IN 1929 COLLEGE ATHLETICS
Introduction
In 1929, Howard Savage prepared a report for the Carnegie
Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, which he entitled
American College Athletics. The Savage Report has been judged as
the most comprehensive examination of intercollegiate athletics
to date.

(Lawrence, 1987) The purpose of the 1929 Savage Report

was to determine the "significant facts" about American college
athletics, to analyze these facts in order to form
generalizations about athletics within the American university,
to summarize the "merits and defects" of American college
athletics, and to offer suggestions for improvement of American
college athletics.

(Savage et al., 1929, p. 3) In addition,

Savage and his colleagues (1929, p. 3) noted that "some attention
was paid to the bearings of college athletics upon the principles
and practices of education."
In the preface of the Savage Report (1929), Henry Pritchett,
President of the Carnegie Foundation at the time, highlighted the
importance of this investigation into the arena of
intercollegiate athletics:
In the United States the composite institution called a
university is doubtless still an intellectual agency. But
it is also a social, a commercial, and an athletic agency,
and these activities have in recent years appreciably
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overshadowed the intellectual life for which the university
is assumed to exist,

(p. viii)

Furthermore, Pritchett noted the importance of examining
athletics in the context of its time and place. At the time, no
"system" of American higher education existed; rather, there was
"a high degree of institutional autonomy and diversity."

(Elliott

et al., 1935, p. 1) The university was a relatively new and
changing entity. Could it "serve every cause--scholarship,
science, business, salesmanship, organized athletics?"

(Savage et

al., 1929, p. xxi) Questions involving the purpose of the
university were constantly being asked, yet remained unanswered.
Graduate research studies had emerged on the same campuses as
undergraduate colleges. Business and professional curricula were
added to the arts and sciences.
The weakness of the American university as it exists today
lies in its lack of intellectual sincerity. It stands
nominally for high intellectual ideals. Its effort at
intellectual leadership is diluted with many other efforts
in fields wholly foreign to this primary purpose. Inter
college athletics form ... one of these.

(Savage et al.,

1929, p. xviii)
"Mass production in higher education" created a "financial load"
on public resources and inspired "social and intellectual
objections;" however, no single formula for effectively
controlling college athletics existed among the 130 institutions
studied.

(Savage et al., 1929, p. xviii) The term "control"
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itself connotes the need to contain a force that may get out of
hand. The Savage Report (1929) defined athletic "control" as:
the conduct of games and contests through the definite
delegation of authority and responsibility touching a vast
number of phases of college life, including a clear
assessment of purposes both actual and theoretical, the
framing and execution of a policy that takes account of the
interests, whether practical or sentimental, of various
groups, the provision and care of suitable accommodations,
medical attention, finance, including auditing and
bookkeeping, the preparation and the holding of contests,
their schedules, and external relations in competition.
(p. 78)
This section of the study examines the issue of control--the
governance of intercollegiate athletics in 1929--through
analyzing constituent use of authority and power. The roles and
responsibilities of constituents within the ideal athletic
authority structure are presented, followed by an analysis of the
discordant practices of those constituents that permitted gaps in
the use of authority to occur. The study then examines the types
of power utilized by constituents to fill in those authority
gaps.
Authority
In the early decades of the Twentieth Century, institutions
of higher education were governed within structures where
constituent roles and responsibilities were specified.

Constituents were delegated degrees of authority within
bureaucratic hierarchies and these roles enabled or restricted
their participation in the governance of intercollegiate
athletics. The constituent roles that exercised authority in the
typical collegiate governance structure of 1929 included the
governing board, the president, the faculty, the athletic
administrator, the coach, the alumni, the conferences, and the
NCAA.

(Savage, 1929; Elliott, 1935) Constituents did not always

fulfill nor limit themselves to the use of their prescribed
authority roles, thus they established breaches in the authority
structure. These breaches were quickly filled by constituents who
were not ordained with the authority to
began to use power,

fulfill the role, but who

either legitimately or illegitimately.

In order to determine the dysfunctions of intercollegiate
athletic governance

in 1929, this study first explains theideal

authority roles and

responsibilities of constituents in

intercollegiate athletic governance. That explanation is followed
by a description of authority gaps that emerged and the power
used to fill those gaps, which are examined through the Savage
Report's (1929) explanation of the practices, policies, and
circumstances of the constituents in intercollegiate athletic
governance.
Ideal Authority; Institutional Actors
State governments granted charters authorizing the operation
of private institutions and served as the ultimate authority in
public institutions as well. The institutional governing board

assumed, or was granted, the authority as the pinnacle of
governance for the university and all of its programs. The
governing board was primarily concerned with policy-making and
procuring resources.

(Elliott et al., 1935) At most institutions

the authority to appoint athletic committees and personnel fell
to the governing board. Some boards delegated this authority to
the president or director of physical education. In rare
instances, the board might contravene a president's
recommendation, generally within financial or personnel matters.
(Savage et al., 1929) However, the final authority over policy,
whether university or athletic, usually rested with, and was
delegated by, the university governing board. The "simple
principle that boards should legislate and presidents should
execute" applied to all areas of responsibility, with the rare
exception of legal responsibilities and investments.

(Elliott et

al., 1935, p. 187)
The university president was generally appointed by the
board as the chief executive officer and was delegated the
authority to carry out university policy. In the ideal authority
hierarchy, the president was responsible for athletics, although
he delegated that authority to other university officials. The
president often delegated the authority to control finances and
maintain accounts to administrative officials such as the
treasurer, or to athletic officials, such as the director or
coach. Eligibility decisions were often delegated to the
registrar or athletic committee.

Personnel selection decisions were not as consistent across
institutions. Athletic personnel decisions, such as the choice of
coaches, were often delegated to an athletic board, the athletic
director, or even the alumni.

(Savage et al., 1929) In some

cases, the governing board retained its authority in athletic
personnel matters, as well. For example, one-third of the
institutions in the Savage Report required a cooperative effort
in the selection of a coach. The final choice was usually made by
the president, the athletic director, the alumni, or, far less
frequently, the faculty. The choice was made in varying degrees
of cooperation with the president, trustees, faculty, alumni,
undergraduates, athletic director, or athletic committee.

(Savage

et a l ., 1929, p. 164) Boards, through presidents, delegated the
authority of personnel selection to some form of athletic
committee in 30% of the cases; to the alumni in 20%; to the
athletic director in 20%; to the faculty in 17%; and to remain
with the president in 17%. Appointments, equally as diverse among
universities, were conferred by the trustees in 36% of the cases;
the president in 28%; the athletic committee in 18%; the alumni
in 11%; the athletic director in 3%; and the faculty in 2%.
Approval of athletic personnel by the board trustees was required
in 47% of all the institutions.

(Savage et al., 1929, p. 164) The

board and the president were most often responsible for the
selection process, but rarely contravened the decisions of those
to whom they had delegated authority.
Eliot (1908, p. 238) stated that the president should be "an

inventing and animating force, and often a leader; not a ruler or
an autocrat." The president was charged with protecting the
mission of the institution and inspiring the university
constituents. Savage (1929, p. 265) suggested that he was "the
man who is the most likely to succeed in uprooting the evils..."
of college athletics. However the president did play the only
part: "The defense of the intellectual integrity of the college
and of the university lies with the president and faculty. With
them also lies the authority. 11 (Savage et al., 1929, p. xx)
Savage (1929, p. 100, 101) identified three types of faculty
involvement: l) pseudo-faculty control, wherein faculty authority
was overshadowed by other interested parties such as coaches or
athletic directors, or was restricted to certain issues such as
eligibility, or was given to coaches and physical educators who
were "elevated to faculty status"; 2) faculty guidance, wherein
the faculty oversaw student-run athletic programs; and 3) true
faculty control, wherein athletics were regulated, usually
through committee, by academic faculty members. Princeton, Yale,
Tulane, North Carolina, and Georgia were among only eight of the
130 universities that were identified as having true faculty
control.

(Savage et al., 1929, p. 101) In many institutions, the

faculty did have some authority, manifested in a variety of
structures, but by 1929, direct guidance of undergraduate sports
by academic faculty had given way to other forms of governance.
(Savage et al., 1929, p. xx)

Faculty were involved generally on

a limited basis: in only four institutions was a faculty member
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responsible for athletic accounts, and in all four through
athletic committees, councils, or boards.

(Savage et al., 1929,

p. 89)
Athletic personnel in academic enterprises were not endowed
automatically with status within the system. Athletic coaches and
directors had to gain legitimacy through "faculty" appointment by
the board, and, with the institution's blessing. Subsequently
they were delegated the responsibility and authority to oversee
athletics. Athletic administrators and managers, who were often
alumni, were delegated responsibility for athletic finances and
daily operations in many institutions.

(Savage et al., 1929) Like

athletic administrators, physical education directors, coaches,
and managers were usually very prominent in athletic policy
making and generally were responsible for the execution of most
athletic policies.

(Savage et al., 1929, p. 88) Athletic managers

and coaches were even authorized in some universities to control
and maintain athletic accounts. However, they generally had
little authority in personnel decisions, having the selection
authority in 20% of the institutions and appointment authority in
only 3% of the institutions.

(Savage et al., 1929, p. 164) In

many instances, however, athletic managers and coaches were
delegated the responsibility of verifying an athlete's
eligibility. To have the eligibility approved, which was almost
always the case, they typically reported to a representative body
or some form of athletic association or committee.
al., 1929)

(Savage et

The majority of the 130 universities had some form of
athletic association, committee, council, or board.

(Savage et

a l ., 1929) Athletic associations, committees, councils, and
boards varied from institution to institution in their
composition of members. The most common form of athletic board
was based upon balanced representation of a number of athletic
interests. Constituents involved in athletic boards included
college administrators and officials, athletic managers and
coaches, academic faculty members, alumni, and undergraduates.
Athletic associations, generally possessing athletic interests,
were often responsible for athletic accounts, finance, and
personnel.

(Savage et al., 1929) In 62% of the institutions

offering athletic subsidies, athletic associations were involved
in the funding and dispersal of subsidies to athletes.

(Savage et

al., 1929, p. 241)
Athletic board members varied in their degree of authority,
in part based on the responsibilities delegated to the board.
Alumni gained legitimate authority through athletic boards and
associations. In many institutions, such as Brown, Columbia, and
Pennsylvania, they legitimately controlled financial policy
through the athletic board. In 20% of the institutions, the
alumni selected athletic personnel, and in 11%, they had the
authority to appoint athletic personnel through the athletic
board.

(Savage et al., 1929, p. 164) The relation of the alumni

to their Alma Mater was ideally based upon an affection that led
to service. In reality, however, alumni served as a "source of

funds" solicited in support of university finances.

(Savage et

al., p. 191) An estimated 20% of all alumni were active in either
the control of athletic policies, or the recruiting and financing
of athletes, or both.

(Savage et al., 1929, p. 192) While alumni

gained authority through the athletic boards, undergraduate
participation on athletic boards was often superficial, such as
at the University of Pennsylvania, where they were not permitted
to vote on such key issues as finances.

(Savage et al., 1929, p.

89)
The authority of athletic associations, committees,
councils, and boards did vary from institution to institution.
Those boards with alumni and athletic interests generally had
final authority over critical issues such as finances and
personnel, but faculty-controlled committees were typically
advisory bodies.

(Savage et al., 1929) The majority of boards

that played a supervisory role did so because they had the
ability to obtain the funds necessary for the operation of the
athletic programs.

(Savage et al., 1929) These athletic boards

and committees were generally dominated by athletic interests
such as physical education directors, managers, coaches, and even
alumni.

(Savage et al., 1929, pp. 100, 101) Presidents had

authority over athletic committees at Iowa and Minnesota, but
generally the committees were appointed by, and responsible to,
the governing board.

(Savage et al., 1929, p. 100) Meanwhile, the

faculty rarely dominated the athletic boards. Athletic committees
with true faculty interests, such as those at Lafayette College

and the University of Southern California, remained advisory in
nature, dealing with eligibility approval and only such policy
that immediately concerned academics.

(Savage et al., 1929, p.

100)

Ideal Authority; External Actors
Conferences were granted authority by their members, and
exerted that authority in attempts to standardize practices
across institutions in areas such as player eligibility and
contest scheduling. These areas of standardization primarily
addressed policy issues and practical concerns that enhanced
competition but did little else. Conferences established minimum
academic standards for athletic eligibility that, in some cases,
were further strengthened by individual institutions.

(Savage et

a l ., 1929, p. 96) Some conferences, such as the Pacific Coast,
the Southwest, and the Mid-Western, required "certification" of
athletes' eligibility through a normal institutional channel,
such as the registrar.

(Savage et al., 1929, p. 201) The Mid-

Western and the Rocky Mountain conferences were among a number
who required "faculty control" as a condition of membership. The
typical athletic conference of the day was:
"... a voluntary regional association of colleges and
universities through elected or appointed representatives
for discussion of problems concerning intercollegiate
athletics, formulation of regulations to govern athletic
contests between member institutions, and usually the
conduct of competitions in various branches of inter-college
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... athletics. Thus its functions are deliberative,
regulatory, and executive." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 199)
The authority of conferences varied, yet most possessed
"police functions" in order to enforce rules.

(Savage et a l .,

1929, p. 199) Conferences also influenced athletic scheduling of
member schools, often determining who and when contests would be
played. Conferences had the authority to approve or restrict
opponents and to determine the sites of contests.
The Savage Report (1929, p. 199) explained the NCAA, which
was founded in 1906, as a "national representative body" with
"many of the characteristics of an athletic conference." The
difference between the NCAA and conferences was essentially in
its "size, membership, and geographic extent." (Savage et al.,
1929, p. 199) Creating "countrywide affiliations, the NCAA was
"open to all colleges, universities, and institutions of
learning" in the U.S. and was "deliberative and legislative in
its activities."

(Savage et a l ., 1929, pp. 208-209) Its

resolutions nominally supported the notion of college amateurism
and sportsmanship. With the support of its membership, the NCAA
was granted authority as a national organization functioning as a
collective body to promote the ideals of educationally-beneficial
athletics. Its functions included framing the rules of athletics,
preserving records, and arbitrating member disputes.

(Savage et

a l ., 1929, p. 209, 210) The rules and purposes of the NCAA were
viewed by the Savage Report (1929) as "so important and ...so
wholesome," that they were "almost impeccable." (p. 210, 211)
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These rules called for "institutional control," "amateurism,"
"strict eligibility rules," and "the supervision of the
regulation and conduct, by its constituent members, of
intercollegiate sports." (Savage et al. 1929, p. 210)
Through its collective proclamations, the NCAA began to
emerge as a national influence on athletics; however, the
association held no enforcement authority for the rules or
recommendations that it adopted. At the time, regional
conferences actually exercised more authority in the governance
of intercollegiate athletics. Individual institutional members
authorized conferences to enforce the conference rules on their
campuses.
Breaches in Authority
The ideal governance structure on paper often does not
represent reality. College athletics in 1929 was no exception.
"Slogans", such as "athletics for all" or "every student a
player", commonly took the place of genuine educationallyinspired athletic policy.

(Savage et al., 1929, p. 80) Authority

breaches, which led to dysfunctions in the governance of
intercollegiate athletics, occurred when constituents either did
not fulfill or overextended their prescribed authority roles. For
example, a "politically minded governing board" dominated by
trustees with athletic interests could extend their authority, or
override the authority they had delegated to the president to
execute policy, if specific policies contradicted the board's
athletic interests.

(Savage et al., 1929, p. xx) While the
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governing board could exert its authority in such manner legally,
such action contravened the nature of the authority roles in the
governance of higher education and athletics.
Presidents were generally authorized by trustees in the
operation of college athletics; however, they were often too busy
with day-to-day duties and they neglected athletic policy.
(Savage et al., 1929) Recognizing the potential profits and
prestige available to the institution, presidents "left the
shaping of athletic policies" to constituents with athletic
interests in order to capitalize on the external relations of
athletics.

(Savage et al., 1929, p. 80) Presidential involvement

in athletic governance ranged from "deliberate unconcern" to
"active participation", with most occupying the "mid-ground" in
delegating authority.

(Savage et al., 1929, p. 79) Presidents at

Wisconsin and Dickinson attempted to justify the administrative
independence of athletics, while at Oglethorpe and Allegheny they
participated fully in the minute details of athletic operation.
(Savage et al., p. 79)
However, most university presidents were pragmatic in their
delegation of authority in athletics. Some presidents overlooked
activities inconsistent with proper administration because they
coveted the financial rewards of winning athletic teams. The
Savage Report (1929) noted the reluctance of some university
authorities, including presidents, to take an unpopular stand;
therefore, presidents, through the delegation of authority,
allowed athletic policy to be determined by a variety of special
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interest groups. Presidents were at times unconcerned with
athletics or chose not to make decisions regarding athletics that
would be unpopular with either the alumni or the undergraduates
since student fees supplemented gate receipts, from alumni and
students, and outside revenue in funding athletics.

(Savage et

al., 1929)
Undergraduates were generally supportive of commercialized
athletics for its entertainment value and prompting of school
spirit. Undergraduates retained some formal authority in
athletics at a few institutions; however, their use of authority
was rare and usually bound by the guidance of older, wiser
constituents.

(Savage et a l ., 1929) Students served on athletic

committees, but in many cases could not vote on financial or
eligibility matters. The Savage Report (1929) found the
"meagerness" of undergraduate responsibility "regrettable," but
noted that it would be unwise to entrust "all of the weight and
the complexity of the financial burden" of intercollegiate
athletics "upon undergraduate shoulders."

(Savage et al., 1929,

p. 102) There was also no undergraduate involvement in the NCAA,
which was influenced instead by "men to whom athletics are a
vocation."

(Savage et al., 1929, p. 211)

The exclusion of

undergraduates from authority in athletic governance was "by no
means an accident" having been accomplished by "deliberate
calculation" of higher.authorities, including coaches and
faculty.

(Savage et al., 1929, p. 102)

While some faculty attempted to collectively assert

themselves in athletics through advisory committees, most faculty
members were "aloof from athletics ... concerning themselves with
the study and the lamp," and leaving athletic governance to
others.

(Savage et al., 1929, p. 23) "Faculty control" often

existed in name only, such as in the Missouri Valley Conference
universities.

(Savage et al., 1929, p. 100) In these

institutions, faculty had nominal authority, usually through a
committee, but athletics were controlled by alumni or
administrators with athletic interests. The majority of faculty
members maintained a "laissez-faire" policy toward the
administration of college athletics.

(Savage et al., 1929, p. 23)

Of the three types of faculty control--pseudo-faculty control,
faculty guidance, and true faculty control-- the most prevalent
was pseudo-faculty control.

(Savage et al., 1929) The faculty

nominally gained control at some institutions through coaches who
received faculty appointments. Control of athletics by faculty
members whose interest was in "physical education" was not held
in high regard, as these faculty positions were not delineated
clearly from athletics.

(Savage et al., 1929, p. 10, 11) In

addition, the faculty involved in athletic boards often had
personal athletic interests; faculty athletic representatives
were likely to receive an "honorarium" from the athletic
department.

(Savage et al., 1929, p. 101)

Intercollegiate athletics, intramurals, and physical
education were housed together at most institutions of the day.
Physical education directors, athletic managers, and coaches,

while a part of the legitimate governance structure, had personal
interests because, in many cases, they received money from
athletics. In athletic governance, athletic managers, coaches,
and physical education directors all served "many masters," and
were criticized for their special interests. (Savage et a l .,
1929, p. 182) While many faculty members "began their careers as
hired coaches of teams," the "faculty status" of professional
coaches was not highly regarded by non-coaching faculty members,
who were necessarily concerned only with the intellectual.
(Savage et a l ., 1929, p. 22-23) The academic faculty, with
intense demands on their time, did not actively fight to control
athletics, despite some rhetorical complaints. "There was
scarcely a struggle for control," as academic faculty directed
their interests elsewhere than athletics.

(Savage et al., 1929,

p. 23)
"Faculty status" coaches, because of their athletic
interests, were most often in physical education.

(Savage et al .,

1929) To the dismay of academic faculty, the "obvious" difference
between physical and academic studies was often "neglected" with
regard to coaches' salaries, particularly football, as football
coaches' salaries averaged 18% higher than their academic
counterparts' salaries at over 100 institutions.

(Savage et a l .,

1929, pp. 171, 172) However, the funds used to pay coaches were
not always from the institution, coming from athletic revenues
instead. Coaches who were paid through athletic associations
generally received higher salaries, while coaches with "faculty
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status" received 27% less than their non-faculty counterparts.
(Savage et al., 1929, p. 172) Coaches typically had low status
among faculty on campus, but they received significant
remuneration, and with it influence, from commercially-driven
constituents. However, while coaches were typically well rewarded
in financial terms, they had little security.
"Faculty status" did little to protect coaches from the
pressures of producing victories. Losing teams were found to be a
factor in the dismissal of coaches in many more instances than
administrators were willing to admit.

(Savage et al., 1929, p.

170) Coaches' status as faculty was viewed by academicians as
insincere, although it was founded on the notion that a coach
should be a man of high morals concerned with student learning.
They also believed the practice of assigning faculty status to
coaches was dishonest because coaches, whether broadly trained or
specialized, were not considered equal to the faculty whose chief
concerns were intellectual.

(Savage et a l ., 1929, p. 167) The

academic credentials of 104 football coaches showed that 17% had
no college degree, 70% had at least a bachelors degree, 7% had a
masters degree, and 6% had a doctoral degree.

(Savage et al.,

1929, pp. 162-163) Coaches were typically regarded as "evil
geniuses", operating against academic interests.

(Savage et a l .,

1929, p. 187). The quality of coaches' character was questioned
because many had come from physical education, athletic, or
business backgrounds, not serious academic backgrounds.
Coaches were expected to "produce" (victories) in order to
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retain their employment.

(Savage et al., 1929, p. 182) They had

to teach, tutor, and obtain players, and deal with extramural
relations such as other colleges and coaches and with prospective
players, local merchants, the alumni and townsmen who provided
financial support, and the press who provided publicity. The
"complexity of duties", legitimate or otherwise, associated with
coaching was comparable "only with that of the president."
(Savage et al., 1929, p. 175) The authority to fulfill the vast
responsibilities associated with coaching rarely matched the
expectations of the position, but was legitimized to a degree by
awarding faculty status to coaches.
Conferences often required "complete faculty control" and a
representative body; however, it was not unusual for "faculty
control" to exist "in name but scarcely in fact."

(Savage et al .,

1929, pp. 100, 201) Pseudo-faculty control resulted in academic
faculty being authorized to control specified issues such as
eligibility, usually through athletic committees that served in
an advisory capacity. Through the assignment of faculty status to
coaches, the "actual control" as authorized by the university was
often determined to "rest with the directors or the coaches."
(Savage et al., 1929, p. 100) The NCAA, because of its lack of
enforcement authority, unwittingly allowed the control of
athletics to be in the hands of athletic interests. The NCAA,
like conferences, relied primarily on individual universities to
monitor and enforce the rules and standards of practice. Without
external enforcement, many universities relinquished control of
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athletic governance to a variety of constituents with overriding
commercial interests.
Power
The potential financial gains and the impact upon
institutional reputation and "a thousand other forces" made
college athletics in 1929 "joint cooperative enterprises
involving presidents, trustees, faculties, alumni, townsmen, and
the vast publics of the radio and the press."

{Savage et a l .,

1929, p. 79) Many institutions had "no settled athletic policy"
as a result.

{Savage et al., 1929, p. 79) With the control of

athletic policy "grounded in human relationships," the desire for
"power and influence" among a variety of constituents was the
"source of most controversies over athletic administration and
control."

(Savage et al., 1929, p. 79) Noting the need to

differentiate between "theoretical and actual control,"--or for
the purposes of this study between authority and power--Savage et
a l ., (1929) stated:
It is one thing to announce a program of athletic
administration and another to effectuate it, it is a third
and entirely different matter to maintain in its practical
application the balance of powers which any such system is
designed to guarantee." (p. 77)
While, ideally, athletic policy would be guided by
educational motives, "in reality, athletics involve several
groups," each of whom possessed "an interest which savors of the
proprietary."

(Savage et al., 1929, p. 81) Conflicts of interests
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resulted from the "necessity to control." {Savage et al., 1929,
p. 81) Control of college athletics resulted from the application
of power and/or authority by constituents with personal interests
in athletics. Different constituents exercised varying degrees of
power at individual institutions. Some constituents utilized both
authority and power in the governance of college athletics;
others had official authority in the athletic governance
structure, but exercised little or no power in the process of
governance. Still others used power to influence or control
athletic policy and practices, but had no legitimate authority in
the governance structure. Savage et a l ., (1929) cited the
constituents in this struggle for control:
Trustees, faculties, directors, alumni, townspeople, all,
indeed, except for the undergraduates, who might profit most
by athletics, have expected, and in some instances demanded,
that the shaping of athletic policies be entrusted at least
in part to them. (p. 81-82)
Noting the many masters to be served and the resultant
"confusion of aims to which athletics at present are subject,"
the Report delineated myriad interests of the constituents
involved in college athletics.

(Savage et al., 1929, p. 81)

First, the board was interested in athletics as a source of
wealth to bolster the university, and found it "comforting to
find one source of funds that gushes without the use of a rod."
(Savage et al., 1929, p. 81) Presidents were involved with
athletic governance "by virtue of their responsibilities and
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functions as coordinators of general policy."

(Savage et a l .,

1929, p. 81) Faculties were charged with promoting educational
interests. Directors and departments of physical education were
concerned because of their "convictions concerning the values
inherent in athletics as well as because of more personal
ambitions and reasons."

(Savage et al., 1929, p. 81)

Alumni were interested in athletics because of their loyalty
to Alma Mater, and "less admittedly," because their financial
support of the institution "is an established fact of university
policy, they are held to have in justice a right to a voice in
the conduct of those activities which afford the spectacular and
concentrated diversion."

(Savage et al., 1929, p. 81) Townsmen

impacted athletics "because of the financial returns from the
crowds of people who attend games, not to mention the active
civic pride of trade and welfare organizations."

(Savage et al.,

1929, p. 81) Finally, undergraduates were not included, although
they were interested,

"not because athletics necessarily fire

them with a spontaneous loyal enthusiasm but because it is
nowadays assumed that athletics benefit the institution;" and
because athletics spurred interest in physical activity, which
was "regarded as 'good for' undergraduates;" and, "finally,
because teams that 'represent' a university are traditionally
composed of student members of the university."

(Savage et a l .,

1929, p. 81)
Based on varied motives and interests regarding athletics,
some constituents vied for and other relinquished control,

107

whether through hierarchical lines of authority or informal
channels of power. The Savage Report (1929) concluded that "the
actual weight of authority and control rests upon quite other
shoulders than those intended by the framers of the systems." The
control exercised by these various constituents can be separated
into three modes of power available to, or used by, constituents
in college athletics, as identified by Wolf (1990). These modes
of power are interpersonal, tactical, and structural.
Interpersonal Power
Interpersonal power is the ability of an individual or group
to impose its will upon another individual or group, irrespective
of the field of play. It results from the "sequences of
interactions and transactions among people." (Wolf, 1990, p. 586)
The use of interpersonal power in the governance of
intercollegiate athletics manifested itself through friendships,
loyalties, and resource exchanges. Board members and presidents
delegated and often relinquished control by authority, which
permitted gaps to be formed and interpersonal power to be
inserted by commercial influences. Personal friendships between
coaches and board members, or coaches and presidents, overrode
the normal lines of responsibility and control. This gap in
authority resulted in the control of athletic finances by coaches
who "assumed or maintained authority which was vested
theoretically in the director of physical education" at
institutions such as North Carolina and Ohio Wesleyan.

(Savage et

a l ., 1929, p. 167) Often this use of interpersonal power occurred
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among football coaches who circumvented athletic administrators
at some universities. However, athletic administrators were also
involved in controlling athletic resources at institutions such
as Amherst, Georgia, and Tennessee, where they had personal
friendships with the president or board members.

(Savage et al.,

1929, p. 89)
In universities with predominantly commercial athletic
endeavors, it was "not astonishing that the name of the modest
gentleman who occupies the president's chair should be less
widely known than that of the coach who he hires to develop a
team."

(Savage et al., 1929, p. 214) A coach's consistent

popularity with undergraduates also strengthened his position.
(Savage et al., 1929, p. 187) Coaches, and in some cases athletic
directors, used the control of resources to obtain interpersonal
power with other constituents. Coaches impacted the board members
or presidents only when those constituents could profit from
commercial athletics professionally or personally. If the board
or president perceived a potential for gain, they were willing to
ignore the operation of college athletics.
Coaches also used interpersonal power in obtaining resources
for themselves and their program. For example, in the recruiting
of prospective athletes, coaches commonly used interpersonal
power to arrange jobs and other special conditions for athletes
in order to persuade the recruit to attend their university.
(Savage et al., 1929) Alumni and townsmen often provided the
financial support for such endeavors, sometimes through their
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interpersonal power in athletic associations, and thereby exerted
interpersonal power over the coach in many instances as well. The
friendship of a coach with an individual or group of alumni or
townsmen, which was prompted by the financial interests of both
parties, often led to a controlling influence by the alumni or
townsmen.

(Savage et al., 1929, p. 184)

The alumni, through "the persistence or the strength of
character," came to dominate many of the athletic boards. An
enthusiastic group of "well-meaning, but unwise," alumni with
strong athletic interests and available resources could
frequently influence athletic policy.

(Savage et al., 1929, p.

xx) These alumni used personal power to influence or control
policy-making through the athletic board at institutions like
Dartmouth, Colgate, Purdue, and the University of Pennsylvania.
At Lehigh, Maryland, Purdue, Brown, and Amherst a single alumnus
used interpersonal power to gain control of athletics. At
Pennsylvania State, Allegheny, Dartmouth, and the University of
Pennsylvania there was "absolute alumni control." (Savage et a l .,
1929, p. 82) The alumni gained this "dominion almost by default,"
since the faculty was not intimately involved in the governance
of intercollegiate athletics, concentrating instead on academic
concerns.

(Savage et al., 1929, p. 24)

The alumni gained their interpersonal power through resource
allocation. Since athletics offered "special training tables, the
costly sweaters and extensive journeys in special Pullman cars,"
and since the costs of equipment and facilities rose steadily,
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expenditures by commercial athletic departments rose accordingly;
thus, increased funds were required for their support.

(Savage et

a l ., 1929, p. xxi, 23) Regular university sources could not
support such commercial endeavors. Alumni who provided
contributions received in return "a generous share" in the
control of athletics.

(Savage et al., 1929, p. 23) "Alumni who

became active in that control gained or retained their power and
prestige by their own contributions of money and by subscriptions
they solicited from other alumni and friends of the college."
(Savage et al., 1929, p. 23)
The alumni sought personal financial gain and control of the
visible athletic component of their Alma Mater. Their involvement
extended into personnel decisions at some institutions. An
unnamed "prominent coach," quoted in the Savage Report, explained
that, "In most colleges coaches owe their jobs to different
groups of alumni who are interested primarily in winning athletic
contests for their institution."

(1929, p. 164) The selection of

the coach was usually "affected by the decisions of persons not
immediately connected with the administration of the
institution."

(Savage et al., 1929, p. 165) In most institutions,

the alumni was a "group to be placated at almost any sacrifice."
(Savage et al., 1929, p. 184) The motive of many alumni involved
in college athletics was often the pursuit of status and
prestige. And that pursuit was often unchecked because of their
use of personal resources to secure their interpersonal power.

Ill

Tactical Power
Tactical power refers to the instruments of power used to
"circumscribe the actions of others within determinate settings."
(Wolf, 1990, p. 586) It involves the methods and strategies
employed by virtue of the specific arena of play. Tactical power
was applied by constituents as an instrument of power to
circumscribe authority because governing boards, presidents, or
other university administrators delegated authority
inappropriately. While boards and presidents were certainly too
busy not to delegate authority, its over-delegation created gaps
that were filled by constituents exercising tactical power.
Conversely, university boards or presidents who under-delegated
authority because of their desire to profit from athletics by
increasing institutional prestige also generated authority gaps
that were filled by the use of tactical power.
Boards and presidents at times permitted abuses, at times
ignored abuses, and at times participated in abuses. Savage
(1929) conjectured that in some cases there was a "powerlessness
of educational leaders" to control commercialized intercollegiate
athletics, in large part due to commercial influences filling
authority gaps.

(p. 23) Alumni, coaches, or athletic

administrators set up unauthorized "slush funds" to cover
expanding athletic operations. At the University of Wisconsin,
for example, athletic revenues were used for illegitimate
expenses such as illegal trips.

(Savage et al., 1929, p. 90)

"Without exception," the Savage Report (1929) concluded, it
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was better to have university administrators in direct control of
athletic finances,

{p. 90) "The control of athletic moneys by

university officers eliminates slush funds ...," that could be
used for inappropriate activities.

(Savage et al., 1929, p. 90)

However, "slush funds" existed at many institutions, whether
disbursed through individuals, athletic associations, or
university officers. Equipment, travel, and "special personnel"
were generally paid for by athletic funds.

(Savage et al., 1929,

p. 88) At Dartmouth and Ohio State even the salaries of some nonathletic university officers and employees were "charged against
athletics."

(Savage et al., 1929, p. 88)

Often when high salaries were paid to coaches, the president
or other university officers had little power over the source of
the funds; therefore, they had little power over the dispersal of
the funds as well. For example, football coaches in particular
gained financially through the gate receipts and publicity they
provided the university through winning teams. Average salaries
of football coaches was $6107, with a range of $1800 to $14,000;
athletic managers and physical education directors ranged from
$1000 to $14,000, averaging $5,095,

(Savage et al., 1929, p. 172)

In comparison, professors averaged $5158, with a high of $12,000;
and deans averaged $6409, with a high of $15,000.

(Savage et al.,

1929, p. 171) Coaches' salaries were higher when athletic
department funds were used, which occurred in the majority of
cases. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 172) Coaches "elevated to faculty
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status" generally received less than their non-faculty
counterparts.

{Savage et al., 1929, p. 171)

Faculties were supposed to protect academic interests and be
involved in athletic governance for educational reasons. However,
few researchers had "taken the trouble to analyze precisely what
those educational reasons are or may be."

{Savage et al., 1929,

p. 81) In addition, the profit from intercollegiate athletics,
especially football, "may be put to academic uses in the form of
new buildings and increased equipment;" therefore, athletics were
seen by some faculty as having residual value.

(Savage et a l .,

1929, p. 81) However, most academic faculty voiced objection to
commercial athletics. The "ideals to which so much lip service"
was rendered by faculty were not actively pursued by those same
faculty, though.

(Savage et al.,

1929, p. 79)

Since the faculty was focused on other interests such as
research, specialized coaches, physical education directors, and
athletic managers emerged to run athletic operations.

(Savage

et

al., 1929, p. 21) Along with the faculty, administrative
officials such as registrars--even when involved with falsified
eligibilities--were presented as the "victims" of the system they
were supposed to prevent, while coaches were found to be the
"evil geniuses" orchestrating the deception.

(Savage et a l .,

1929, pp. 99, 187). For example, coaches used students in
fraternities to help recruit prominent athletes.

(Savage et al.,

1929, p. 239) Once within the student body, an athlete then
"stated"

(self-reported) his own eligibility, which was usually
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verified by the coach and certified rather than scrutinized by
the registrar, even when both knew his statement to be false.
(Savage et al., 1929, pp. 97-99)
Athletes were also recruited by paid professionals--athletic
coaches and directors--and subsidized by the administration in
the form of scholarships and other benefits. The "impecunious
athlete," who would otherwise not go to college, often had his
hand out.

(Savage et al., 1929, p. 227) "Mercenary athlete(s)"

used their athletic prowess as an instrument of tactical power by
"shopping" for the best offer, being "coddled" along the way by
coaches in need of their services.

(Savage et al., 1929, pp. 228,

229) However, prominent prospects whose services were obtained
through subsidies--the majority of whom "valued dollars and
cents"--were regarded as "hirelings."

(Savage et al., 1929, pp.

184, 232) In order to gain the services of these prized recruits,
coaches used subsidies, which usually included room, board,
tuition, books, supplies, and incidental fees, as an instrument
of tactical power.

(Savage et al., 1929, p. 259) The better

athletes received jobs and spending money as well at some
universities.

(Savage et al., 1929, p. 258) The best performers

even received "guarantees" or "pay checks."

(Savage et al., 1929,

pp. 259, 260) Academically, the athlete could obtain "gratuitous
assistance in study by his fellow undergraduates" at nearly all
universities.

(Savage et a l ., 1929, p. 262) Most of these

arrangements were made by coaches in order to attract and
maintain the best athletes.
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While it was normal for coaches to be "elevated to faculty
status," most often, the power of coaches and athletic directors
was derived from the vast amounts of athletic wealth they
oversaw.

(Savage et al., 1929, p. 102) While some institutions

provided funds to athletics through normal university channels,
often athletic departments were responsible for and unchecked
when obtaining the vast sums of money used in the operation of
commercialized intercollegiate athletics. These monies could be
used as instruments of tactical power. Athletic funds were
sometimes used as an "honorarium" to the faculty athletic
representative, thus ensuring athletic interests were realized.
(Savage et al., 1929, p. 101) Athletic department personnel
dispersed "slush funds" to pay for athletic interests, such as
subsidies to athletes, who sometimes received 60 cents per hour
from the athletic department for the same job for which a non
athlete would receive half that wage. Athletic personnel provided
game tickets to athletes for scalping; some tickets brought as
much as $100.00.

(Savage et al., 1929, p. 263)

Athletic coaches, directors, and managers attained a level
of tactical power through their involvement in the daily conduct
of athletic affairs. But, there were limits to their power.
Losses reduced available resources, and the loss of too many
games resulted in termination of many a coach.

(Savage et al.,

1929, p. 170) Coaches were expected to produce "results" as
defined by a variety of constituent interests.

(Savage et al.,
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1929, p. 182) Among those constituents exerting control over
coaches' employment was the alumni.
As alumni recognized that they had the control of some vital
resources, they moved toward a "proprietary" role on campus in
"governance and trusteeship, whether of the university or of
athletics." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 191) An estimated 20% of
alumni were involved in athletics. Their interests were usually
connected to tangible (financial) matters because that was the
university's interest in them. Their relationship to athletics
"manifested itself in two ways: the control of policies, and the
recruiting and financing of athletes." (Savage et al., 1929, p.
192) In some institutions, such as Dartmouth, alumni had few
limits placed on their legitimized authority.

(Savage et al.,

1929, p. 96) Within the hierarchical structure, they dominated
some athletic associations that were responsible only to the
governing board. And with the board often comprised of alumni,
the associations enjoyed great latitude. As an avenue to service,
the appointment of alumni advisory committees to governance
positions in various branches of athletics was a practice that
resulted in alumni domination of athletic governance.
Local merchants collaborated with alumni in recruiting and
subsidizing by "offering rewards" to the best athletes, thereby
gaining influence.

(Savage et al., 1929, p. 184) Alumni and

businessmen who provided resources obtained an "acquiescence of
influence" from the institutions that led to a "domination of
college athletics."

(Savage et a l ., 1929, p. 23) Alumni influence
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in recruiting became commonplace.

{Savage et al., 1929, p. 228)

They intervened with prospective athletes on behalf of the coach.
They provided jobs to athletes, at times $150.00 per month when
tuition averaged $270.00 per year.

(Savage et a l . 1929, p. 242)

In 12% of the institutions offering subsidies, the alumni alone
provided the money; and they provided at least a portion of the
money in over 50% of the universities offering subsidies.

(Savage

et al., 1929, p. 241)
Prized athletes received not only subsidies from coaches,
but also "such valuable considerations as automobiles, clothes,
typewriters, and haberdashery ... if not cash" for advertising
"typewriters, clothing, sweaters, and other merchandise."

(Savage

et a l ., 1929, pp. 185, 277) Players also sold their names and
photographs "for advertising cigarettes." At times, the athlete
used tactical power within the press to gain profit and publicity
against "good counsel from the athletic authorities of his
college."

(Savage et al., 1929, p. 276) Thereby, a small group of

undergraduates, namely the athletes, while viewed by some as
"exploited in news stories, columns of comment, and
illustrations, and even in advertisements," individually used
tactical power and reaped many personal rewards from the
intercollegiate athletic system, which in turn empowered the
media to influence the athletes directly.

(Savage et al., 1929,

p. 275)
As newspapers became "economic products," the press
responded to public interest in college athletics by presenting a
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"distorted" view of universities that emphasized the importance
of athletics.

(Savage et al., 1929, p. 266) Savage et al. (1929)

feared that "overstressing11 athletics would result in "seriously
impaired" relations between colleges and the public,

(p. 266)

However, the Savage Report (1929) conceded that "college
athletics are news and news that appeals to many readers as the
most consistently interesting and important aspect of college
life."

(pp. 266-267) As a result of public interest, profits

associated with college sports rose.
As profits for newspapers, advertisers, and college athletic
programs increased, the press coverage of sports likewise
increased. Newspaper circulation departments, "the thermometers
of public interest and financial success," were concerned with
the quantity of sporting news because of the increased public
demands.

(Savage et al., 1929, p. 289) The press responded to

increased public interest in college athletics: 50% of all
newspapers had over 15% of their pages dedicated to sports, while
some dedicated as much as 25% for sports pages.

(Savage et al.,

1929, p. 289) In the 15 years prior to the Savage Report (1929),
the amount of college sports coverage increased 300-400% in
several major city papers, such as the New York Times. (pp. 267272) "Sensationalism" was commonplace in sports reporting because
it stimulated public interest in college athletics and increased
readership; however, it also obscured the differences in college
athletics from professional competition.

(Savage et a l ., 1929,
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pp. 275, 277) Some college athletes and prospects even obtained
"press agents." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 283)
Most universities obtained "publicity officers," many of
whom were paid with athletic funds, to deal with the press.
(Savage et al., 1929, p. 283) While accusations persisted that
professional sports writers were bribed by coaches to write
favorably about him or his team, this type of "graft" in the form
of cash and perquisites was "not substantiated in a single case."
(Savage et al., 1929, p. 278) It was certain, however, that
advertising and positive publicity for the coach and his team did
reflect favorably on the institution. The coach had to please the
alumni and the general public; therefore, favorable press was an
invaluable instrument in his tactical efforts. As Savage et al.,
(1929) indicated, "the desire of the colleges and their partisans
for the good-will of the public is due much of the publicity
hunting that now obtains in athletics." (p. 284) By the time of
the Savage Report (1929), in no other area was the "public
interest so keen as in athletics."

(p. 194)

Public interest in college athletics was "largely ascribable
to the emphasis laid by our newspapers upon athletics in college
life." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 208, 287) The Savage Report
(1929) noted the aphorism that "a newspaper is no better than its
sporting page." (p. 287) Newspaper publishers were "fully alert
to the interest of their public in athletics," recognizing this,
some charged the highest premium for advertising space in the
sports pages.

(Savage et a l ., 1929, p. 288) Thus, the interest of
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the press in college athletics was "wholly financial,--a question
of profit or loss."

(Savage et a l ., 1929, p. 289) Propelled by

the potential for profit, public interest fostered
professionalized commercial athletics. The commercial interests
of intercollegiate athletics were the source of the structural
power various constituents exerted on their behalf in the
university.
Structural Power
Structural power shapes the social field of action. In its
broadest sense, it encompasses the societal influences
surrounding intercollegiate athletics. It "organizes and
orchestrates" the

playing field and specifies

direction of power play.

(Wolf,

the form and

1990, p. 586)College athletics

had been "transformed from a game played by boys to a profitable
professional enterprise," which reflected the changes in the
American university and in society in general.

(Savage et al.,

1929, p. viii) The weaknesses resulting from the "educational
growth" of universities during the five decades prior to the
Report were "due to our national tendency to compete and
imitate."

(Savage et al., 1929, p. xiii) Universities wanted to

be alike in order to serve the "masses." (Savage et al., 1929,
pp. xvii, xviii) Mass education, a common outcome sought by many
universities, was

one component of structural

power. Mass

entertainment was

another. Both were results of the evolvingmass

society; and all three supported the structural power of
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commercialized athletic competition.

{Savage et al., 1929, pp.

xvii, xviii)
In describing what the authors perceived as the central
problem in college athletics in 1929, the Savage Report cited
"commercialism and all the evils that follow in its train," which
appeared to encompass most facets of college athletics and drive
most non-academic interests surrounding college athletics.
(Savage et al., 1929, p. 88) The Savage Report (1929) defined
"commercialism" in college athletics as:
... the placing of a higher value upon monetary and material
returns, whether direct or indirect, from any athletic
activity than is placed upon its returns in recreation,
health, and physical and moral well-being,

(p. 11)

Money stimulated the growth of and desire for "winning" athletic
programs that, consequently, valued monetary and material returns
more than any other potential benefits of athletics.

(Savage et

al., 1929, p. 11) The control of the abundant financial resources
surrounding athletics, which included the control of accounting
procedures, revenue sources, expenditures and dispersement,
scheduling, and facilities and equipment, was central to the
development of commercialized athletics.

(Savage et a l ., 1929, p.

102) In most cases, the execution of athletic policy, the day-today operation of athletic programs, and the daily supervision of
athletic monies was left to and conducted by the professional
athletic personnel paid with independent athletic, not
university, funds. At times, these professionals were responsible
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to a representative advisory body, which itself was usually
comprised of constituents with commercial interests.
The vast and "steadily mounting" funds that athletics, "and
especially athletic success," brought, created within the
university an "exaggeration of the importance of athletics and
especially football in American college life." (Savage et al.,
1929, p. 88) Public interest, both reflected in and stimulated by
the commercial press, empowered the athletic interests associated
with the university. The power, prestige, and money of football
in particular, derived from the vast public interest,
subordinated academics and other sports. This domination was
manifested in coaches' salaries, conference rules, and
institutional administrative policies. Institutions were
concerned, at least rhetorically, with the "administrative
control" of college athletics, but athletics served "many
masters," few of whom had the intellectual interests of the
university at heart.
The administration of American college athletics is in
reality a problem in the adjustment of human relationships,
and its solution depends upon a compromise and cooperation
which some of those concerned appear unable or unwilling to
accord. Yet few college administrative officers appear to
have attended sufficiently to the fact that the devising of
a logically complete system for the control of athletics has
little relation to the way in which that system may operate
over a period of years.

(Savage et al., 1929, p. 78)

University, conference, and NCAA rules were expanding, yet
"no rule, however well intended, can be made binding without the
consent and the active cooperation of those to whom it applies."
{Savage et al., 1929, p. 208) NCAA, conference, and institution
rules restricting recruiting, subsidizing, and compensation of
athletes were "unmistakable." {Savage et al., 1929, p. 203) The
stated intent was clearly to promote amateurism in college
athletics. Yet, privately, 75% of all institutions offered
subsidies to athletes, some through regular university funding,
most through athletic revenue.

(Savage et al., 1929, p. 241) In

addition, the most "elastic" rules allowed professional summer
baseball.

(Savage et al., 1929, p. 204) The Savage Report (1929)

noted the stretching of the rules "involving ethical values, 'the
letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life.'"

(Savage et al.

1929, p. 203) The evasion of rules reveals the interests of
constituents in maintaining the status quo of the structural
power in which college athletics were played.
Whatever reasons are urged for countenancing procedures
which contravene and nullify the fine phrases in which
conferences indulge concerning the amateur status, the real
reason is this: universities and colleges have found that
unless they relax their rules regarding professionalism and
wink at flagrant abuses they cannot win enough games to
satisfy their constituents and continue their large
expenditures."

(Savage et al., 1929, p. 207)

The Savage Report (1929) determined that, rather than curtailing
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commercial operations, "the university of the present day enters
eagerly ..." into commercial athletics, and that the "weakness of
the American university as it exists today lies in its lack of
intellectual sincerity." (pp. xvi, xviii) "The availability of
such resources stimulates" the desire for successful teams and
the subsequent profits.

(Savage et al., 1929, p. 88) The

"compromises" that universities made to maintain commercialized
athletic programs gave an air of hypocrisy to the whole of higher
education.

(Savage et al., 1929, p. xxi) While various types of

power were being utilized by constituents to fill in gaps left by
the use and misuse of legitimate authority, the structural power
of commercialized athletics became the dominant force in the
governance of intercollegiate athletics.
The governing board and the president welcomed the
additional revenues afforded by commercialized college athletics:
demonstrated by board formation of policy, and by presidential
execution of policy. Administrations accepted the "notion that
the first essential to the execution of any athletic policy is
money, and plenty of it." (Savage et a l ., 1929, p. 79) Governing
boards and presidents used the structural power of commercial
resources in some institutions by extending their own authority
in areas of finance. As a result, boards and presidents "have
profitted by it; the task of finding money for new equipment or
new buildings has been lightened." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 307)
Boards and presidents also succumbed to the structural power
of commercialized athletics by delegating authority to commercial

125

athletic interests. As noted above, they allowed athletic
administrators or coaches to control athletic finances, or they
placed prominent alumni in control of athletic boards, as was the
case at universities such as Brown, Purdue, Colgate, Pennsylvania
State, Lehigh, Amherst, Georgia, Dartmouth, Allegheny, Columbia,
and the University of Pennsylvania.

(Savage et al., 1929, pp. 81,

82) The Savage Report (1929) presented athletics as a relatively
unrestricted commercial system wherein administrations directed
athletic policy toward profit, coaches bought and players sold
their services, and faculty disconnected themselves from the
entire endeavor.
While boards and presidents either quietly succumbed to or
openly promoted commercial athletics, and the faculty grew
powerless in their wake, athletic administrators and coaches
profited by the publicity as well as the revenues of
intercollegiate athletics. In order to obtain the best athletes,
and thereby increase the potential for greater profits that
strengthened structural power, coaches recruited and subsidized
prospective players. Once the athlete matriculated, the coach or
athletic administrator was responsible for verifying his
eligibility, which was nearly always "certified" by higher
authorities.
It would be idle to complain that conference rules are not
enforced. Considering their complexity, the overwhelming
desire for victory, and the reprehensible tendency to win
games by means of 'jokers,' exceptions, and far-fetched
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interpretations of rules or resolutions, the regulations of
conferences are generally well administered. But he who
believes that clean and sportsmanlike games, chivalrous
rivalry, and magnanimous competition are to be attained
through mere administrative provisions and procedure is
indeed naive.

(Savage et al., 1929, p. 207)

Many rules in intercollegiate athletics were ideals that were yet
to be successfully implemented by many institutions. "Rules do
not enforce themselves," and their value lies in their
"observance."

(Savage et al., 1929, p. 9, 10) Coaches and

athletic directors controlled the daily operations of college
athletics largely because that was their charge. Coaches,
athletic directors, athletes, and alumni each had commercial
athletic interests which motivated them to circumvent the spirit
of the rules whether by intent or by circumstance. Often with the
consent of the university administration, coaches and alumni
worked closely together in recruiting and subsidizing athletes.
For example, a coach's letter to an alumnus suggested a
"roundabout method of attack" in recruiting a standout athlete,
while another alumnus offered to "take matters up" since "the
coach cannot make direct contact with players." (Savage et a l .,
1929, pp. 323-324) As a controlling influence in these practices,
the alumni utilized interpersonal, tactical, and structural
power, often outside the normal line of authority in the
university. Where they were formally incorporated into the
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organizational hierarchy, alumni came to dominate as a result of
their combined legitimate authority and structural power.
While the university administration had authority over the
practices of recruiting and subsidizing, they either allowed
these practices to go unchecked or, in some cases, encouraged the
practices for the same reasons the athletic personnel gave:
prestige and revenue resulting from the exposure by the press and
increased public interest. The practices of recruiting and
subsidizing athletes resulted from the structural power of
constituents who were operating in an autonomous atmosphere that
permitted the practices to go unchecked. These constituents were
empowered by their access to abundant revenues and by the intense
public interest in commercial athletics.
The administrations of individual universities, along with
conferences and the NCAA, on the one hand generated idealistic
rules that were not enforced, while on the other hand protected
commercial interests through commercially-motivated scheduling.
Scheduling athletic contests for increased profit, whether
motivated by alumni rivalries or by "the possibility of securing
legislative appropriations" in a state such as Pennsylvania, was
more the rule than the exception.

{Savage et al., 1929, p. 99)

Many university constituents acquiesced to the structural power
of commercialism. Motivated by commercial interests, conferences
used structural power to dominate scheduling, often restricting
less popular non-conference opponents and scheduling instead
contests of great interest to the public. The end result was an
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increased threat to the "athletic autonomy" of the institution.
(Savage et al., 1929, p. 99) However, university athletic
governance was far from autonomous, as many external constituents
exercised power in the governance of intercollegiate athletics.
Alumni and townspeople exercised structural power in college
athletics through their control of financial resources. "Slush
funds" were created through the resources of alumni and townsmen,
and disbursed by athletic officials, the alumni themselves, or
the university athletic association. Each of these constituents
hoped to profit, either personally of professionally, in the
pursuit of winning athletic teams. Athletic funds paid for
advertising, athletic subsidies, athletic personnel, and
facilities. These expenditures were prompted by "two forces,
namely,
crowds."

... alumni and townspeople, and the profits ... from vast
(Savage et al., 1929, p. 92) Public interest in college

athletics resulted in commercial profits for the constituents in
control, while it also empowered those same constituents. Public
interest in college athletics was not only reflected in but also
generated by the press in order to produce increased advertising
profits. The press became the connection between the general
public and the university through college athletics. Thus, the
capitalistic press was empowered through the public's interest in
commercial endeavors such as athletics. The availability of
advertising money and publicity, which translated into revenue as
public interest increased, influenced coaches', players', and
universities' relations with the press. As these constituents
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were guided by commercial interests, the press began to exert
structural power in the operation of college athletics. The
Savage Report (1929) described the media's structural power,
noting that the role of the press "in leading public opinion to
esteem the true value" of college athletics was crucial for
reform: "It is certain that without the help of the American
newspaper, little if any improvement is possible in college
athletics."

(Savage et al., 1929, p. 284) However, the

commercially-driven media did not "meet the responsibilities that
power brings" in terms of "public welfare," but it was giving the
public what it wanted and deserved.

(Savage et al., 1929, p. 289)

Breakdown of Governance
The extent of commercialization in intercollegiate athletics
reflected the changes that had occurred in universities, which
resulted from the impact of the evolving mass society. Commercial
college athletics became a system dominated by resources.
Constituents utilized authority and power to obtain and control
resources, monetary and otherwise. The Savage Report identified
three critical areas for "control" of athletic resources: 1)
finances, including revenues, expenditures, scheduling, and
facilities; 2) personnel, including the selection of personnel
and the determination of "faculty status" and "control"; and 3)
student athletes, including the determination of athletic and
academic eligibility of players, and the recruiting and
subsidizing of athletes.

(Savage et al., 1929, p. 77) The control
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of these resources in athletics was exercised by a variety of
constituents.
In nearly every instance, the governing board of the
university had, whether exercised or not, the authority to
determine athletic procedure. The college president received by
delegation from the board the authority to set athletic policies
and control athletic practices. In turn, he generally delegated
it into other hands. The academic faculty normally had authority
in name only. The committees controlled by academic faculty were
advisory in nature.
In many cases, boards, presidents, and faculty relinquished
their authority to athletic managers and coaches. Authority over
day-to-day operations was often delegated directly by the board
to athletic personnel. Coaches and athletic directors often
received "faculty status" in order to function within the
hierarchy of authority. At times, alumni managers were also
incorporated into the lines of legitimate authority through
faculty appointment. More frequently, alumni managers obtained
authority in college athletics through formal representation on
athletic boards or associations.
Collectively, institutions invested authority in
representative bodies. On the regional level, conferences were
typically given collective authority over scheduling and
eligibility issues. And on the national level, the NCAA
represented its member institutions with limited authority over
specific issues such as eligibility as well.
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Interpersonal, tactical, and structural modes of power were
exercised in varying degrees by constituents both inside and
outside the authority hierarchy. The governing board and
president used power to support their authority over the
operation of college athletics. Academic faculty members,
disinterested in athletics, abdicated their advisory authority
and refrained from seizing opportunities to solidify power. Aloof
academicians joined the board and president to hand opportunities
to utilize power over to commercial athletic interests.
It is not evident, however, had any of these legitimate
authorities wanted to, that they could have controlled the
structural power of the vast external forces that stimulated a
commercial athletic system based upon profit and loss. Coaches
and athletic directors, whose careers depended upon serving
athletic interests and fielding successful (i.e., winning and
profitable) teams, exerted tactical power in the execution of
daily operations. When supported by structural power, they served
other masters, namely commercial interests rather than academic
interests.
The alumni garnered great influence in college athletics
through exerting interpersonal, tactical, and structural power.
Because they provided vast resources, alumni gained a proprietary
interest in athletics. Local townsmen and merchants supported,
financially and philosophically, the commercial growth of
athletics as well since it translated into profit.
The structural power that drove the commercial athletics
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system stemmed from stimulating profit and public interest. The
commercial press, which both reflected and stimulated public
interest, had vast structural power, serving as the reciprocal
link between the public and college athletics. In the end, the
power utilized to control college athletics derived simply from
resources.
The incongruity between university practices in controlling
athletics, whether implemented through the use of legitimate
authority or illegitimate power, and the ideal collective
policies promoted by bodies representative of the university
revealed a systemic dysfunction in the governance of
intercollegiate athletics in 1929. In the majority of cases,
collective lofty policy, particularly with regard to the control
of resources, was subservient to pragmatic university efforts to
profit from college athletics. In short, through their individual
actions, university administrators utilized structural, tactical,
and interpersonal power to promote the professionalized,
commercial athletics that were demanded by the press and the
public interest. On their own campus, they promoted these
interests, at times willingly and at times without guile, at the
expense of the collective public ideals that they promoted
through the NCAA and conference associations. Whether university
administrators engaged in willing hypocrisy or acquiescence to
the manipulation of the structurally powered athletic
constituents, the result was a dysfunction in the governance of
intercollegiate athletics.
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The dysfunction in the governance of intercollegiate
athletics in 1929 resulted from constituents' exercise of various
modes of power to fill the gaps in authority. The delegation of
authority is necessary for the efficient operation of any
university. Yet, in the case of athletic governance, unchecked
delegation resulted in commercially-motivated constituents
exerting interpersonal, tactical, and structural power by which a
modicum of control was gained.
Despite rhetoric and collective proclamations to the
contrary, the administrations of individual universities sought
the profits of commercial athletics. As legitimate authority
yielded, the unchecked structural power that controlled college
athletics emerged from outside the university; although
constituents with commercial athletic interests were formally
incorporated into the organizational hierarchy as well. Whether
constituents were internally or externally situated, their
structural power resulted from the availability of potential
resources. Resource-driven, profit-oriented, publicity-seeking
commercialized athletic interests reflected and fed the public
interests of the emerging mass society. Commercialized athletics
thus served the commercialized society that subsidized them and
subsequently empowered them.
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CHAPTER V

POWER AND AUTHORITY IN CONTEMPORARY ATHLETICS
Introduction
In modern college athletics, "the desire to win and the
financial and more intangible rewards associated with success
have, at times, led participants, administrators, supporters, and
institutions to compromise fundamental principles of honesty and
integrity."

(NCAA, 1983) In 1989, the Knight Foundation

Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics began what would be a
three year and $3 million investigation of college sports. Its
purpose was "to propose a reform agenda for college sports,"
which would ultimately restore "the public's trust in the
integrity of college sports." (Knight Commission, 1993, pp. I,
VII) Intercollegiate athletics "never has been devoid of
scandals;" however "media attention has heightened awareness of
abuses."

(NCAA, 1983) Introducing the American Council on

Education study of 1986, ACE President Robert Atwell commented on
college sports' growing need for attention:
Intercollegiate athletics is one of the most volatile areas
in higher education. The reputations of many institutions
and their leaders have been sullied by scandals growing out
of the extreme pressure that surrounds big time college
athletics. Yet despite the importance of the subject, there
has been very little scholarship in this area.
a l ., 1986, p. v)

(Gilley et

135

Founded by the NCAA with the conviction that the "abuses needed
to be dealt with forcefully," the Select Committee on Athletic
Problems and Concerns in Higher Education noted: "Despite all of
the problems that have been associated with college athletics
programs, their contributions to the overall well-being of higher
education have outweighed their negative aspects."

(NCAA, 1983)

But the Knight Commission (1993) emphasized that athletic
problems highlighted in the Savage Report of 1929 had only gotten
worse.
"Governance is a prime issue confronting all segments of
intercollegiate athletics." (NCAA, 1983) Each of the afore
mentioned national reports called for legitimate campus
authorities to control college athletics, which "must be grounded
in the academic traditions that created and nurtured" them.
(Knight Commission, 1993, p. VI) While college sports have "a
legitimate and proper role to play in college and university
life," the myriad abuses reflect systemic problems in governance.
(Knight Commission, 1993, p. I)
Authority
Institutions of higher education, like other organizations,
devise structures through which the enterprise is governed.
Within these structures, roles are specified and ascribed various
degrees of authority. Constituents in prescribed roles in
intercollegiate athletic governance are thereby enabled or
restricted by their degree of authority in the decision-making
and implementation process. The authority of a prescribed role is
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dependent upon the place that the role occupies in the chain of
command or organizational framework.

(Westmeyer, 1990)

The constituents in a normative collegiate governance system
that exercise various degrees of authority based on their
prescribed roles and responsibilities in the governance of
intercollegiate athletics include the governing board, the
president, the athletic director, the coach, the conferences, and
the NCAA. These prescribed authority roles and responsibilities
in the governance of intercollegiate athletics are generally more
clearly delineated today than they were in 1929; therefore, there
is more concern with roles currently.

(Chait et al., 1993;

Westmeyer, 1990)
However, constituents who undertake these roles in athletic
governance do not always fulfill or limit themselves to the ideal
authority roles and responsibilities. Relinquishing the
prescribed responsibility or authority of a governance role
stimulates the creation of a breach in authority. Constituent
actions that create the gaps in authority allow other
constituents to use power to fill in those gaps. Within the realm
of big time intercollegiate athletics, when an authority breach
occurs in any part of the governance structure, the gap is filled
quickly and eagerly by persons, without legitimate authority but
with something to gain, using power in the place of legitimate
authority.
Ideal Authority; Institutional Actors
Ideal collegiate authority is entrusted, on behalf of the
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public, by state charter to institutional governing boards. The
governing board operates as the "final institutional authority."
(Peterson et al., 1991, p. 160) Governing boards are "expected to
be the champions of the institutions they serve," charged with
protecting the institutional mission.

(Kauffman, 1980, p. 54)

Boards are often comprised of prominent citizens, alumni, and
business leaders with an "individual and collective competence of
recognized weight." (Peterson et al., 1991, p. 160) The board has
supreme responsibility for both long-term policy formation
relative to the university mission and fiscal matters.

(Kauffman,

1980, p. 53)
The governing board is responsible to be "a fundamental
defense of the vested interests of society in the educational
institution."

(Peterson et al., 1991, p. 161) Ultimately

responsible for overseeing the long-term direction of the
university, the governing board defines, refines, and protects
the institutional mission. Typical governing board
responsibilities also include the formation or approval of
university policy relating future needs to "predictable
resources," obtaining necessary resources and capital for
operation, and broadly dealing with personnel.

(Peterson et a l .,

1991, p. 160)
The governing board's authority derives from the
institutions charter or directly from the state. As the pinnacle
of the university hierarchy, the board formulates policy, leaving
the execution of policy to other constituents.

(Chait et al.,
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1993) As the board oversees the implementation of "the policies
and procedures of the institution under its jurisdiction," it
"entrusts the conduct of administration to administrative
officers."

(Peterson et al., 1991, p. 160) The governing board

should "genuinely respect the legitimate roles of others in the
governance process."

(Chait et al., 1993, p. 127) Because of its

farsighted concerns, and the fact that most board members are
"part-time, unpaid trustees" with outside interests in addition
to university policy, the governing board delegates the authority
to manage the daily affairs of the university to the president.
The president serves at the will of the governing board.
(Kauffman, 1980) The president, or chancellor, is the chief
executive officer of the university, having the formal authority
to make and execute policies necessary to fulfill the mission of
the institution. The president is supported by delegated
authority from the board above and the faculty and staff below in
the university governance hierarchy.
The president's work is to "plan, to organize, to direct,
and to represent." (Peterson et al., 1991, p. 161) It is also the
responsibility of the president to define and achieve goals, to
take administrative action, to represent the institution
publicly, and to engage in planning.

(Peterson et al., 1991, p.

161) In addition, the president is responsible for maintaining
and expanding institutional resources and for defending the
academic integrity of the institution.

(Peterson et al., 1991, p.

161; Knight Commission, 1993, p. VI) The president is accountable
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to the board for the all the major elements of a university's
life, including both academic and athletic endeavors.
While maintaining authority over and responsibility for
athletics, the president generally delegates the daily
responsibilities of athletic policy execution and operation to
the athletic director. Noting the "complexities" of college
athletics and "myriad problems" confronting college presidents,
the ACE Policy Statement (1979, p. 347, 348) addressed the need
for presidents to delegate authority:
Presidential delegation of authority for all types of
programs, including athletics, is necessary to effective
administration. Presidents who delegate authority to an
athletics director for the conduct of collegiate athletics
are, nevertheless, responsible for assuring ... integrity.
Athletic directors are often delegated authority by
university presidents to execute the policies associated with the
operation of intercollegiate athletics. Athletic directors may
formulate athletic policies necessary for the daily operation of
athletics, but these policies must serve, not contradict, broader
university policy.

(Jensen, 1983) For example, unless university

policy permits such deviation, the ideal athletic policy should
not allow the admission or class-status promotion of athletes who
have substandard academic records and do not meet general
university requirements.
The authority of athletic directors typically extends to the
execution of policy in areas of personnel, finances, and even
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academic concerns related to athletics. Athletic directors have
the responsibility for the overall operation of the athletic
program subject to the approval of the president. In turn, the
responsibility for the day-to-day training of players and the
operation of specific sport programs is delegated by the athletic
director to the coach.
Through the athletic administration, coaches are generally
delegated the specific authority needed to operate their athletic
team. They determine such procedures as practice planning, player
discipline, and player selection.

(Sabock, 1985) The

responsibility and operational authority of the coach is derived
from the athletic director in a hierarchical chain of command.
Thus, the ideal scope of coaches' authority is generally limited
to sport-specific training and the execution of related athletic
policy within the university that has a clear administrative
hierarchy.
Ideal Authority; External Actors
As the authority role and responsibilities of the NCAA has
expanded over time, extrainstitutional authority has changed. The
NCAA, a voluntary national association of more than 850
institutions, operates with a mission of ensuring a level playing
field for intercollegiate athletics. The Association pursues this
end through distributing collegiate teams into distinctive
categories based upon their level of competition, and by
developing and enforcing rules and regulations regarding athletic
procedures for each of those categories. As a collective
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organization comprised of various institutions with diverse
intercollegiate athletic programs, the NCAA's authority
originates from its member institutions by virtue of their
participation under its umbrella.
Presidents are expanding their collective authority in the
NCAA and in conferences.

(Knight Foundation, 1993) College

presidents have policy formation authority within the NCAA,
influencing the Association's legislative and executive process
through their delegates and the Presidents' Commission.
University presidents have begun to assert their collective
authority in proposing legislation in the NCAA through the
Presidents' Commission. University presidents voluntarily
participate in guiding NCAA policy primarily through the
Presidents' Commission. The presidents selected to sit on the
Commission propose legislation founded on the educational
interests of the presidents they represent. At the NCAA's annual
convention, presidents often delegate to their faculty athletic
representatives the authority to vote in the legislative process.
Presidents, however, can retain this authority if they choose to
do so.

(Knight Commission, 1993)

Thus legitimated by its membership, the NCAA's authority is
manifested in legislation that addresses all areas of athletic
operations. Presidents have asserted their collective authority
through the Presidents' Commission, and through their faculty
athletic representatives in the legislative process of the NCAA
by proposing and supporting legislation such as Proposition 48,
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which sets minimum academic eligibility standards for incoming
student-athletes.

(NCAA, 1983) While Gilley et al. (1986, p. 5)

found that the NCAA had its greatest authority relative to
eligibility and financial assistance, its role in other athletic
concerns has increased. For example, the NCAA has passed
legislation restricting the involvement of "non-institutional
personnel" in recruiting either on or off campus, and other
legislation restricting the salary and tenure of coaches.

(NCAA,

1983, pp. 19, 22) The Knight Commission (1993) recognized the
increased authority role of the NCAA in issues pertaining to
academic integrity and finances.
NCAA authority now covers policy-making in the areas of
recruiting, finances, eligibility, academics, and in other
issues. For example, the NCAA has recently mandated several costcutting measures designed to limit institutional spending, such
as further restricting the employment conditions of coaches and
reducing the number of scholarships in some sports. As a result
of the expansive legislation, the NCAA publishes a manual and
several smaller guides, detailing its comprehensive rules and
regulations.

(NCAA, 1994) The NCAA's authority extends to the

creation and enforcement of its rules, the investigation of
infractions, and the imposition of sanctions, censure,
probations, or the "death penalty"--the termination of
competition for a specific athletic team--on offending members.
For example, Southern Methodist University was forced to disband
its football team and Tulane, its basketball team, as a result of
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NCAA penalties. In the 1980s, over 50% of all NCAA Division I-A
institutions had violated rules, received sanctions, and abided
by the penalties.

(Knight Commission, 1993) Between May and

November of 1994, ten universities were sanctioned by the NCAA,
joining 23 other institutions already on probation.

(33

Institutions, 1994) The most common violations have occurred in
the recruitment of prospective athletes. The NCAA has also
extended its authority to ameliorate the problems it encounters.
For example, to combat recruitment and eligibility problems, the
NCAA has established a Clearing House to register all high school
athletes interested in obtaining an athletic scholarship.
The authority of the NCAA is not unchecked with regard to
its rules and its enforcement procedures. The Association has
begun to face challenges in legislatures and in courts from some
of its member schools, individual athletic interests, and even
the federal and state governments. For example, the Florida
legislature, like several other states, passed a due-process law
which "prohibits the association from dealing with member
institutions in Florida under its own rules." (Sidelines, 1994)
Former Congressman Tom McMillen warned the NCAA Forum

that

Congress might "begin micro-managing the affairs of the NCAA."
(NCAA, 1988, pp. 21, 22) While the NCAA's enforcement authority
is limited by the federal and state governments through
litigation, the inclusion of presidents in the NCAA's legislative
process and the bolstering of its enforcement branch with more
personnel has strengthened the NCAA's authority to enforce its
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rules on individual campuses. The NCAA's expanded authority to
enforce, along with its control over elements of intercollegiate
athletics that impact institutional revenue, have strengthened
its position as a major player in the "big-picture" of college
athletics.
Athletic conferences, which are comprised of similarly
constituted universities, function as regional versions of the
NCAA in that they enact rules and regulations that derive from
the characteristics and circumstances of their membership.
(Knight Commission, 1993) Conference authority therefore arises
from the needs of those institutions that comprise its
membership. As a result of the relatively small number and
homogeneous nature of conference members, conferences are closer
to and therefore more accountable to their membership than the
NCAA.
Conference authority manifests itself in rules that reflect
members' needs in many areas of athletic operations, including
academics, finances, and eligibility. For example, as in the Ivy
League, conferences may choose to offer no athletic-based
scholarships. Conferences might devise revenue sharing plans for
member institutions. Conferences can establish and maintain
eligibility standards, which can enhance but not conflict with
NCAA minimum standards. Conference authority, although arising
from its members, is limited externally by the NCAA, in that the
rules and regulations of the NCAA supersede those of the
conference.
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Although Gilley et al. (1986, p. 5) did not consider
conferences to be "major factors" in the control of athletics
during the mid-1980s, larger "super conferences" have begun to
emerge by result of conference realignments. The majority of the
most prominent Division I-A universities are now affiliated with
a conference in either football or basketball, or both. For
example, Notre Dame and the University of Miami, traditionally
prestigious and independent athletic programs, have joined the
Big East Conference. The Big Ten Conference has added Penn State
and may look to add another institution. The Big Eight has
expanded by adding powerful new members such as Texas A & M. The
renewed interest in conference membership, and the realignment
into new conferences, suggests that the authority of conferences
is reemerging.
As set forth in the Tenth Amendment of the federal
Constitution, all powers, or authority given the definitions used
in this study, not specifically given to the federal government
pass to the state or the people. Since education is not
specifically addressed, in the best interests of its citizens, it
is within the authority of the state government to maintain a
public higher education system. Government use of authority in
the governance of higher education, and in particular
intercollegiate athletics, arises in all three branches through
executive, legislative, and judicial actions. For example, the
governor appoints trustees to state institutions. The state
legislatures appropriate funds to state institutions and grant
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charters for the operation of private institutions. Both state
and federal courts often interpret the application of broader
policies to higher education. For example, federal courts
determined the profound impact of Title IX gender equity
legislation upon intercollegiate athletic governance at both
public and private institutions.

(Johnson & Frey, 1985)

While government authority has been exercised more regularly
than in 1929, there are many comparisons to be drawn between the
two periods. Current governing boards and presidents have
retained their paramount authority over the university and its
athletics program. However, the athletic director has
consistently increased his/her authority role over that of 1929.
Today's coach has gained legitimacy through additional authority
roles as well. The NCAA has an increased inter-institutional
authority role as a result of its economic impact and enforcement
capability. However, conference authority is currently more
restricted than in 1929, not by the members below, but by the
NCAA above. The alumni no longer hold the same legitimacy that
they had through their control of athletic boards in 1929. And
the limited authority roles of faculty and undergraduates in 1929
have persisted.
Actors Without Authority
University constituents possessing limited or no authority
in the governance of college athletics include the faculty, the
undergraduates, the alumni, and the university community.
University faculty, by virtue of their role, are concerned with

147

the academic interests of the university. Faculty react to
athletics in one of three ways. Often they are critical of
commercial intercollegiate athletics for their negative impact on
academic concerns, such as admissions exemptions for an
outstanding athlete who does not meet institutional standards, or
grade manipulation by university officials.

(Gilley et al., 1986,

p. 37) Some faculty, though, are staunch supporters of athletics
for their entertainment value, institutional image enhancement,
and revenue potential. These faculty believe that athletics can
attract more students and, with them, an increase in revenue to
be used for academic programs. Still other faculty members are
indifferent to college athletics, having neither the time or
inclination to take note of the role of athletics on campus.
Faculty play a limited role in "big-time" athletic programs.
On some campuses, limited "authority for the athletics program
[is] delegated to a faculty committee" by the university
president.

(ACE, 1979, p. 348) Through these advisory committees,

the faculty has formal input into athletic policy. This input,
though, is usually limited to academic concerns and is most often
restricted to advice given to the athletic director. Participants
on advisory committees are commonly supportive of athletics.
Undergraduates are also generally supportive of
intercollegiate athletics. They are entertained and inspired by
athletic success. Not always aware of the bigger picture of the
university mission as a group, the students often place athletic
interests ahead of academic interests. Universities, fearing
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intentional or inept misuse of authority with regard to athletics
by undergraduates, have elected to withhold authority from them.
Although students do at times have a representative on athletic
advisory committees, they have no formal authority in policy
formation or execution. Their contributions to the administration
and supervision of athletic operations are limited by the
university that houses these operations. Athletic operations
count on student activity fees, in addition to student gate
receipts, as a considerable source of revenue, averaging 8% of
total athletic revenues at Division I-A schools.

(Fulks, 1993, p.

25) Despite their generation of resources, students are not
entrusted with any significant authority in college athletics.
The alumni contribution to athletic revenues is a
substantial 15%, excluding their portion of ticket sales.

(Fulks,

1993, p. 25) Yet, like the undergraduate, their role, as a body,
in the campus governance is very limited. The alumni perceive
athletics as the window through which the world sees their Alma
Mater. Therefore, they generally want winning athletic teams.
While the alumni are products of the university, the most
supportive often do not hold the same value for the academic
mission of the institution, therefore supporting athletic
interests over academic interests.

(Knight Commissions, 1993)

This manifests itself in formal alumni fundraising efforts.
(NCAA, 1982)
Alumni, through their official associations, are a
significant source of revenue for the university as well as for
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its athletics program. While alumni do not have the legitimate
authority to dictate policy, either academic or athletic, their
spirited gifts through an official alumni association are
essential for the very survival of the institution.

{Gilley et

al., 1986) It is through this formal alumni association, or an
association specifically for athletic development, that alumni
are incorporated into the authority hierarchy of university
athletics programs. The authority of alumni associations is very
limited by the university. The association, and its membership,
are responsible for the acquisition of resources. They have the
limited authority, in the name of the university, to raise funds,
either for general accounts or earmarked for specified uses such
as athletics.
Formal governance authority is withheld from the university
community, which includes boosters, local citizens, business
leaders, and the general public. The intrinsic and extrinsic
support by these external constituents demonstrates a dual
personality though. A 1989 Harris Poll indicated that 80% of the
public felt that intercollegiate sports were out of control,
corrupted by big money, and were undermining the traditional role
of the university.

(Knight Commission, 1993, p. II) Yet,

attendance at intercollegiate athletic events has steadily
increased and televised contests have generated large viewing
audiences.

(Knight Commission, 1993, p. II) Winning athletic

programs, particularly football and basketball teams, generate
vast revenue and notoriety through the media, and serve as a
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source of pride for the university communities. However, once
again the academic mission of the university often takes a back
seat to the desire for victory among the community of university
boosters, business leaders, and "fans" in the local community,
whose interests often lie beyond intellectual pursuits.
Like the alumni, the university boosters' resources are
critical for maintenance of the present level of operation. Some
officially sanctioned booster clubs generate over $5 million per
year, while individual boosters have donated up to $1 million to
an athletic department.

{Gilley et al., 1986, pp. 38, 39)

Possessing no legitimate authority to make policy, the community
and boosters are limited in the formal governance structure to
the booster organization whose purpose is to provide resources
without controlling the "purse strings."
Breaches in Authority

As in Chapter IV, breaches in authority occur when a
constituent in the authority hierarchy does not fulfill its
responsibilities within the prescribed role, or when a
subordinate constituent is allowed by a superior to overstep the
limits of its formal authority. The end result is a breach in the
athletic governance structure. Such gaps are likely to be filled,
from within or outside of the institution, by another
constituent. Since the constituent stepping in does not have
legitimate authority, it must revert to using interpersonal,
tactical, or structural power.
The governing board can generate breaches in authority at
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the top of the organizational hierarchy. Individual board
members, some of whom possess athletic interests, guide
institutional policy. These board members can overstep their
authority roles by becoming involved in micro-managing athletic
affairs. For example, they may become involved directly in the
hiring or firing of a coach or in the efforts to raise athletic
resources. Such was the case at the University of Nevada, Las
Vegas (UNLV) with regard to the hiring and firing of basketball
coaches.

(Lederman, 1991, p. A44) In this case, a breakdown of

the institutional hierarchy from the top created gaps in the
chain of command allowing for commercial athletic interests to
permeate those gaps. When the governing board micro-manages the
daily affairs of athletics it over-extends its responsibilities,
because the role of daily management is appropriately delegated
to other authorities, such as the athletic director.
While the board can generate a breach in authority simply by
not delegating authority, it can also produce authority gaps by
over-delegating authority, and by relinquishing its
responsibility through the hierarchy, thereby abdicating its
authority in athletic governance. If the board and its members
are oblivious to university athletics, the authority that they
delegate may be misused by those to whom it was delegated, or
challenged through the use of power by constituents with
commercial athletic interests. In this instance, an authority gap
occurs in part due to a lack of oversight by the board within the
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hierarchy, thus allowing an ebb of power into the governance
process.
Presidential "control" has been a central concern on all
major reform agendas (Knight Commission, 1993; Gilley et a l .,
1986)

However, since direct institutional financial support of

athletics amounts to only 6% of the average Division I-A athletic
program's revenue, presidential authority has been challenged by
commercially motivated constituents using power.

(Fulks, 1993, p.

25) While presidents must obtain and expand the resources
necessary to preserve the university, they must, as a part of
their role, simultaneously protect the integrity of the
university mission. It is not uncommon that these purposes
conflict, as the president faces a quandary of "disparate
demands" on campus, where presidential authority is restricted by
the complexity of university governance.

(Kauffman, 1980, p. 79)

While the delegation of authority by the president is
necessitated by this complexity, vagueness in the athletic
hierarchy at some universities allows for fractured lines of
authority in the athletic governance process.

(Gilley et al.,

1986, p. 7) Delegated through regular university channels,
authority roles and responsibilities have been placed in the
hands of interested parties within the university, such as
athletic directors. Seeking the resources needed to preserve
their athletic interests, but not supplied through regular
university channels, these athletics-oriented constituents have
allowed external interests into the governance process. The
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exercise of authority by the individual president is limited
through the use of power by external constituencies with vast
resources that are necessary for the operation of big time
college athletics. In response to the challenges they face on
their own campuses, presidents have expanded their authority
externally through the NCAA.

(Knight Commission, 1993)

The NCAA has itself become a major authority holder in the
governance of intercollegiate athletics. While the NCAA receives
its authority from its member institutions, it also functions
both as an external regulator and as an economic cartel. As a
cartel, the NCAA restricts its members, who collude to restrict
the product of intercollegiate athletics.

(Lawrence, 1987) The

NCAA's regulatory authority derives in part from its control over
economic resources. The 512 pages of NCAA rules are considered
arbitrary by constituents with athletic interests and their
enforcement selective by offending institutions and even the
general public.
1993, p. 8)

(Gilley et al., 1986, p. 36; Knight Commission,

While the NCAA membership, and its presidents, make

the rules, 57 out of 106 Division I member universities broke the
rules during the 1980s alone.

(Knight Commission, 1993, p. II)

This situation reveals either the hypocrisy or the
ineffectiveness of presidents on their own campus. It also
suggests that NCAA enforcement authority is in part effective,
but that its collective policy formation authority is not
consistent with its members' practices. Thus, the NCAA has used
its authority to emerge as a separate regulatory and economic
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interest, intent on self-preservation and not necessarilyreflecting the interests of a majority of its members.

(Lawrence,

1987)
Within the hierarchy of athletic governance, the athletic
administrator has emerged as a major player. Although athletic
administrators are frequently products of athletic programs,
having served as players or coaches at the high school, college,
or professional level, the current trend is to hire
administrators who are business-oriented individuals whose chief
concerns are not academic. Charles Moore at Cornell University is
one example of an ex-business executive recently hired as the
director of athletics by a prominent university to manage their
big budget athletic enterprise.

(People in Athletics. 1995) At

many of the NCAA sanctioned institutions, authority over
admissions processes, remedial programs, academic advising, and
record maintenance had been placed in the hands of the athletic
department.

(Gilley et al., 1986, p. 33) In this sampling of

institutions with a record of NCAA violations, "administrative
independence" for the athletic department, with no clear lines of
authority, was the rule.

(Gilley et al., 1986, pp. 36, 37)

Athletic governance had either been orphaned by the university or
had run away of its own accord. In either event, athletics were
governed independently of the regular university channels of
authority in these institutions with athletic problems.

(Gilley

et a l ., 1986)
While in many institutions the athletic director is "the
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central and most powerful figure on campus in regard to all
aspects of the program," the authority of athletic administrators
is delegated from the president, either by fully informed
intention, lack of interest, or confused lines of responsibility.
(Gilley et a l ., 1986, p. 5) Like presidents, athletic
administrators face limits on their authority from external
commercial constituents who exercise power as athletic
administrators pursue external revenue sources. (Gilley et al.,
1986, p. 35) By not providing full funding for athletic programs
through regular institutional channels, gaps in authority are
generated.
The official authority of athletic administrators is often
confined to matters of policy execution. However, the authority
to execute policy can transform into the authority to form policy
in a confused governance structure with fractured hierarchical
lines. An athletic director given autonomy in controlling
athletic operations can determine policy for that athletic
department. For example, the lack of "supervision of any kind"
over the athletic department in one institution allowed complete
authority and self-determination by athletic interests.

(Gilley

et al., 1986, p. 36) On the other hand, in some universities, the
authority of athletic directors over their own department, and
the coaches within, is limited by an obscure hierarchy with
tangled lines of responsibility. In one case, the athletic
director's position was created after the university president
had already hired a coach. The channels of authority were
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confused as both the coach and the athletic director reported
directly to the president who "had little interest in the
athletic program."

(Gilley et al., 1986, p. 36)

Coaches are generally also products of the athletic system
that they now guide. Like athletic administrators, their chief
concerns are not commonly those of the academy. Most often, they
are the most publicly recognizable representative of the
university. This public recognition comes from extensive media
coverage of the coaches of winning teams. Their salaries, which
can exceed those of their university's president at some big time
programs, are often supplemented by the resources of external
athletic interests.
Higher authorities delegated more responsibilities within
the athletic program to coaches, particularly if the coach
consistently produced revenue for the athletic department. If the
athletic program operates with administrative independence within
a confused hierarchy, the lack of administrative supervision
generates breaches in authority, allowing coaches to exert power
either in the formation or execution of athletic policy.

(Gilley

et al., 1986, p. 36) At some institutions, the coach is not
responsible to the athletic administrator but directly to the
president or even the board, thus establishing a breach in
authority.

(Gilley et al., 1986, p. 36)

Authority Breaches and Institutional Mission

Indeed, various constituencies maintain assorted degrees of
authority at individual institutions; however, generalizations
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can be made based upon consistent governance patterns identified
in the reports.

(Knight Commission, 1993; Gilley et al., 1986)

The reports describe the governance of intercollegiate athletics
frequently as revolving around the loss of, and need for,
"control" of athletics by academic interests. Thus, the reports
imply disharmony between athletic and academic constituents who
desire different ends, with each seeking to preserve and
strengthen its own self-interests.
Due to the variety of roles fulfilled by the multiversity,
the university mission is often not universally annunciated.
(Kerr, 1982) Individual constituents perceive different
institutional missions; therefore, the execution of authority by
each constituent may be directed toward varying ends. Without
these various components of the mission linked together, a
muddled sense of purpose has resulted in an obscure hierarchy, a
confused chain of command, and fractured channels of
responsibility and communication among the constituents involved.
In the execution of athletic policy, constituents then fail to
fulfill their responsibilities or over-extend their authority
roles, generating authority gaps. These breaches in authority are
filled with an influx of power into the governance process.
Power

Burbules (1986) noted not only that power is necessarily
involved in every relationship, but also that power results from
underlying conflicts of interest. The varied constituent
interests associated with college athletics stimulate power

relationships due to conflicting goals and means that result in
breaches in authority. In an attempt to control intercollegiate
athletics, constituents with conflicting academic and athletic
interests determine and execute university athletic policy
through the combined exercise of authority and power. The
constituents who possess some degree of power in the process of
athletic governance include the governing board, the president,
the faculty, the athletic administrator, the coach, the
undergraduate, the alumni, the university community, the business
community, the boosters, the general public, the media, the NCAA,
the conferences, and the government.' The modes of power used by
these constituents to fill gaps in authority were identified by
Wolf (1990): interpersonal, tactical, and structural.
Interpersonal Power
Interpersonal power is the ability of an individual or group
to impose its will on another individual or group. It manifests
itself through the "sequences of interactions and transactions
among people." (Wolf, 1990, p. 586) In the governance of
intercollegiate athletics, relationships between specific
individuals, whether on or between campuses, result in
interpersonal power. Individuals serving as board members,
presidents, athletic directors, coaches, players, boosters, and
even government officials all may use interpersonal power in the
governance of intercollegiate athletics. Their utilization of
interpersonal power often resembles that of their 1929
counterparts.
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Board members with athletic interests continue to use
interpersonal power to promote athletics on their campus.
Athletic resources, tangible and intangible, are at times pursued
irrespective of their compatibility with university mission. More
than one university president has lost or resigned from his/her
job over an athletic conflict with the board wherein the
president's defense of mission contradicted a board member's
commitment to athletic interests. After a prolonged "war over
basketball," in which several university board members supported
commercial athletic interests by getting directly involved in
personnel decisions, a frustrated UNLV President, Robert Maxson,
left for California State University at Long Beach.

(Lederman,

1994, p. A44)
The athletic-minded president, athletic director, or coach
may also direct interpersonal power toward obtaining resources or
favors for athletic interests. Presidents and athletic
administrators use personal power to procure money and other
resources for personal, athletic, and university interests. For
example, Winston-Salem State University was sanctioned for the
financial violations of its chancellor.

(33. Institutions. 1994)

Their interests range from augmenting the institutional image, to
winning contests, to blatant self-promotion. Coaches entice
recruits--critical resources in college athletics--in order to
enhance winning and job security. An attempt to gain the services
of a valuable player through the use of illegitimate power by a
coach, athletic administrator, or even a university president, in

160

the process of recruitment reflects the perception that selfpreservation in intercollegiate athletics is tied directly to and
often dependent upon resource acquisition.
Boosters have offered, and players have accepted or even
expected, inducements to attend certain universities or to
perform at a specified level. These boosters use interpersonal
power to persuade these athletes. Former University of Georgia
football players Jimmy Womack and Norris Brown recalled "padded
handshakes" of $100.00 bills from boosters.

(Sanoff & Schrof,

1990, pp. 46, 47) Boosters have provided a shoebox full of money
for a top athlete, fishing trips for recruits, hotels, private
jets, champagne, jobs for family members, summer employment for
athletes, and even cash payments to prospects.

(Gilley et al.,

1986, p. 38) In return, boosters gain influence over and, at
times, profit from a winning athletic program. Texas A & M
boosters, in one specific case, made $18,000.00 in improper
payments to football players. Players at the University of Miami
were promised incentives by athletic boosters for each big play
they made, such as $500.00 for a touchdown.

(Sidelines, 1994g,

1994h)
Athletic boosters apply interpersonal power frequently
through giving money directly to the university's athletic
department. Amounts vary, but Gilley et al. (1986, p. 38) noted a
single one million dollar donation by one booster. Such donors
are coddled by athletic officials in need of resources. Boosters
also often have strong ties with board members or other
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"individuals who are powerful in the university," even to the
point of having been teammates at the university.

(Gilley et al .,

1986, p. 39) Thus, while boosters utilize a variety of resources
from cash to athletes in their exercise of interpersonal power,
they also employ loyalty and friendship as instruments of power.
The booster, coach, or athletic director with a specific
athletic agenda may gain the ear of a powerful board member and
supersede the authority of the president. Gilley et al. (1986, p.
37) described one university case in which a successful athletic
director had "important friends on the Board of Directors, and
among boosters." After several NCAA violations in the athletic
program, the university president resigned because of athletic
differences with the board, which maintained support of the
athletic director despite his repeated violations of regulations.
The athletic director's use of interpersonal power to gain job
security was successful because the board valued winning and
commercial success in their athletic program.
Business leaders promote their interests, personal and
financial, through their use of interpersonal power with athletic
department officials or individual players. For example, sports
agents supplied money and gifts worth $10,000.00 to Florida State
University football players.

(Sidelines. 1994e) Since many

professional athlete's contracts are in the seven- and eightfigure range, if the agents obtained the right to represent these
potential professional players, they could have received a large
return on their $10,000.00 investment. However, this payoff was a
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violation of NCAA rules on behalf of the players and resulted in
an NCAA probe. In another instance, a ticket broker's request for
the right to purchase 4,000 Rose Bowl tickets was approved by
Chancellor Charles Young after the broker donated $100,000.00 to
UCLA.

(Sidelines, I994f) The broker would certainly profit beyond

the $100,000.00 he donated from the sale of 4,000 Rose Bowl
tickets. The Chancellor, however, compromised the integrity of
the institution in order to obtain additional resources, in this
case $100,000.00, for the University because funding needs
outweigh their availability.
Interpersonal power is dependent upon the individual
involved. Most of the current actors are the same as their 1929
counterparts. The methods of exercising interpersonal power have
changed little as well. However, the magnitude of resources has
multiplied. As in 1929, the perceived need for resources can be a
driving force in university governance and often, the use of
interpersonal power involves both monetary and personal pressure.
However, it is the power of the person, not the position, that is
applied in individual relationships in order to achieve the
intended results. The constituents using power benefit their own
interests and obtain outcomes from which they profit. In each of
these cases, constituent use of power in athletic governance
derives from situations wherein a breach in authority has been
generated.
Tactical Power
Tactical power refers to the instruments of power used to
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"circumscribe the actions of others within determinate settings."
(Wolf, 1990, p. 586) It involves the methods and strategies
employed by virtue of the specific arena of play. Tactical power
emanates from the organization of intercollegiate athletics, its
governance structure and processes, and its constituent
interests. The application of tactical power in college athletics
by actors with athletic interests is highly systematic. The
current use of tactical power by circumventing rules and
adjudicating conflicts is more sophisticated than that of 1929.
The NCAA regularly exerts tactical power to promote its own
interests over those of its membership through the enforcement of
rules. One might assume that the application of sanctions is
within the authority of the NCAA. However, the rules presented in
the 512 page NCAA Manual are perceived by athletic interest
groups and the general public as arbitrarily applied and
selectively enforced by the NCAA. The NCAA applies tactical power
by selectively pursuing violations in certain athletic programs.
(Knight Commission, 1993, p. 8; Gilley et al., 1986, p. 36) For
example, a University of Florida football player violated NCAA
rules by writing a satirical restaurant review column for the
student newspaper. The player received no payments from the paper
and paid for his own meals; however the NCAA selected to pursue
and sanction his reviews as endorsements, which they consider an
illegal activity.

(Sidelines. 1994m) There are many other cases

of more serious rule violations the NCAA has chosen to pursue,
including "substantial inducements to recruits" at UNLV, cash
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payments to players at Auburn University, improper loans to
athletes at the University of Virginia, and the use of ineligible
athletes at San Francisco State and University of New Mexico, to
name but a few.

(33 Institutions. 1994, p. A43)

The fact that 57 out of 106 Division I-A member universities
were caught breaking NCAA rules during the 1980s alone suggests
that the NCAA's enforcement ability in imposing these rules over
member institutions is effective.

(Knight Commission, 1993, p.

II) Yet, the extensive number of violations suggest that the
NCAA's policy formation does not curb all of its members'
practices that contradict those policies. In a counter-tactic to
serve their own interests, most conferences and most major
universities operate a compliance department.

(Yaeger, 1991) When

conferences or individual institutions conduct their own
investigation or impose their own penalties prior to NCAA
sanctions, they are treated favorably by the national
association. For example, NCAA officials said that penalties
would have been different for the University of Washington if the
Pacific-10 Conference had not imposed sanctions on the university
before the NCAA became involved.

(Athletic Notes. 1994)

Nonetheless, when over 50% of NCAA Division I-A members have been
caught operating outside the rules made by their representative
organization, the NCAA functions as a self-preserving body less
responsive to its member universities than to its own ends.
(Knight Commission, 1993, p. II) The NCAA uses tactical power to
function as a cartel that controls the trade of intercollegiate
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athletics and restricts its members from profiting independent of
the cartel.

(Lawrence, 1987)

Currently, the NCAA is using tactical power in considering a
format for a Division I-A football playoff to determine a
national champion. The four highest-bidding football bowl games
would form an alliance as a part of a playoff system under NCAA
control.

(Sidelines, 1994i) While the NCAA has the authority to

determine a national champion, this tactic would assure the NCAA
a portion of the massive television revenues from such an
endeavor. Thereby, the NCAA would maintain control over its most
visible members, the top Division I-A football programs, who rely
on the bowl revenues that can exceed $7 million. In this case the
instrument of tactical power would be the playoff and the
objective of the NCAA is increased profits. University membership
in the NCAA would become less voluntary because of the NCAA's
economic power. Most universities' athletic programs receive
money from the NCAA's revenue-sharing plan. Major university
athletic programs perceive a need for the vast revenues they
receive through NCAA television contracts, such as its $1.75
billion deal with C.B.S. to televise NCAA basketball
championships.

(Blum, 1995)

As Burbules (1986) points out, power is interactive. While
membership of elite athletic programs in the NCAA seems compelled
by economic circumstances, those very institutions recognize that
they may tactically gain power through the NCAA's dependence upon
their market appeal. For example, some of the top football

universities, most of whom are also members of the College
Football Association (CFA), have proposed creating a new level of
competition within the NCAA for big time programs. This new
category would offer them more autonomy in developing legislation
and disbursing revenues; therefore, they could reduce financial
and other limits imposed by the NCAA by creating new rules.
(Sidelines, 1994k) In addition, these institutions tactically use
the courts to pursue their goals. For example, in 1981, the
College Football Association (CFA) defied the NCAA control of
television contracts. That same year, the University of Oklahoma
and the University of Georgia each filed suit against the NCAA
for "price fixing ... and monopolizing." In 1984, the Supreme
Court decided in favor of the CFA, finding the NCAA in violation
of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Thus, the reciprocal nature of
inter-active power play is clearly demonstrated by these
constituents' use of tactical power against one another.
(Burbules, 1986)
Likewise, the NCAA and other constituents tactically attempt
to establish, maintain, or extend their power through the courts
when the normal authority roles do not achieve their intended
outcomes. Individual athletes, institutional employees, state
boards, and individual institutions have challenged the NCAA, or
member institutions following its rules, in court. In one of the
most celebrated, and longest, legal battles, the NCAA was aligned
with UNLV President Robert Maxson against UNLV basketball coach
Jerry Tarkanian over the lack of due-process rights in NCAA
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investigations. The U.S. Supreme Court decided that the NCAA,
because of the voluntary nature of its membership, did not have
to follow due-process procedure in its investigations.

(Yaeger,

1991, p. 237) In other cases, a University of Montana student is
contesting NCAA drug testing requirements, and gender equity
issues are currently in litigation at NCAA institutions such as
Baylor University and Saint Bonaventure.

(Sidelines, 1992a;

1994b) In August 1994, the NCAA filed suit against the Florida
Board of Regents in an attempt to overturn a Florida due process
statute hindering its investigative processes.

(Sidelines, 19941)

In each case, the authority of the courts was used by the
constituents as a tactic to realign the power when the
constituents' interests were conflicting.
As the NCAA has joined individual institutions, university
employees, and student-athletes in using tactical power in
pursuit of their self-interests externally through the courts,
the NCAA has taken on a life of its own. The organization has
become more than the sum of its members. Tactically, it actively
attempts to protect its own legal and commercial interests
through organizational innovations. Its Governmental Affairs and
Joint Legislative Committee promotes cooperation with various
branches of government, its enforcement and compliance branches
used to police its members, and its recent hiring of a
"congressional liaison" to lobby for NCAA interests in Congress.
(Sidelines. 1995a)
The NCAA obtains much of its power from external
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economically-motivated sources, such as the multi-billion-dollar
media interests. It derives authority from its members, but its
power and resources are used to keep individual institutions at
bay. Through its revenue-sharing plan, the NCAA uses tactical
power over member institutions by enticing members to comply
through NCAA control of the distribution of vast revenues
generated from the public interest in college athletics. The
NCAA's tactical power is also held over its individual members
through the process of selective enforcement by the NCAA's
enforcement branch.
Presidents initiate much of the NCAA legislation through the
Presidents' Commission, tactically promoting their own academic
interests collectively through the NCAA. However, while
presidents support NCAA legislation publicly, in using tactical
power, they do not always actively pursue the same goals on their
own respective campuses. For example, Winston-Salem State
University was recently cited for NCAA violations that included
the "inappropriate use of university funds by the chancellor.11
(33 Institutions. 1994)
Presidents' delegates, faculty who represent their
institutions, vote on the NCAA the rules. Yet, over half of NCAA
Division I-A members were rule violators in the 1980s. While 92%
of the presidents surveyed believed that there were major
problems in college athletics, only 22% believed that problems
existed at their own institution.

(Gilley et a l . ,1986) Thus,
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presidents appear to be either hypocritical or ineffective on
their own campus.
Although seemingly inactive in policing their own campuses,
presidents use their collective voice in the NCAA as a self
preserving tactic to maintain the balance between the need for
athletic resources and the integrity of the institutional
mission. They attempt to "legislate integrity" at the public NCAA
level while their leadership at their own university does not
"commit itself to complete integrity."

(Slaughter & Lapchick,

1989, p. 161) Presidents' public postures bolster the image of
academic integrity, while their private commissions and omissions
give in to the pursuit of resources. For example, the President
of the University of San Francisco, which had previously received
the NCAA's "death penalty" for violations in basketball, Rev.
LoSchiavo stated:
How can we contribute to the building of a decent, lawabiding society in this country if educational institutions
are willing to suffer their principles to be prostituted and
involve young people in that prostitution for any purpose,
and much less for the purposes of winning some games and
developing an ill-gotten recognition and income.

(Chu, 1989,

p. 155)
The private on-campus actions of individual presidents speak as
loudly toward their interests as the collective public voice
tactically presented in the NCAA and in other public forums.
Chancellor Charles Young, who accepted a $100,000.00 donation to
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UCLA from a ticket broker seeking 4,000 Rose Bowl tickets, was
also a prominent member of the Knight Commission when it
condemned commercialism in college athletics.

(Sidelines, 1994f;

Knight Commission, 1993)
At "four institutions identified as exemplary, 11 (Gilley et
a l ., 1986, p. 5)--Michigan, Notre Dame, Penn State, and Virginia-the president "emerged as the most powerful figure" in the
governance of athletics. However, the president was "clearly
second in power" to the athletic director at most institutions.
(Gilley et al., 1986, p. 5) Athletic departments, administrators
and coaches, assumed control of policy development and execution
because of their administrative independence, which has resulted
in increased commercialization of college athletics.
The autonomy of the athletic department originates with the
application of tactical power by athletic administrators and
coaches. Gilley et al. (1986) described the coalition of power
sources that often converge with the athletic director: external
revenue sources provide most of the funds for the operation of
intercollegiate athletics, while internal university officials
give the control of those funds to the athletic director.

(Fulks,

1993, p. 25) Thus, the athletic director uses tactical power as
the connection between the external resources and the university.
The ability of athletic departments, through their administrators
and coaches, to attract resources empowers these departments and
individuals. Therefore, the tactical power of the athletic
director and coach is derived from the autonomy of the athletic
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department. For example, in hopes of an improved winning
percentage, an assistant basketball coach at UNLV became legal
guardian of a touted recruit and supplied him with a car, a
motorcycle, and cash in order to secure his services.

(Dealy,

1990) In other areas, several coaches and athletic department
officers have violated NCAA rules by modifying eligibility
reports or circumventing reporting procedures in order to retain
athletes' services or other resources they deemed necessary.

(33

Institutions. 1994)
Coaches also apply tactical power on the national level
collectively through associations such as the National
Association of Basketball Coaches (NABC). The NABC convened a
National Summit to tactically promote specific NCAA rules changes
that its members perceived to be in their interest, such as
rescinding Proposition 48 eligibility standards.

(Richardson,

1994, p. 9) Recently, the Black Coaches Association (BCA)
proposed resolutions addressing eligibility requirements for NCAA
athletes and the payment of athletes. The BCA has worked with
Department of Justice mediators to negotiate with the NCAA, whose
rules are not in line with the proposals of the BCA.

(Blum, 1994)

While these associations have no authority, they are applying
tactical power in an attempt to collectively influence the NCAA
and other legitimate authorities in the governance of
intercollegiate athletics to modify their rules in favor of the
NABC and BCA proposals.
From an external perspective, government officials use

tactical threats of direct involvement in intercollegiate
athletics in attempts to stimulate self-regulation. Recognizing
the government's lack of legitimate authority in governance
issues, Maryland Congressman Tom McMillen (1988) stated, "The
government might not have a role in these issues, you might say,
but it will have a role." He was referring, of course, to the use
of tactical power through which the government might have its
"role". Legislative tactics, he said, were designed to "prod the
system along."

(NCAA, 1988, p. 22) McMillen (1988) pointed out,

"I have to remind you only of Title IX and the Civil Rights
Restoration Act to show you that the Federal government does get
involved in these issues." Federal power, whose source is in the
funds it provides to universities, outweighs the authority of
internal university governance structures.
Additional Federal legislation presented by Paul Henry (MI),
Bill Bradley (NJ), Ed Jenkins (GA), and Winston Winter (KS)
addresses Internal Revenue Service tax-free status for athletics
and due process procedures for the NCAA. Their measures serve as
a tactic to support the legitimate authority of universities and
the NCAA. Maryland's Tom McMillen introduced an NCAA Reform Bill
that empowered the NCAA to negotiate television contracts for its
members, required it to equitably share revenues, mandated
presidential control of the NCAA, and determined due process
standards, thus supporting the legitimate authorities in the
governance of intercollegiate athletics. Finally, Illinois
Senator Carol Mosely-Braun and Representative Cardiss Collins
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sponsored the Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act, attached to the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act, which required public
disclosure of athletic departments' revenues and expenditures.
(Sidelines. 1994n) This was a tactic designed to bolster
legitimate institutional control of athletic finances.
Federal legislation has often dealt with intercollegiate
athletics as interstate commerce. The "big business" of college
athletics has been the subject of the Ways and Means Committee as
well as other federal agencies, such as the Education
Department's Office of Civil Rights, the Justice Department, and
the Department of Labor, which have directly addressed policy and
compliance issues, such as gender equity in intercollegiate
athletics.

(33 Institutions, 1994; Sidelines. 1994j ; NCAA, 1988,

p. 21) In most cases, the federal government has employed tactic
power to support the legitimate authority roles in the governance
of intercollegiate athletics, thus circumscribing the
illegitimate use of power by those not in authority.
State governments directly impact campus athletic policy and
practice through legislation. At the state level, at least six
states--California, Iowa, Michigan, Tennessee, Texas, and
Alabama--have proposed or enacted laws that provide criminal
penalties to athletes, their families, or boosters who are
convicted of involvement with illegal recruiting inducements.
v.

These laws are tactics designed to bolster the power of the NCAA
and university governance structures over external constituents.
Twelve states have previously introduced or enacted legislation
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designed to curb NCAA investigative procedures on campuses in
their state: Nebraska, Nevada, Florida, Kansas, Illinois,
California, South Carolina, Iowa, Missouri, Minnesota, New York,
and Connecticut.

(Associated Press, 1994) These laws are tactics

intended to increase the autonomy of individual institutions, or
their athletic departments, in the governance of their athletic
programs at the expense of the authority of the NCAA. Most
recently, Mississippi, on the heels of an NCAA investigation at
the University of Mississippi and on the verge of one at
Mississippi State, has proposed legislation that would require
due-process procedures such as cross-examination of witnesses and
state court appeals of NCAA rulings.

(Sidelines. 1995c)

Some state legislatures have proposed or passed laws that
limit illegitimate or self-promoting behavior among interested
parties. These range from Oklahoma's 1951 attempt at requiring
the University of Oklahoma to ignore NCAA rules regarding
televised appearances, to laws that restrict the direct use of
public funds for college athletics, to others that provide for
legal action against boosters involved in actions that result in
NCAA violations. Respectively, each of these laws is used as a
tactic aimed toward achieving an intended outcome: from limiting
or supporting the legitimate authority of the NCAA, to limiting
or supporting legitimate university authority. The Nebraska state
legislature has recently introduced a bill that would require the
University of Nebraska to pay its football players, contrary to
NCAA rules.

(Sidelines. 1995b) This new proposal is a tactic
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intended to empower Nebraska's football program at the expense of
the legitimate authority of both the University and the NCAA. The
New York legislature, supported by the governor, approved $3.6
million for a new football stadium at the State University of New
York at Stony Brook over faculty complaints tactically supporting
the athletic department's intent to move into NCAA Division I-A
competition. While direct government support outside the
university authority hierarchy amounts to 2% of college athletic
revenues, the ability to impact finances, through tax exemptions
as well as direct appropriations, is the true source of tactical
power for the government.

(Fulks, 1993)

The potential for large financial returns motivates business
interests to use tactical power as a source of revenue for
college athletics. Business leaders are empowered because they
can make equipment available to athletic departments and hefty
contracts available to coaches and universities. Coaches' shoe
contracts, which can exceed seven-figures for a public
endorsement, such as that given to Duke's basketball coach, Mike
Krzyzewski, enable manufacturers to have their product
prominently displayed by college athletes.

(Sidelines, 1994d) The

NCAA itself has bargained for an "undisclosed sum" with athleticapparel manufacturer Starter, to give the company exclusive
rights to provide shirts and caps to be worn after NCAA
championships.

(Sidelines. 1994d)

Companies employ these tactics because they receive
profitable returns on their investments. The NCAA and coaches
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each enter into these agreements in order to obtain the resources
they presume they need. Thus, these arrangements between
constituents with business interests and constituents in athletic
governance are an example of the bilateral, reciprocal use of
tactical power by both constituents in the governance of
intercollegiate athletics.
Booster groups also supply revenues needed for the operation
of athletic departments that are often under-funded through
regular institutional channels, which permits tactical power to
be employed. For example, Annapolis' Naval Academy Athletic
Association, a private organization, bought the athletic director
a condominium and paid for 100 officials and boosters to go to
the Army-Navy game in Philadelphia.

(Sidelines, 1994j) At some

institutions, these private booster groups provided as much as $5
million per year.

(Gilley et al., 1986, p. 38) Along with alumni

contributions, they account for more than 15% of athletic
revenues at Division I-A institutions.

(Fulks, 1993, p. 25) These

instruments of tactical power are employed to bolster the
autonomy of the athletic interests in the university, while at
the same time, the alumni and booster groups are pursuing their
goal of having a winning athletic program.
The media can offer notoriety to coaches and players and can
impact, and even define, the image of the institution itself.
Fame translates into money, giving the media the tactical power
of resources. Resources available from the media are offered
directly in the form of television dollars for athletic programs.
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For example, the CFA's five-year television contract is worth
$300 million to its 67 members.

(Sidelines. 1994b) The most

recent contract for the rights to televise the NCAA basketball
championship between CBS and the NCAA is worth $1.75 billion.
(Blum, 1995) As super conferences, such as the Southeastern, Big
Ten, Pacific-10, Big East, and Atlantic Coast Conferences, emerge
from conference realignments, each is seeking its own television
deal, worth up to $100 million over five years.

(Sidelines,

1994b) The University of Notre Dame has an individual agreement
with NBC television.

(Sidelines. 1994a) On the average,

television revenues directly account for 8% of the athletic
operating budget.

(Fulks, 1993, p. 25) So major athletic

conferences are using their audience draw as an instrument of
tactical power to gain monetary resources while the television
networks profit through additional advertisements.
With professional athletic contracts worth in excess of $100
million, athletes are indebted to the media for a potential
professional sports career resulting from their collegiate fame.
Yet most players, the best of whom generate as much as $1 million
in revenue for their school, remain generally powerless.

(Blum,

1994) They have yet to organize or recognize their potential in
this high stakes game.
The resource-driven nature of power in intercollegiate
athletics is evident in the use of tactical power by various
constituents. Those individuals and groups who control the vast
revenues associated with college athletics exercise power in the
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governance of intercollegiate athletics. This commercial system
derives, however, from the structural power surrounding
intercollegiate athletics.
Structural Power
Structural power shapes the social field of action. In its
broadest sense, it encompasses the societal influences
surrounding intercollegiate athletics. It "organizes and
orchestrates" the playing field and specifies the form and
direction of power play.

(Wolf, 1990, p. 586) It creates and

maintains the reality of the environment in which college
athletics exist. We necessarily address academic interests in the
university environment; however, we must be aware that
universities reside in a commercial society that values systemic
capitalistic exploits. Thus, intercollegiate athletics have
become commercial ventures, reflecting society's interests and
bolstered by the inherent structural power of competition and
commercialism. Broadly interpreted, structural power in
intercollegiate athletics emanates from its connection to
commercial societal values.
College sports' wide-spread popularity with the general
public has resulted in mega-dollar television and business
interests. In 1989, a Harris pole found that 78% of the general
public felt that "big time" college athletics were "out of
control", but by 1993, only 52% agreed with the same conclusion.
(Knight Commission, 1993, p. 3) While a majority of the
population still perceived a problem, the reduced dissatisfaction

179

among the general public reflects the expanded power of
commercial values. Public interest in college sports remains
high. Sold out 100,000 seat stadiums, with ticket sales
accounting for 33% of athletic revenues, and $1.75 billion
television deals reflect the high entertainment value of college
athletics.

(Blum, 1995) As commercial motives dominate college

athletics, universities are seeking to maintain a share in the
control of their athletic enterprises.
The composition of the Knight Commission, and those with
whom they counselled, reveals the variety of interests connected
to college athletics, thereby reflecting the structural power
surrounding college athletics. The Commission was composed of
eight university presidents, the chief executive officers of the
NCAA and the U.S. Olympic Committee, three corporate CEOs, one
alumni association representative, one trustee, a former member
of Congress, and a former television network chair. In response
to the varied interests in college athletics, the Commission also
met with 12 conference commissioners, 13 faculty athletic
representatives, 16 athletic directors, 11 basketball coaches,
seven football coaches, six student-athletes, several authors who
write about college athletics, several legal experts, print and
television media personnel, NCAA personnel, a professional sports
league representative, education association representatives, a
high school representative, and a business association
representative. While academic interests rest primarily with the
presidents, the structural power of commercial interests resides

180

in the NCAA, government, alumni, media, and business interests
now included in the Commission, as well as in resource-driven
university athletic officials.
The co-chair of the Knight Commission, William C. Friday,
President Emeritus of the University of North Carolina, noted the
continued "capitulation to the pressures of money" by college
athletics and the presidents, whom the Commission recommended
take control of those pressures.

(Blum, 1994) However, the

pressure of money and resources is so great because their power
is structural in nature. Tulane 's Faculty Athletics
Representative Gary Roberts summed it up: "The implications of
the money, the compromises that might have to be made, are
considered simply the cost of doing business."

(Blum, 1995)

Money, and the image it helps create, is a driving force in
society. Resources are not easily controlled by those who do not
possess them, or those who rashly pursue them.
Breakdown of Governance

While loss of institutional control over athletics may be a
function of the structural power of resources, it is also, in
part, a result of administrative laxity.

(Gilley et al., 1986, p.

37) Academic and athletic interests can conflict. The mission of
the university is often referenced by academic interests, but
rarely clearly defined. Various constituents perceive different
institutional missions; therefore, the possession and application
of power by constituents is often directed toward varying ends.
This muddled sense of purpose has resulted in an obscure
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hierarchy, a confused chain of command, and fractured channels of
responsibility and communication among the constituents involved.
The Knight Commission (1993) found that college athletic
policies often are not explicit; thus, leading to inconsistent
application of authority and power in the execution of policies.
The ambiguous governance structure opens the door for athletic
interests to exert power in the execution of policy.

(Gilley et

al., 1986) At times, the power of athletic interests, located
both within and outside of the governance structure, extends in
actual practice beyond policy execution to the point of policy
determination. Interested parties, from athletic directors to
boosters, maintain control of athletics on individual campuses
because they have either the resources or a mutually beneficial
relationship with the sources of revenue. Athletic department
members have been empowered by the university to control the
product that makes the profits, college athletics, and thereby
have obtained the power of resource control. Regular
institutional authorities have at times abdicated their local
control, and at other times have relinquished it to constituents
exercising illegitimate power.
Educational aims are prominent in rhetorical, and sometimes
substantive, reforms at the national level led by presidents
through the NCAA's Presidents' Commission. However, the NCAA, now
a self-serving entity, is driven by its own need to gain
structural power within commercialized athletics. The structural
power of resource-driven commerce combines with the interpersonal
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and tactical power of constituents possessing resources to
dictate the nature of intercollegiate athletics.
Actors with academic interests residing in legitimate
authority roles and fulfilling prescribed responsibilities
acquiesce to illegitimate power groups outside of the legitimate
authority hierarchy because the former do not have the power or
will to override the latter. Therefore, the presidents espouse
their interests collectively through the NCAA, while knowing, or
ignoring, the fact that they have increasingly abdicated or have
never had the power to control the athletic machines on their own
campuses.

{Knight Commission, 1993; Savage et a l ., 1929)

Collective statements of policy through the NCAA reveal the
public face of universities that, when compared to the individual
implementation of policy, often contradicts the private actions
of the university. The predisposition of colleges to collectively
empower commercially-motivated constituents by saying one thing
regarding public national athletic policy formation and doing
another in individual policy execution is common.
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CHAPTER VI
A MODEL OF BALANCE IN ATHLETIC GOVERNANCE
Introduction

Intercollegiate athletics are a component of America's
system of higher education that demand the same attention from
researchers that they have attained from the general public.
Analyzing the application of power and authority at two points in
the development of intercollegiate athletics, 1929 and the
present, reveals continued systemic dysfunctions in their
governance. Conflicting interests among constituents in athletics
require decisions to be made by those constituents that have in
some circumstances resulted in breaches in authority. The gaps
have, in turn, often been filled by power exercised
illegitimately by other constituents in the governance process.
Who are the constituents involved in the governance of
intercollegiate athletics? The legitimately empowered
constituents who have specified roles and responsibilities as
well as internal limits on their power within the governance
structure include the board, the president, the athletic
director, the coach, the conferences, and the NCAA. Other
constituents obtain their power through illegitimate channels,
often commercial sources or resources; these constituents
function within the process, but outside the legitimate authority
structure, of athletic governance. These constituents include
boosters, community business leaders, and the media.

184

This analysis of the use of power and authority in the
governance process, exercised by constituents both within and
outside of the governance structure, has revealed a systemic
dysfunction in the governance of intercollegiate athletics that
is often commercially driven and has remained consistent over
time.
When the governance system is functioning properly,
constituents use legitimate power through hierarchical authority.
The board, for example, supervises the president, the president
guides the athletic director, and the athletic director directs
the activities of the coach. However, breaches in authority can
occur, wherein constituents either abdicate or are robbed of
their legitimate power through regular channels of authority,
thereby creating gaps that are filled by the use of illegitimate
power. For example, institutional administrators can empower
constituents outside the governance structure if the resources
needed to operate their programs are not provided through regular
university channels and not controlled through that structure. If
individual constituents can obtain needed resources through
outside sources, such as contributions from boosters or
businesses, these constituents are in a position to wield
illegitimately-obtained power in the governance process that
operates outside the organizational hierarchy of intercollegiate
athletics.
The three types of power that Wolf (1990) has identified
have been utilized within the legitimate hierarchical lines in
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the governance structure by authorized constituents. They have
also been used by unauthorized constituents through illegitimate
channels to fill authority gaps in the governance structure left
when legitimately authorized constituents do not fulfill or
exceed their prescribed roles and responsibilities.
The continued use of legitimate and illegitimate power,
through or in spite of lines of authority, reveals an historical
systemic dysfunction in intercollegiate athletic governance. Why
has this dysfunction occurred? Constituents, whether applying
legitimate power through prescribed lines of authority or
illegitimate power to fill in breaches in authority, are
utilizing power for their own self-interests. For example,
university presidents might legitimately use power to support
their authority in executing policies that are presumably driven
by academic interests, such as protecting the university mission.
On the other hand, coaches might illegitimately use power to
contravene the hierarchical lines of authority by promoting
athletic interests that are commercially-driven and profitoriented. Since academic and athletic interests often appear to
conflict, each of the constituents seek to preserve his/her own
self-interests. In describing the component parts of the Model of
Balance in Athletic Governance, self-interest--ultimately selfpreservation- -becomes the foundation upon which governance
decisions are made.
Self-Preservation

Self-preservation is the drive by individuals or groups in
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athletic governance to preserve their current status. It is the
objective of organisms and organizations alike, the need of
individuals and institutions. Maslow (1970) has theorized that
humans build to a peek of autonomous self-actualization, but his
Hierarchy of Needs is founded on the basic needs of security and
safety. These basic needs are deficiency needs, meaning that, if
they are not met, the person will seek to make up for the
deficiency, and this takes precedence over all other needs.
(Maslow, 1970)
Owens (1981) applied Maslow's theories to educational
organizations and the individuals in those organizations. Owens
(1981, p. 114) noted that "a need that has been satisfied is not
a motivator" and only "unmet needs motivate people." Herzberg
(1966) described factors similar to Maslow's general deficiency
needs in organizational settings as "hygiene" or "maintenance"
factors, upon which "motivation" factors could be built. If
maintenance factors are sufficiently present, they can facilitate
motivation. Like deficiency needs, these maintenance factors have
a preventive function, however, and if they are not adequately
met, they can block motivation. For example, job security as a
deficiency need might be obtained in athletics by winning games.
If a coach needs job security as a part of his/her selfpreservation, he/she might feel pressure to win games in order to
ensure his/her survival, whether the pressure is real or selfinduced perception. The coach might pursue that end as a
deficiency need, first and foremost above others. Any resources
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available to the coach would be directed toward selfpreservation, any perceived need for resources that were deemed
necessary to win--in order to maintain job security--would be
sought above all else.
Maslow, in his Hierarchy of Needs, suggests that the basic
needs of safety and security are deficiency needs that serve as
the preeminent motivation for human behavior. Referring to
athletics, University of Virginia Athletic Director James
Copeland suggested that "...programs go through stages and growth
just like human beings do." (Teel, 1995) Various constituents in
college athletics perceive diverse needs to secure their own
self-preservation. These needs include, but are not limited to
job security, academic integrity, positive image, and resources,
such as money or athletes.
As breaches in legitimate authority result from the pursuit
of these needs, some constituents illegitimately use power to
meet needs that have not been met through the authority
hierarchy. Thus, constituents in the college athletic governance
process are driven by self-preserving interests. Toward that end,
certain constituents in athletic governance need and attempt to
obtain the resources that will ensure their self-preservation
when the mission they perceive is to win-at-all-costs.
Perceived Resource Needs

Resources are the various objects, actions, or concepts that
are assigned value by the constituents involved in
intercollegiate athletic governance. Resources sought by
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universities include space, time, books, equipment, reputation,
and money (Westmeyer, 1990, p. 107) Constituents perceive these
valued resources as necessary for success in achieving their
primary objective, self-preservation, within the system of
intercollegiate athletics. More resources and better quality
resources are continually sought by constituents as a source of
self-preservation.

(Westmeyer, 1990) Constituents' perception of

resource needs is influenced by the mission of the institution,
the type of resource sought, the accessibility of the resource,
and the perceived impact of the resource on the constituent's own
self-preservation within the organization.
Resources relative to intercollegiate athletic governance
come in many forms, both tangible and intangible. Intangible
resources may include a positive reputation,
visibility/publicity/fame, influence, and athletic contest
victories; whereas tangible resources might include prospective
athletes, and, very often, money or other capital gains.
Different constituents typically value, and therefore seek, the
type of resources that they perceive necessary for selfpreservation .
Promising athletes are a valuable resource to coaches
because they represent the potential to field a winning team. A
winning team can ensure the coaches' self-preservation. Some
presidents value the visibility associated with winning programs,
which yields increased revenues for the institution and perhaps
larger and therefore more selective enrollment. Yet, presidents
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must also protect the mission of the institution, and therefore,
they value a positive academic reputation in order to preserve
themselves as the educational leader of their institution. In
pursuit of a positive academic reputation, presidents present
public faces in leading the NCAA reform agenda. Simultaneously,
they privately tolerate NCAA infractions on their own campus,
demonstrating their pursuit of diverse self-preserving resources.
(Gilley et al., 1986)
Boosters and business leaders typically seek to profit from
their association with college athletics and pursue money,
publicity, and influence. Their actions ensure the continued
commercialization of intercollegiate athletics and reflect the
perception by these boosters and business leaders that such
commercial endeavors are central to their self-preservation as
athletic constituents. The NCAA has been seeking financial
resources in order to expand its influence in college athletics.
The NCAA's $1.75 billion contract with CBS Television is an
example of the magnitude of the monetary gains currently
available in college athletics, wherein both parties perceive the
need to attract billions of dollars in order to survive.
While perceived needs of the various groups tend to foster
the pursuit of top athletic prospects, new stadiums, and cold
cash, each constituent pursues those resources--first and
foremost--that will best enhance his/her own self-preservation.
The greater the perceived potential a resource has to impact upon
a constituent's self-preservation and the higher the level of
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need for that resource, the greater the pursuit for that resource
will be. For example, a "blue chip" athlete, one who can turn a
program into a winner, will be a highly valued and pursued
resource for a coach who perceives a great need to win.
In the actual pursuit and acquisition of resources,
constituents must determine if the desired resources can be
feasibly obtained. Access to resources can significantly impact a
constituents' perceived level of need. In general, easily
accessible resources will result in a lower perception of need.
In contrast, inaccessible resources stimulate a heightened
perception of need. For example, if an athletic department
obtains $4 million per year, and that money covers the
department's expenses, the perception of monetary resource needs
would not be as great as that in a department not covering
similar operating expenses by obtaining only $1 million per year.
Both departments have similar actual resource needs in the form
of operating expenses. However, their perception of need varies
based upon the accessibility of resources, which impacts the
degree of need. Subsequently, the departments vary in their
perception of resource need.
The perception of need can reflect real need, like that
resulting from concrete numbers as in the previous example.
However, perceived need can also result from intangible elements
or forces, such as self-created or situational pressure to win.
(NCAA, 1983) If a coach, or president, perceives a need to obtain
or maintain a winning season, whether or not it is real, he/she
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will pursue a strategy to win which includes securing the
resources necessary to win in order to enhance his/her selfpreservation.
Ultimately, the perception of resource needs, whether real
or imagined, is impacted by the constituents' access to and the
availability of those resources, which are pursued to enhance
self-preservation. In pursuit of the perceived need to win, if
wins are realistically unobtainable, the coach or president must
find the means to enhance his/her access to the needed resource.
The perception of resource needs is directed by the pursuit
of self-preservation. A variety of resources, including athletes,
money, and visibility, are pursued by athletic constituents. The
perceived need of resources, and the degree to which the resource
is pursued, is related to the perception of its relative impact
upon self-preservation: the more the potential impact, the
greater the perceived need. The accessibility of resources
impacts the perception of resource needs as well, with less
accessible resources heightening perceived needs. Influenced by
the type and accessibility of the resource, the degree of need,
the perception of resource needs and the subsequent pursuit of
those resources impacts the integrity of constituents in the
governance of intercollegiate athletics.
Integrity

Integrity in higher education, and in particular, in the
governance of intercollegiate athletics, involves both
individuals and institutions. The integrity of institutions or
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individual constituents in intercollegiate athletics reflects a
"wholeness" based upon salubrious values.
1991)

(Bailey & Littleton,

Integrity requires an incorruptible adherence to specific

values and a dedication to mission. Institutional integrity
begins with a commitment to mission and requires the members of a
university to embrace "transcendent goals and ideals while having
to exist and be of service in a practical, imperfect world."
(Bok, 1982, p. 11) However, the mission must be clearly defined.
Kerr (1982) defined modern "multiversities" as institutions
with many components, each having a distinct yet related purpose.
Kerr's conception of the American university allows disparate
objectives to be defined by each of the many university
constituents. Mission in this diffuse institution is sometimes
neither clearly defined nor universally agreed upon.
Institutional integrity becomes ill-defined as well, when diverse
components housed under the university umbrella are directing
their interests toward distinctly different, yet still related,
goals. Academic, athletic, and external commercial constituents
alike have distinct interests that can impact the university
mission. Institutional integrity can be enhanced by clarifying
the missions of these varied university components, and
emphasizing their related goals.
Integrity, whether institutional or individual, is reflected
in actions. Specifically, constituent integrity, defined here as
commitment to the university mission, is revealed through the
constituent's use of power and authority. In the athletic
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governance process, constituents face many pressures, real or
perceived, from a variety of interests, each of which may
conflict with university interests and mission. The degree of
integrity and therefore the adherence to authority and use of
legitimate and illegitimate power by constituents reflects the
pressures they perceive and the primary interest of each
constituent, self-preservation. Constituent perceptions of the
importance of integrity in self-preservation vary. Each
individual constituent perceives his/her commitment to mission on
a scale from essential to non-essential for his/her selfpreservation. Therefore, constituent actions in power and
authority relationships, directed toward self-preservation,
reveal the role of integrity in decision-making.
Independence of purpose entails purposeful action in
congruence with mission. The independence of purpose in
constituent actions reflects the level of integrity with which
they are acting. A high level of independence in constituent
actions, without regard for consequences aside from the impact on
mission, reveals a high level of integrity. In a university with
a governing board influenced by commercial athletic interests, if
the university president exercises the authority to remove a
coach who is operating without regard for the mission of the
institution, that president's independence of purpose reflects a
high level of integrity since his/her actions are dictated by
his/her commitment to the mission.
Constituents with a high level of independence perceive the
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commitment to mission as a requisite for their self-preservation.
In contrast, constituents perceiving the commitment to mission as
irrelevant to self-preservation, whose decisions reveal little
independence in purpose and are dictated by other interests,
reflect a low level of integrity. In college athletics, these
constituents commit or allow actions contrary to the mission of
the institution. Regardless of the level of integrity or the
perception of resource need revealed by their actions,
constituents remain directed by self-preservation as they
encounter conflicting interests.
When faced with conflicting interests, constituents-attempting to preserve themselves--reveal through their actions
the balance struck between their integrity, or commitment to
mission, and their need for resources. For example, the
presidents' role in protecting the university mission must be
balanced with their role in obtaining new resources for the
university.
Balance of Perceived Resource Weeds and Integrity

The objective of the constituent is to protect his/her selfinterests: self-preservation is the ultimate goal and foundation
of decision-making. The tendency for presidents to present a
visible public face--for example, leading the call for reform
legislation in the NCAA--while conducting, or allowing, private
actions on their own campuses contrary to their rhetoric-emphasized by more than 50% of Division I-A universities caught
breaking their own NCAA rules in the 1980s--is dictated by their

pursuit of self-preservation.

(Knight Commission, 1993, p. II) As

conflicting interests require a decision to be made, each
constituent bases his/her decisions upon the foundation of selfpreservation. For example, the resignation of a university
president brought about by an overzealous board who wants to winat-all-costs suggests that integrity is more critical to that
president's own self-preservation than either winning or job
security. In contrast, a president caught breaking NCAA rules by
offering illegal inducements to athletes has his/her selfpreservation closely tied to the acquisition of resource needs.
In each case, constituent actions are directed by their perceived
needs. Dictated by the need for self-preservation, the balance
between integrity--independence of purpose in commitment to
university mission--and perceived resource needs in these cases
was asymmetrical.
An imbalance between perceived resource needs and integrity
of purpose results in the creation of breaches in authority into
which a subsequent influx of illegitimate power fills the gaps. A
dysfunction in the athletic governance process results. These
imbalances have been systemic in nature, resulting in the
application of illegitimate power in intercollegiate athletics
for some time. For example, the unethical recruiting of
prospective athletes has been a major concern from 1929 to today.
(Savage et al., 1929; Knight Commission, 1993) Constituents with
commercial athletic interests have consistently been quick to
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fill breaches in authority as they have occurred, thus,
perpetuating the systemic imbalances in athletic governance.
Balance between perceived resource needs and integrity can
be achieved in intercollegiate athletics. Systemic balance can
only be achieved, however, through the many constituencies in the
intercollegiate athletic governance process in reform efforts. A
balance between perceived resource needs and integrity of purpose
is more likely to produce use of legitimate power within the
authorized governance structure. Where integrity and perceived
resource needs are balanced, athletic governance should function
properly if the actors are fulfilling their roles. Some athletic
programs do it right. For example, Gilley et a l . (1986)
identified four university athletic programs--Michigan, Notre
Dame, Penn State, Virginia--in which athletic governance
structures function through designated channels of authority.
Systemic Dysfunction Over Time
Constituents involved in the governance of intercollegiate
athletics have remained similar over time. In both 1929 and
currently, the constituents with legitimate authority in
athletics include the governing board, the president, the
faculty, the athletic director, the coach, the conferences, and
the NCAA. Undergraduates have consistently had a limited role or
none at all. The media, alumni, boosters, and business leaders
have consistently had an interest in intercollegiate athletics as
well.
While constituents have remained similar, some of their

197

defined roles have evolved over time. For example, the alumni
have seen their legitimate role in the governance of athletics
dissipate. In 1929, alumni gained legitimate authority at some
institutions through athletic boards, while current alumni are
excluded from legitimate roles in athletic governance.
Conferences played a larger role in the governance of
intercollegiate athletics in 1929 than they do today, but the
emergence of new conferences may signal a renewal of conference
power. As conference roles have decreased, the legitimate role of
the NCAA has expanded. The burgeoning influence of the NCAA make
it the supreme inter-institutional authority in athletic policy.
The media influencing intercollegiate athletics in 1929 was
the newspaper. The power of the media at the time was clearly
presented in the Savage Report (1929), which concluded that
reforms could not succeed without media support. The significance
of the media today has not waned. In addition to continued
newspaper coverage, the current method of coverage has expanded
to include countless sports magazines and the powerful media of
television. The increased magnitude of media influence is
reflected in a $1.75 billion television deal for NCAA basketball.
(Blum, 1995) The intensifying scrutiny of college athletics has
resulted in several sports broadcasting networks.
While the magnitude and intensity of constituent roles may
have changed over time, the incongruence between the structure
and process of governance in intercollegiate athletics has
remained constant. During both time periods, authority gaps were
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generated when prescribed roles were either neglected or
exceeded. Consistent breaches in authority were filled by
constituents exercising power. For example, the faculty continues
to focus on intellectual responsibilities, leaving athletics
governance to other constituents. Presidents while tending to
academic matters, have consistently permitted athletics to be
influenced or controlled by commercially-motivated constituents.
In each time period, the needs that motivated constituents
to employ power and authority are consistent. An analysis of
constituent practices, policies, and circumstances in 1929 and
the present reveals that self-preservation has consistently been
the pre-eminent need. For example, in order to preserve their
jobs, coaches in 1929 and currently have cheated to obtain
players who could enhance the prospect of winning.

(Savage et

a l ., 1929; Gilley et a l ., 1986) The consistent imbalance between
resource needs and integrity over time has generated breaches in
authority that are filled by illegitimate power. Thus, athletic
governance has endured a systemic dysfunction for some time.
Model of Balance in Athletic Governance
Constituents in intercollegiate athletic governance make
decisions based upon their need for self-preservation. The
pursuit of perceived resource needs or integrity of purpose
results in the application of power, either legitimately through
the authority hierarchy or illegitimately filling in authority
breaches. An analysis of the application of authority and power
in intercollegiate athletic governance reveals a systemic
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dysfunction that is caused by self-preserving interests impacting
the balance between perceived resource needs and integrity of
purpose. As decisions in athletic governance are consistently
based upon a foundation of self-preservation, and impacted by the
balance between perceived resource needs and integrity of
purpose, a Model of Balance in Athletic Governance emerges to
explain the process.
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Figure 2: Model of Balance in Athletic Governance

Coaches cheating to obtain players, boosters buying
influence with huge cash payments, presidents abdicating their
authority to get winning teams, and board members ignoring
legitimate channels of authority in athletic hiring or financing
issues are all examples of an imbalance in which perceived
resource needs are high and integrity is low. When, to ensure
self-preservation, the perceived need for resources is higher
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than integrity of purpose, authority breaches occur and these
gaps are filled by the application of illegitimate power in the
governance process. Indeed, constituents in authority roles who
place perceived resource needs above integrity give up their
legitimate power, or have it taken from them by constituents
applying illegitimate power in a variety of forms. Constituents
who exceed or neglect their role in the athletic governance
structure in pursuit of self-preservation allow the development
of authority breaches and the application of power in the
governance process.
A constituent who places more emphasis on integrity than on
resource needs to ensure self-preservation, can generate
authority breaches as well, if other constituents' resource needs
are high (see figure 2). The resulting gaps are filled by the use
of illegitimate power in the governance process. These imbalances
appear to be less common, but do occur. For example, reports
suggest that the University of Virginia Athletic Director left
his post to assume the corresponding position at Southern
Methodist University because athletic interests on Virginia's
Board of Visitors superseded his authority over the football
coach.

(Teel, 1995) The board reportedly wielded power contrary

to the accepted line of authority in pursuit of maintaining a
valued resource--in this case, the services of the football
coach--thus revealing an imbalance that results in a dysfunction
in the athletic governance process. In recent years, a number of
university presidents have resigned, or been released, over
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conflicts with the university governing board, centering on
athletic control. In each case, integrity appears to be an
essential part of self-preservation, ranking higher than the
perceived need for resources. This was the case for the UNLV
President Robert Maxson, whose resources needs did not include
job security.

(Lederman, 1994)

Athletic governance functions properly when, to ensure selfpreservation, a balance between the perceived need for resources
and integrity of purpose exists (see figure 2). In this scenario,
legitimate power is applied through channels of authority in the
governance structure. Authority roles are fulfilled, subject to
neither excess or neglect. Constituents make decisions through
regular university channels and do not operate independent of the
university authority hierarchy; this balance of resource needs
and integrity leads to proper functioning of university athletic
governance.

(Knight Commission, 1993) Universities such as Penn

State and Notre Dame are cited as examples of athletic programs
that operate within the proper administrative authority of the
university, in which a balance between perceived resource needs
and integrity of purpose exist.

(Gilley, et a l ., 1986)

In institutions where constituents can balance perceived
resource needs and integrity of purpose, self-preservation is not
fully dependent upon either and enhances the balance. Power is
applied through regular channels of authority. A coach might not
perceive pressure to recruit unethically because his/her selfpreservation is not dependent upon resource needs, in this case
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athletes, which are either readily accessible and easily
obtained, or are not expected to be obtained. The coach meets the
perceived resource needs through authorized activities within the
regular administrative hierarchy, neither exceeding nor
neglecting authority roles and without having to resort to
illegitimate sources of power.
In pursuit of self-preservation, the balance of perceived
resource needs and integrity of purpose results in proper
operation of the governance process through the use of legitimate
power in the authority hierarchy of the athletic governance
structure. An imbalance between perceived resource needs and
integrity of purpose results in a dysfunction in the governance
process through the actions of constituents, some of whom fail to
fulfill their legitimate roles in the governance structure and
some of whom use illegitimate power to fill the breaches in
authority. Constituents, motivated by self-preservation, reveal
through their power and authority relationships, the relative
importance of balanced resource needs and integrity.
The Model of Balance in Athletic Governance shows the
relationship between perceived resource needs and integrity of
purpose, and the impact that their relative balance has on the
creation of authority breaches and the subsequent application of
illegitimate power. This conclusion provides insights into the
governance of intercollegiate athletics that suggest alternatives
for change. If systemic change is to occur, individual
institutions, and the constituents within those institutions,
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must balance perceived resource needs and integrity as they make
decisions in the athletic governance process.
Recommenrlations for Reform

Recommendations for reform in the governance of
intercollegiate athletics are based upon the systemic
dysfunctions revealed by the analysis of the use of power and
authority and the resulting Model of Balance in Athletic
Governance. Based on the underlying causes of systemic
dysfunctions in the governance of intercollegiate athletics,
potential avenues for affecting change should determine the
participants and methods for reform (see figure 3).

1929
self -pres erva tion
needs prompt
authority breaches
filled by power;
reveal governance
dysfunctions

+

Present
self-preservation
needs prompt
authority breaches
filled by power;
reveal governance
dysfunctions

Reform
systemic
dysfunctions
in
governance
reveal avenues
for reform

need for self-preservation motivates
constituent use of power and authority, reveals
_______ systemic dysfunctions in governance_____

►

reform

Figure 3: Cause-Based Reform

The use of legitimate power in support of clearly
established lines of authority will limit authority breaches and
the resulting influx of illegitimate power. There are two levels
at which the following reforms must ensue: at individual
institutions, and inter-institutionally. Specifically, the
ensuing recommendations for reform are:
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1. Each institution must clearly define its athletic
mission.
2. Presidents must take responsibility for the policies and
practices related to the athletic mission.
3. The authority within the NCAA must be decentralized to
the conference and institutional level so that individual
institutions can connect their practices to their self-proclaimed
athletic mission.
4. Conference membership must be required of big time
athletic programs within the NCAA, thereby placing more authority
with the conferences.
5. Full public disclosure of the athletic mission and all
practices related to athletics must be required by the NCAA and
provided by each institution.
Each institution must individually commit to establish clear
lines of authority in the governance of athletics on its own
campus. Toward this end, institutions must first clearly define
their own mission, and their companion goals for athletics. The
roles of each constituent and the channels of authority must be
specified within the institution. Institutions and constituents,
from the board down, must use whatever legitimate power necessary
to support the authority structure in maintaining the congruence
between the goals and behaviors of each constituent and the
university. If commercial athletics are valuable to an
institution, that value should be acknowledged, not ignored. For
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example, universities should openly disclose their athletic
intentions and practices, even if they are commercially driven.
Aligning perceived resource needs with a clearly defined
mission and goals will support the integrity of purpose of
constituents and balance in athletic governance. Substantive
reforms are essential for the intercollegiate athletic governance
system to foster balance between resource needs and integrity. In
order to promote balance, institutions could increase resource
accessibility. Specifically, if monetary resources are
predominant needs for athletic constituents, universities could
meet those needs by fully funding athletic programs through duly
authorized channels. In that way, institutions should lock out
the illegitimate use of power by preventing breaches of
authority. If an intangible resource need for coaches is
security, institutions could increase coaches' resource
accessibility by de-emphasizing winning and increasing job
security for coaches, if these are objectives congruent with the
mission of the institution and its constituents.
Individual institutions through their governing boards and
presidents must accept responsibility for the operation of their
own athletic program. Each constituent and individual should be
supported by higher authorities in his/her use of legitimate
authority and power in the athletic governance process. Boards
and presidents must support athletic directors and coaches who
fulfill their roles and responsibilities prescribed by the
university in accordance with the university mission. In turn,
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board members, presidents, athletic directors, and coaches alike
should neither exceed nor neglect their prescribed roles in the
hierarchy. University constituents must require adherence to the
authority hierarchy in athletic governance. As constituents
accept the responsibility of their roles in athletic governance
through regular university channels, universities will check the
influx of illegitimate power, backed by commercial interests.
Contrary to many reform alternatives, these recommendations
are in no way an unqualified indictment of commercial athletics.
Given the magnitude of the illegitimate power constituents are
willing to use to fill any emerging gaps in authority, attempts
to eliminate commercial interests in athletics are not only
unfeasible but also unwise, unnecessary, and unwanted at the
highest levels of competition. The elimination of commercial
interests would create an imbalance that would ultimately result
in an authority breach that would be filled by illegitimate
power. If power is used legitimately through the authority
hierarchy, then universities will control their commercial
athletic activities. Big time commercial athletics can be
compatible with the mission of a major university, if that
university chooses to fully incorporate its athletic program as a
legitimate component of the university, and if the university's
mission includes articulated commercial athletic goals. Full
public disclosure of the athletic mission, policies, and
practices must become standard procedure. Requiring full
disclosure of individual university athletic purposes, policies,
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and practices would enhance the clarity of the role of athletics
within the mission of the university. Institutions are more
likely to match their practices with their respective missions if
both elements are made public and addressed through regular selfstudy and reporting. Universities can profit from athletics-regardless of the level of commercialization--if each university
controls athletic governance through regular authority channels
by clearly defining athletic purposes, appropriately funding
athletic operations, and specifically defining the authority
parameters of each constituent.
University leaders can no longer be a spectator, viewing
athletics with pride when teams are winning or attracting
positive attention, or with shame when teams are losing or left
to run out of control. Only when individuals in universities
equalize their pursuit of resources with a commitment to
integrity at each level of the governance process will a balance
be created that will ease the systemic dysfunctioning of college
athletics on their own campus. Inter-institutional athletics will
be impacted by reform at the campus level, but intercollegiate
athletic reform must also occur through the NCAA and at the
conference level.
The NCAA is central to athletic reform. However, the
Association and its member institutions must recognize the NCAA's
self-preserving interests as the same motivation driving other
constituents. As with its individual members, the NCAA should
clearly define its mission and openly pursue that mission through
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a legitimate hierarchy of authority. If the NCAA, as a result of
increased resource needs, has become increasingly commercialized,
as reflected in its $1.75 billion television contract, it must
come to grips with its own commercial interests, recognize those
of its member institutions, and incorporate those interests into
its mission. If the NCAA is to be anything more than a selfserving commercial organization, its member institutions must
control its commercial endeavors through restructuring its
authority hierarchy to more accurately reflect the interests of
its membership.
After specifically defining its commercial interests, the
NCAA should decentralize its authority by returning more
authority roles and responsibilities to individual institutions
in order to increase its effectiveness. While requiring public
disclosure of athletic mission and practices through the NCAA,
more authority reserved for individual universities would result
in more effective compliance and enforcement of NCAA rules and
regulations because each university would truly be responsible
for its own athletic program. The nature of NCAA rules and
regulations must necessarily change to better serve the interests
of the membership. Since universities are diverse institutions,
the NCAA's attempt to standardize them by delineating 512 pages
of detailed rules has been ineffective. NCAA rules should reflect
the least common denominator among its members institutions.
Detailed NCAA rules should be replaced by broader, more easily
enforced rules. For example, an NCAA rule requiring each member
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institution to disclose all athletic purposes, policies, and
practices would place the responsibility for clarifying each
athletic program's relation to overall mission upon the
university itself. This type of broad-based rule would increase
the role and accountability of local campus authority. An
increase in local campus authority, and collective authority
through conferences, must parallel the decentralization in order
to build upon the basic NCAA rules.
Conferences can play a significant role in intercollegiate
athletics, as they have in the past, by balancing conference
membership to promote competitive parity. Like their similarlyconstituted individual members, conferences must clarify their
mission. Conferences, like other constituents, must pursue their
objectives--regardless of the level of commercialization--within
their established channels of authority. A conference, reflecting
its member institutions and operating through a legitimate
authority hierarchy, might legitimately pursue an agreed upon,
commercially-oriented course of action in the governance of
conference athletics. Conference realignments appear to be a step
toward increasing parity among similar institutions and toward
reestablishing conference authority in athletics. If the emerging
super-conferences continue to function as legitimately authorized
constituents in the governance of intercollegiate athletics, they
will become critical in intercollegiate athletic control and
reform.
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Recommendations for Further Study

This study deals specifically with the uses of power and
authority in the governance of intercollegiate athletics. The
Model of Balance in Athletic Governance, developed to explain the
actions of constituents in the governance of athletics, lends
itself to application in other areas, both inside and outside of
higher education. For example, the model might be employed to
examine other institutional components or other constituents in
universities. The model could also be applied in political
arenas, businesses, or other organizational studies. It might
also be adapted to a study of personal decision-making
strategies.
The analysis of the application of power and authority in
college athletics ultimately led to the Model of Balance in
Athletic Governance. A similar analysis of power and authority
relationships in other arenas, either inside or outside of higher
education, would seem to be a natural next step. For example, an
analysis of the application of power and authority in athletics
in high schools, or Division II and Division III institutions
might follow. Additional studies might analyze other areas of
concern within higher education. The analysis of power and
authority could be adapted to non-educational organizations, such
as business or political organizations. Since this study is based
on national data, a follow up could utilize similar techniques to
look at individual institutions. Thus, individual universities
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could begin to make necessary changes based on their specific
circumstances.
An analysis of the application of power and authority,
leading to use of the Model of Balance in Athletic Governance,
could readily be applied to individual case studies of athletic
directors, presidents, board members, coaches, or other
constituents. In order to determine cause-based solutions to
specific problems, a similar analysis of the use of power and
authority, leading to the application of the Model in an
institutional case study of an athletic department or other
university program might be useful. The Model might also be
adapted to a case study of an organization outside of academe.
In conclusion, this study determined how some constituents
legitimately use authority within the organizational structure,
and how others illegitimately use power to fill gaps in
authority. These breaches are generated by the pursuit of selfpreservation by constituents who are balancing resource needs and
integrity. The result of the use of illegitimate power by
constituents to fill in breaches in authority is a systemic
dysfunction in the governance of intercollegiate athletics that
has existed over time. This dysfunction has been allowed to go on
for over sixty years and the gaps

have widened consistently in

that time. Individual universities must align athletic purposes,
policies, and practices with their mission. Thus, in looking to
the future, duly authorized administrators of individual
institutions must assume more responsibility in the governance of
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athletics on their own campus as well as through their conference
and the NCAA.
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ABSTRACT

The intent of this study was to explore constituent
utilization of power and authority over time that led to systemic
dysfunctions in the governance of intercollegiate athletics, and
to examine the needs motivating the interested constituents, thus
suggesting alternatives for reform, a comparison of the policies,
practices, and circumstances of constituents in 1929 and the
present was based upon an analysis of the Carnegie Foundation for
the Advancement of Teaching Report (1929) ; the American Council
on Education Report (1986); and the Knight Commission Report
(1993), and other books, articles, and reports.
The constituents involved in the governance of
intercollegiate athletics were consistent over time and included
the governing board, the president, the faculty, the athletic
director, the coach, conferences, the NCAA, boosters, business
leaders, and the media. These constituents' use of power and
authority was examined based upon Burbules' (1986) description of
the legitimacy of authority and the reciprocal nature of power
and upon Wolf's (1990) modes of power: interpersonal, tactical,
and structural.
In both time periods, systemic dysfunction in the governance
of intercollegiate athletics resulted from constituents who
either neglected or exceeded their prescribed authority roles,
thus generating breaches in authority. Other constituents
subsequently exercised illegitimate power to fill these gaps in
authority. Since constituent exercise of power and authority is
based upon the inherent conflict of interest in power relations,
an examination of the needs motivating constituents to use power
and authority was essential. The examination of needs was based
upon Maslow's (1970) deficiency needs that were the foundation of
his Hierarchy of Needs. The basic constituent need that motivated
constituents to exercise power and authority in both 1929 and the
present was founded on self-preservation.
The Model of Balance in Athletic Governance explained the
relationship between constituent resource needs and their
integrity and was based on self-preservation, when an imbalance
occurred, the Model explained why constituents exceeded or
neglected their prescribed authority roles and why other
constituents used power to fill the gaps in authority.
Reformers must ultimately understand the needs and roles of
constituents and their use of power and authority over time in
the governance of intercollegiate athletics in order to devise
feasible reform alternatives. Only through understanding the
participants and process of athletic governance can reformers
have a genuine and lasting impact upon changes in the operation
of intercollegiate athletics. Recommendations for reform were
based upon the needs of constituents that motivate their exercise
of power and authority. Reform recommendations at both the
individual university and inter-institutional level included: 1.
clarify the athletic mission; 2. presidential control; 3.
decentralize the NCAA and increase conference influence; and 4.
require full public disclosure of policies and practices.

